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1
Improved efficiency, less centralization, and adequate accessibility, those were the 
primary goals of the Dutch healthcare reform of 2006 (1). These were to be reached 
through the introduction of competition (i.e. market-mechanisms) by the Health Insurance 
Act (‘Zorverzekeringswet’) in 2006 (2-6). Competition was introduced in the country’s 
healthcare sector as a means to optimize the welfare of its citizens (2, 3, 5, 7). The call for 
using competition to make the Dutch healthcare sector more efficient can be traced back 
to the 1980’s (2, 4, 5). However, the notion of competition in health care has generated 
controversy, discontent, and a fierce public debate ever since the 2006 reform (5). 
Protagonists argue that competition stimulates efficient resource allocation and argue that 
all its preconditions should be met in order to be truly effective (2, 8). Antagonists argue 
that competition compromises core values of health care such as solidarity and accessibility 
and that the logic of competition, which revolves around individual choice, does not apply 
well to health care (2, 9). To date, the debate is still widely disputed in the Netherlands and 
reverting back to a non-competitive, public healthcare system emerged as one of the most 
debated topics during the campaigns for the national elections of 2017. 
The polarizing public debate regarding competition in health care has left academics 
pondering over the question whether the introduction of competition has indeed made the 
Dutch healthcare sector more efficient. In the decade after the introduction of competition, 
the expenditure on health care in the Netherlands has increased by 24 billion Euro’s, or 
1.5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (10, 11). In the decade prior to the introduction 
of competition, health expenditure increased by 30 billion Euro’s, or 2% of the GDP (10, 
11). Some research has furthermore shown that the introduction of competition has 
lowered costs, particularly for outpatient treatments, and has improved patient experiences 
in hospitals (12, 13). However, before and after the introduction of competition, the 
percentage of health spending on hospital care has consistently been roughly 25% of the 
total health expenditure (10). Other studies find mixed effects or no effects on price and 
quality indicators, (14, 15). While the Dutch healthcare system is currently ranked among 
the best in the world (e.g. 16), the life expectancy at birth, a frequently used indicator of a 
country’s health status, has risen equally before and after the introduction of competition 
in the Netherlands (11). Scientific evidence of the effects of competition in the Dutch 
healthcare system on its performance in terms of cost and quality of care is thus mixed. 
There appears to be no clear relation between introducing competition in the healthcare 
sector and improved or worsened healthcare outcomes. 
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Competition in health care
Competition in health care means different things to different stakeholders (17-19) and has 
been referred to in terms ranging from simply ‘competition (in health care)’ to ‘managed 
competition’ or ‘managed care’. At its core however, competition in the healthcare sector 
implies “a purchasing strategy to obtain maximum value for money for employers and 
consumers. It uses rules for competition, derived from rational microeconomic principles, 
to reward with more subscribers and revenue those health plans that do the best job of 
improving quality, cutting costs, and satisfying patients.” (18). In this definition, value for 
money refers to the best possible health outcomes for the least amount of money (20). 
The micro-economic principles of competition to which Enthoven (18) refers carry two 
important assumptions. The first is that competition between organizations leads to an 
optimal price for specific services. That is, a price at which supply equals demand (21). The 
second is that competition forces organizations to innovate in order to create and uphold 
a competitive advantage over rival organizations (22, 23). Both of these mechanisms are 
assumed to ultimately benefit consumers or, in the case of health care, patients. 
Whether competition leads to optimal value for money in the healthcare sector depends 
on the way it is structured (24, 25). Patients do not typically purchase healthcare services 
directly from the providers. Instead, competitive healthcare industries are structured as 
option-demand markets in which third-party payers (e.g. health insurers) are responsible 
for matching supply and demand for healthcare services. Competition occurs in three stages 
in such markets (represented by Figure 1.1) (e.g. 26, 27-31). In the first stage, third-party 
payers can selectively contract providers based on the price and quality of their services. 
Contracting high value for money providers enables third-party payers to offer high value 
for money insurance plans in the second stage where they compete with one another for 
enrollees (i.e. subscribers) to their insurance plans. In the third stage, enrollees who fall 
ill seek out a provider of which the services are covered by the insurance plan they have 
purchased. 
The contracting process between third-party payers and healthcare providers (i.e. the first 
stage of competition) arguably has the greatest influence on consumer welfare and has 
hence been studied in growing stream of research (31). Gaynor and colleagues (31) have 
reviewed this body of literature. They indicate that in this first stage the price of specific 
services can either be negotiable between purchasers and providers or pre-determined by a 
central authority. Freely negotiable prices between purchasers and providers result in price-
competition between providers. Pre-determined prices of specific services result in non-
price-competition between providers. In the Netherlands, roughly 8% of all specialized care 
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1
services were subject to price-competition upon introduction of the HIA in 2006 and the 
percentage has been gradually increased to 70% of all specialized care services being subject 
to price-competition since 2012 (6). In their review, Gaynor, Ho (31) note that theoretically, 
the quality of services will increase under conditions of non-price-competition whenever 
the pre-determined price exceeds the marginal costs of providers. They furthermore show 
that this prediction is generally supported by empirical research. Under conditions of price-
competition, the theoretical prediction is that price and quality will either increase or 
decrease depending on price- and quality-elasticity of demand (31). Empirically, the effect 
of competition on quality does indeed seem to vary but most empirical studies do indicate 
that price-competition decreases prices (31).
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Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of competitive healthcare industries based on Gaynor and 
Town (29)  
1.2 Cooperation in health care The model of competition in health care is based on the micro-economic principles of the so-called neoclassical theory of the firm (18, 32). This model assumes that organizations in a market act independently and that interactions between them 
Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of competitive healthcare industries based on Gaynor and Town 
(29) 
Cooperation in health care
The model of competition in health care is based on the micro-economic principles of the 
so-called neoclassical theory of the firm (18, 32). This model assumes that organizations 
in a market act independently and that interactions between them are governed by price-
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mechanisms and executed at arms-length (32, 33). Under this model, cooperation between 
organizations is often dubbed collusion, and perceived as a deliberate attempt to frustrate 
the market and create an unfair advantage by forming cartels (32). Put more simply, 
cooperation between competing organizations is considered ‘sleeping with the enemy’ 
(34). More recently however, the perception that organizations are fully atomistic actors 
which solely compete with one another to maximize their profits is increasingly perceived 
as inadequate (35). Instead, researchers have widely acknowledged that organizations 
are embedded in networks of various cooperative relations with other firms (e.g. 35, 36-
39). Cooperative relations between organizations can take many forms ranging from joint 
ventures to trade associations and the reasons for organizations to collaborate can be as 
diverse as reducing costs, sharing risks, improving efficiency, creating a new market, and 
learning (37, 40-42). In general terms however, organizations cooperate in order to achieve 
goals they cannot achieve on their own (43). 
In his seminal work, Arrow (44) has described several characteristics on which the health 
care market deviates from the competitive neoclassical model in other industries. The 
widespread prevalence of inter-organizational cooperation in the healthcare industry is 
not one of the characteristics described in Arrow’s work however. Yet, in health care, inter-
organizational cooperation has had a longstanding tradition and can arguably be considered 
more common than in other industries. Due to its specialized and fragmented nature 
health care is in fact commonly delivered by networks of multiple organizations connected 
through various forms of cooperative relations ranging from patient transfers to shared 
human resources and interlocking directorates (e.g. 43, 45, 46-51). Like in other industries, 
cooperation between healthcare organizations is driven by motives rooted in theories such 
as resource dependency theory, institutional theory, and strategic choice theory (52). 
Despite the widespread occurrence of cooperation between healthcare organizations, pro-
competitive reforms are based on a model of competition which considers cooperation 
collusive. In line with this thought, competition in health care has predominantly been 
studied using approaches which build on the neoclassical model of competition and disregard 
the strategies of- and cooperative ties between- healthcare organizations (31). Overlooking 
this intermediary (inter-)organizational level of analysis forms one of the explanations of 
the mixed evidence regarding the effect of competition in health care, in the Netherlands 
as well as internationally. Consequently, competition, its mechanisms, and especially the 
tensions between (price-)competition and cooperation are not fully understood in the 
healthcare industry. As long as this is the case, the debate on whether or not competition 
is effective as a means to make healthcare more efficient will remain a polarizing matter. A 
closer examination of the behavior of competing healthcare organizations will foster a better 
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1
understanding of how competition in the healthcare industry works in practice. On the one 
hand it can reveal which strategies are adopted by healthcare providers in competitive 
markets and whether these strategies have changed as a result of pro-competitive reforms. 
On the other hand it can reveal the influence of specific strategies on costs and quality 
of care. A closer examination of the behavior and strategies of competing healthcare 
organizations will thus shed more light on the question whether competition is indeed a 
useful tool to improve the efficiency of the healthcare sector. 
Aim of the dissertation 
Most of the empirical research regarding competition in health care has disregarded the 
role of cooperation and inter-organizational relations between competing healthcare 
organizations. Some noteworthy exceptions from the Italian healthcare system have shown 
that competing healthcare organizations are more likely to collaborate (53-56). However, 
the Italian healthcare system does not rely on price-competition. A wide range of studies 
from the U.S. healthcare system, in which price-competition does exist, have studied the 
existence of cooperative inter-organizational relations between healthcare organizations. 
These have for example created various typologies of healthcare networks or studied their 
effects (e.g. 51, 57, 58). However, for the most part they have not paid specific attention 
to the influence of (the introduction of) competition on these relations and the interplay 
between competition and cooperation in the healthcare industry. 
Tentative evidence from the Netherlands suggests that the introduction of price-competition 
has limited the tendency of healthcare organizations to cooperate (59). Although it can 
thus be expected that (the introduction of) competition alters the cooperative behavior 
of healthcare providers, robust, longitudinal, and industry-wide empirical evidence of this 
mechanism is lacking. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to study cooperative inter-
organizational relations between healthcare organizations in a price-competitive healthcare 
market. More specifically, the dissertation aims to answer four distinct research questions: 
1. How can the interplay between pro-competitive policy reforms, inter-organizational 
relations, and health outcomes be conceptualized?
2. How are cooperative inter-organizational networks between providers in a price-
competitive healthcare market structured at different points in time, based on: a.) 
shared board members, b.) Shared medical professionals, and c.) shared patients? 
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3. Do observed network structures deviate from formalized network structures? 
4. How does (price-)competition influence the formation of cooperative inter-
organizational relations between healthcare providers? 
A variety of methods are used to investigate these research questions. These include 
theoretical, qualitative, and quantitative research approaches as well as exploratory, 
descriptive, and explanatory work. These are furthermore conducted at different levels of 
analysis including the individual, organizational, and network levels.
Outline of the dissertation 
The dissertation is structured in four main parts. Chapter 2 constitutes Part I and answers 
the first research question. It introduces a novel conceptual framework from which several 
testable propositions are derived. As such, it forms the theoretical and conceptual foundation 
of the dissertation. More specifically, Chapter 2 describes the intermediary role which 
inter-organizational relations play in pro-competitive healthcare reforms. It furthermore 
discusses shared board members, shared professionals, and shared patients as examples 
of such relations. The remaining chapters constitute the empirical operationalization of this 
theoretical foundation. 
Part II of this dissertation is comprised of Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5. These aim to 
answer the second and third research question of the dissertation and study the structure 
and evolution of cooperative inter-organizational networks of shared board members, 
shared professionals, and shared patients respectively. Chapter 3 presents a descriptive 
quantitative study in which uses social network analysis is used to investigate the structure 
of networks of interlocking directorates (i.e. shared board members) between healthcare 
providers in the Netherlands and to assess whether these networks have changed over 
time. Chapter 4 constitutes an exploratory mixed-method (i.e. quantitative and qualitative) 
study of sharing professionals (i.e. medical specialists), a novel operationalization of inter-
organizational cooperation between healthcare organizations. The phenomenon of sharing 
medical specialists is quantitatively explored through social network analysis. Furthermore, 
the motives underpinning the formation of inter-organizational relations in the form of 
shared specialists are qualitatively studied using semi-structured interviews. Chapter 5 uses 
social network analysis to quantitatively study networks of shared patients in the Dutch 
specialized care market. Additionally, it tests the differences between pre-determined 
patient transfer networks in oncology and those observed in practice in order to answer the 
third research question. 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
General introduction
17
1
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 focus on the influence of (price-)competition on the formation of 
cooperative inter-organizational relations, which is the fourth research question. Together, 
these chapters form Part III of the dissertation. Chapter 6 quantitatively investigates 
cooperation and coopetition (i.e. cooperation with competitors) through shared specialists. 
It studies the personal and organizational determinants of sharing specialists between 
specialized care providers in the Netherlands using logistic multilevel regression models. 
Chapter 7 quantitatively investigates the effect of price-competition on the evolution 
of cooperative inter-organizational networks through shared medical specialists, using 
longitudinal social network analysis. 
Lastly, Part IV of the dissertation is formed by Chapter 8 which contains the general 
discussion. It presents the theoretical and methodological reflections on the work described 
in the preceding chapters as well as its implications for policy and practice and suggestions 
for future research.
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PART I
Theoretical aspects of inter-organizational relations
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Abstract
Pro-competitive policy reforms have been introduced in several countries, attempting to 
contain increasing healthcare costs. Yet, research proves ambiguous when it comes to 
the effect of competition in healthcare, with a number of studies highlighting unintended 
and unwanted effects. We argue that current empirical work overlooks the role of inter-
organizational relations as well as the interplay between policy at macro level, inter-
organizational networks at meso level, and outcomes at micro level. To bridge this gap and 
stimulate a more detailed understanding of the effect of competition in health care, this 
article introduces a cross-level conceptual framework which emphasizes the intermediary 
role of cooperative inter-organizational relations at meso level. We discuss how patient 
transfers, specialist affiliations, and interlocking directorates constitute three forms of inter-
organizational relations in health care which can be used within this framework. The paper 
concludes by deriving several propositions from the framework which can guide future 
research. 
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Introduction
Rising healthcare expenditures (1), demographic challenges, and technological 
advancements compel nations to find appropriate ways to organise their healthcare systems 
(2). Policymakers face the challenge to control health expenditures at the macro level while 
incentivising efficiency at the micro level (3). Between the 1970s and the 1990s regulated 
systems were the most common way for Western countries to organize their healthcare 
sector (4, 5). Although they were able to control macro-level health expenditures, these 
systems were burdened by imbalanced supply and demand and a lack of efficiency stimuli 
(2, 5). Several countries consequently introduced legislation spurring competition within 
their healthcare system in an attempt to stimulate efficient healthcare delivery and resource 
allocation (2, 5-9). Yet, competition in health care is controversial topic and its potential 
adverse effects have left some policymakers hesitant to introduce pro-competitive reforms 
(6).
In health care markets competition is often referred to as ‘managed competition’ which 
is defined as a set of ‘rules for competition’ between care providers designed to obtain 
maximum value for money (10). Value is the best possible health outcomes achieved per 
dollar spent, which is what ultimately matters for patients and society (11). Competition 
can furthermore occur between third-party purchasers such as insurers who compete for 
enrolees or between healthcare providers (i.e. organizations) who compete to be (selectively) 
contracted by purchasers (12, 13). In this chapter we refer to the latter. Supporters of 
competition argue that it stimulates providers to seek a competitive advantage over each 
other, which boosts efficiency and ultimately benefits patients (12, 14, 15). However, 
antagonists argue that the characteristics of health care render competition in the sector 
ineffective (16). 
Empirical studies regarding the impact of competition on health outcomes have produced 
positive as well as negative results in price-competitive as well as non-price competitive 
systems (i.e. systems where prices are regulated or pre-determined) (17, 18). In price-
competitive systems like the United States or the Netherlands purchasers selectively contract 
services from providers based on freely negotiable treatment prices (13, 19). The theoretical 
prediction that this drives down treatment price is supported by several empirical findings 
(e.g. 20, 21, 22). But findings regarding the effect of price competition on various indicators 
of quality of care are mixed. Some studies find that it increases quality (e.g. 23, 24-26) while 
others display opposing or no significant effects (e.g. 27, 28). In non-price-competitive 
systems on the other hand, quality is the primary differentiating factor for providers, which 
can result in a so-called ‘Medical Arms Race’ (MAR) (29). The theoretical prediction that this 
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increases overall health expenditures (13, 30) is supported by several empirical findings (e.g. 
31, 32, 33), while findings concerning the effect of non-price competition on indicators of 
quality of care are also mixed (24, 34-41). 
Most of these empirical studies have been rooted in the traditional neoclassical perception of 
competition. It assumes that outcomes are a result of an industry’s structural characteristics 
which influence rivalry and organizational behaviour (42, 43). The Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm, in which market structure (e.g. concentration) is associated 
with outcomes, has hence served as the primary empirical approach. However, the approach 
is typically applied in a cross-sectional way to analyse markets in an equilibrium, whereas 
healthcare reform is an inherently dynamic and ongoing process (44, 45) that makes markets 
unstable and changing. It has furthermore been criticized for overlooking organizational 
behaviour in empirical testing (46, 47) and inter-organizational cooperation has been 
explicitly described as difficult to capture within the traditional competitive paradigm (48). 
The dynamic nature and failure to account for inter-organizational behaviour could very 
well explain the mixed findings of empirical research. As a result, our understanding of the 
effectiveness of competition in healthcare settings remains limited and a conclusive answer 
to the question whether policymakers should or should not introduce pro-competitive 
reforms to improve value for patients is lacking. 
In order to foster a more detailed understanding of competition in healthcare markets, some 
researchers have suggested that the institutional context (i.e. macro level), behavioural 
features of healthcare providers (i.e. meso level), and health outcomes (i.e. micro levels) 
should be considered simultaneously when analysing healthcare reforms (49, 50). Scant 
academic attention has however been paid to the complex interplay between the policy 
(macro), inter-organizational (meso), and outcome (micro) levels. This study aims to 
advance the understanding of the interplay between these levels. It does so by formalizing a 
conceptual framework that can support future research regarding the role and evolution of 
cooperative inter-organizational relations between healthcare organizations as intermediary 
between policy reforms and health outcomes. 
Theoretical approach
We have conducted a narrative review of academic literature regarding 1) the relation 
between macro level reforms and meso level healthcare markets, 2) the meso level 
healthcare market and health outcomes, 3) the role of cooperative inter-organizational 
relations between healthcare providers in determining health outcomes, 4) how inter-
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organizational relations form networks of healthcare providers, and 5) the types of inter-
organizational relations which exist in health care. We have synthesized the findings from 
these bodies of literature by formalizing a cross-level conceptual framework (see Figure 
2.1). The framework highlights the interplay between macro level policy reforms, meso 
level healthcare markets, and micro level outcomes. At the meso level, the role of inter-
organizational relations between healthcare organizations is emphasized. The framework 
seeks to facilitate research regarding the effect of pro-competitive policy reforms on patient 
level outcomes within the healthcare domain. In order to guide such future research, several 
testable propositions have been derived from this framework.
 
Micro Level Meso Level Macro Level 
Policy 
Market  
structure 
(Inter-) 
organisational 
behaviour 
Healthcare Market 
Costs 
Quality 
Accessibility 
Outcomes 
Figure 2.1: Cross-level conceptual framework
Results from the literature review
The need for an inter-organizational network perspective to health care
Despite the fact that the neoclassical rules of competition have been well-established, many 
scholars have also recognized the fact that cooperative inter-organizational relations between 
independent autonomous organizations are essential to an organization’s goal attainment 
(51). This notion has for example been formalized in concepts such as the relational view 
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(RV), which proposes that dyads of organizations create additional value through sharing 
knowledge and utilizing complementary resources (e.g. 52, 53), ‘coopetition’, which 
refers to the simultaneous cooperation and competition between organizations (e.g. 54, 
55), and strategic networks, defined as purposeful long-term relations between separate 
organizations to pursue a competitive advantage (e.g. 48). 
Although it was not specified as a differential factor by Arrow (16) in his influential work on 
the differences between the healthcare industry and other industries, much of the initial 
work regarding cooperative inter-organizational relations has stemmed from non-profit and 
specifically the healthcare industry (e.g. 51, 56). The non-profit nature of the industries in 
which inter-organizational relations were commonly discussed initially led strategy scholars 
to pay little attention to the concept (48). However, inter-organizational relations have long 
been established as a relevant mechanism for and determinant of efficient and effective 
healthcare delivery (57, 58). This crucial role of inter-organizational relations within the 
healthcare domain primarily stems from healthcare’s fragmented nature and (increasing) 
sub-specialization (59, 60). In fact, scholars have widely recognized that health care is a 
service which is delivered by several cooperating providers (58, 61, 62), implying that even 
for a single disease, a patient is typically treated by more than one organization. In 1984 
for example, Provan (63) wrote that ‘most hospitals form collaborative agreements with 
other healthcare organizations’. Fostering and sustaining successful inter-organizational 
collaboration between healthcare providers has subsequently been, and continues to be, a 
focal point of research within the industry (e.g. 61, 64). 
While the non-profit environment of many healthcare industries is what has arguably 
enabled cooperative inter-organizational relations to flourish, pro-competitive reforms 
have greatly altered the context of the healthcare industry in several Western countries. 
In any industry a firm’s performance cannot be fully understood without considering the 
inter-organizational relations in which it is embedded (65). We argue that overlooking 
inter-organizational relations in health care, an industry in which they are widespread, 
generates an incomplete understanding of the effects of pro-competitive reforms. In order 
to better understand whether pro-competitive reforms positively affect health outcomes, 
research should thus consider (changes in) such inter-organizational relations between 
healthcare organizations. The consideration should furthermore transcend the dyadic 
level (i.e. as a relation between organization A and organization B) because that disregards 
the embeddedness of such relations in a larger social context (66). The collection of inter-
organizational relations between a group of organizations together comprise a ‘whole’ 
network (52, 58) and should instead be considered as such. 
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The term ‘network’ is widely used and difficult to pin down. Examples in health care include 
terminology such as network organization, integrated delivery network, hub and spokes 
network, or multi-hospital network (48, 61, 62, 67-70). At the meso level, we view a network 
as a collection of dyadic cooperative inter-organizational ties. They are neither arms-length 
transactions between separated organizations nor fully integrated organizations (63, 
71). Instead, they consist of a collection of legally independent organizations (i.e. nodes) 
connected by (multiple) cooperative inter-organizational ties (72). Considering inter-
organizational relations in their network context furthermore allows for the investigation 
of their intermediary role between the macro and micro level. As Borgatti and Halgin (73) 
put it; considering the network perspective allows for the identification of processes that 
determine why networks have the structures they do (e.g. the interplay between the macro 
and meso level) and how specific network structure lead to certain outcomes (e.g. the 
interplay between the meso and micro level).
Inter-organizational ties in health care
Cooperative inter-organizational relations come in a variety of forms (57, 74). In order to 
influence outcomes they should however transcend mere formal agreements to collaborate 
and constitute actual collaborative tasks and behaviour (64, 75). In other words, they 
should involve flows of assets, information, or status from one organization to another 
(76). Although several of such ties are conceivable, we review here three which are used in 
existing literature. These are: patient transfers, professionals’ affiliations, and interlocking 
directorates. Together these describe a cross-section of a typical healthcare organization 
at the patient level, the professional’s level and the board level. They can furthermore be 
studied in a horizontal (i.e. between providers in a similar domain) as well as a vertical 
(i.e. between providers in different domains) sense. However, by no means do these ties 
constitute an exhaustive list. Future research could identify other generalizable, healthcare-
specific, inter-organizational relations able to perform the mediating role at the meso level.
Patient transfers
Patient transfers between healthcare providers have been used in pioneering papers in the 
field of inter-organizational networks within health care (e.g.57, 77-82). They represent a 
form of collaboration that is inherent to the fragmented nature of the healthcare industry 
in which multiple organizations treat a patient. Patient transfers have been described as a 
cooperative inter-organizational relation due to the fact that transferring a patient from one 
organization to another establishes a relation in which information and knowledge is passed 
from one to the other (77). As Lomi, Mascia (81) describe it: “Patient sharing requires that 
partner hospitals commit resources to joint infrastructural investments to support relational 
coordination, a reliable signal of collaboration between sending and receiving hospitals.” 
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(81). Or as Gittell and Weiss (59) put it; “To discharge patients properly requires some kind of 
relationships with downstream providers who will care for the patients post-discharge, both 
to assure that slots will be available on short notice, and to assure that once gone, patients 
will be in good hands.” (59). 
Professionals’ affiliations
The second type of cooperative inter-organizational relation we propose to accompany our 
framework is that of professionals’ affiliations. Empirical research has focused on cooperation 
between healthcare professionals such as medical specialists (83) but has predominantly 
done so within organizational boundaries. We instead propose an inter-organizational 
approach to this matter. In line with Dyer and Singh (52), Gittell and Weiss (59), and Westra, 
Angeli (84) we propose that interfirm knowledge sharing routines can consist of healthcare 
professionals who cross organizational boundaries. Such interaction between organizations, 
operationalized for example through sharing healthcare professionals, can foster inter-
organizational learning (59, 85). 
Interlocking directorates
The third form of inter-organizational cooperation within the healthcare domain we 
propose to consider at the meso level is that of interlocking directorates. Interlocking 
directorates refers to the practice of ‘sharing’ board members between organizations. It has 
been described as a strong predictor of strategic decisions by organizations which in turn 
influence an organization’s profitability and serve as a vehicle to reduce external uncertainty 
stemming from competition for example (68, 86). Interlocking directorates are perceived as 
vehicles of communication and coordination between organizations which can influence an 
organization’s financial sustainability and facilitate health outcomes such as the accessibility 
of care. 
The macro, meso, micro interplay
Pro-competitive reforms are an instrument used by policy makers to optimize the outcomes 
for patients, rather than a goal in itself (87, 88). Two distinct mechanisms underpin this effect. 
The first is that the behaviour of healthcare organizations drives the creation of value for 
patients. Rooted in the traditional neoclassical competitive logic, the assumed mechanism, 
in the case of pro-competitive healthcare reforms, is that competition maximises value for 
patients (10, 11). In other words, that competitive behaviour of healthcare organizations will 
leave patients better off than non-competition between providers. The second underlying 
mechanism is that the institutional context at the policy (i.e. macro) level influences the 
behaviour of healthcare organizations (i.e. at the meso level) (7, 89) and that organizations 
display different behaviour in response to different policy alternatives (90). With pro-
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competitive healthcare reforms the assumption is that the changes in the institutional 
context will lead healthcare providers to actually compete with one another (44). 
These mechanisms highlights that pro-competitive reforms generate positive outcomes 
for patients, or fail to do so, through the intermediary role of the behaviour of healthcare 
providers. The interplay between three distinct levels of analysis thus becomes apparent. 
The first of these is the policy (i.e. macro) level. It is the institutional context which dictates 
the rules of the game and which can be directly altered by policy reforms. The healthcare 
market is the second (i.e. the meso) level. Here healthcare providers can display specific 
behaviour, of which competing with other providers is one example. The outcome level is 
the third and final of these levels. It is the level at which value for patients is assessed based 
on dimensions such as the price, quality, and accessibility of specific services. 
Both of these mechanisms have been subject to empirical research within health care. 
However, following the SCP approach, the intermediary meso level has been operationalized 
by structural market features. We will not reiterate the mixed findings of empirical studies 
regarding the effect of competition on price and quality outcomes (i.e. the first mechanism) 
described in the introduction of this chapter, we do however point out that the second 
mechanism has also attracted academic attention. Both in and outside the US, there 
has been a trend towards consolidation of healthcare markets and integration between 
providers subsequent to pro-competitive reforms (67, 88, 91, 92). Gaynor and Haas-
Wilson (92) for example question whether the ‘unmistakable trend of consolidation’ in 
healthcare markets represents an efficient response to external uncertainty or attempts 
to gain anticompetitive advantages. While their work underlines the mechanism that pro-
competitive reforms influence the healthcare market, it also highlights the reverse interplay 
between the meso and macro level. In related work, Gaynor and Vogt (93) and Loozen (94) 
have for example discussed the rationale behind, issues with, and required adaptations of 
anti-trust enforcement in health care. 
Formalisation of the framework
In the preceding sections we have introduced a conceptual framework based on a review of 
academic literature regarding the interplay between macro level policy reforms, meso level 
healthcare markets, and micro level outcomes and the role of inter-organizational relations 
between healthcare organizations in healthcare markets. The framework aims to guide 
future research regarding pro-competitive policy reforms on patient level outcomes within 
the healthcare domain. This section presents several testable propositions based on this 
framework. The propositions focus on the interplay between the macro and meso levels, 
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market structure and inter-organizational relations within the meso level, the meso and the 
micro levels, the micro and meso levels, and the micro and macro levels. 
Policy and inter-organizational relations: macro and meso
While several studies have been conducted regarding the evolution of market structure 
following pro-competitive policy reforms in the healthcare sector of several countries, there 
is scant research investigating the relation between macro level policy and the structure and 
evolution of cooperative inter-organizational networks. This is particularly true for research 
utilizing the three types of inter-organizational ties we have proposed. Yet, as our framework 
proposes, if the influence of pro-competitive healthcare reforms is to be fully understood, 
this relation should be studied in more depth. 
While research has shown that inter-organizational relations such as patient transfers are 
common in Bismarck-type healthcare systems (e.g. 78) as well as in Beveridge-type systems 
(e.g. 81), the effect of reforming one type of system towards the other has yet to be studied 
in detail. In essence, examining this interaction tests the influence of the institutional 
context on the structure and evolution of inter-organizational networks in healthcare. For 
example, the hierarchical nature of a Beveridge-type National Health System could result 
in hierarchically imposed patient transfers towards a specific centre of excellence. Provan 
(63) has shown that hospitals which are part of a larger system (i.e. a consortium) possess 
less strategic decision making autonomy. A similar rationale would hold for hospitals in an 
NHS system. Increasing organizational autonomy by reforming the system towards a more 
competitive, Bismark-type, system could hence alter the structure of these networks. 
The same logic holds for other types of inter-organizational ties. In the case of shared 
professionals or board members the influence of the institutional context could be even 
more explicit. In some countries it is illegal for professionals to be affiliated to multiple 
organizations (84) and the Dutch governance-code for example limits the amount positions 
which can be held by board members. However, two studies in the Dutch context do indicate 
an increase in inter-organizational cooperation based on specialists’ affiliations (i.e. shared 
medical specialists) as well interlocking directorates following the introduction of price 
competition in the Dutch healthcare market (84, 95). We formalize the interaction between 
the institutional context at the macro level and inter-organizational networks at the meso 
level in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1a – Pro-competitive policy reforms affect the structure of inter-organizational 
networks of healthcare providers.
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A reverse interaction between inter-organizational networks at the meso level and policy at 
the macro level can be described twofold. First, based on the ongoing nature of healthcare 
reforms (44, 45). The ongoing nature of reforms suggests that policymakers can introduce 
additional reforms based on the response organizations have displayed to previous (pro-
competitive) reforms. Second, in line with the reasoning of consolidating healthcare 
markets, several authors have argued that some forms of inter-organizational cooperation 
potentially impede effective competition (12, 84, 96), highlighting the potential need for 
stricter enforcement or adaptations of existing antitrust regulations. We hence formalize 
the following proposition regarding the meso to macro level interaction. 
Proposition 1b – The structure of inter-organizational networks of healthcare providers 
affects policy reform.
Inter-organizational relations and market structure: at the meso level
Throughout this chapter we have stressed the value of inter-organizational relations 
at the meso level. However, our framework does not propose a singular focus on inter-
organizational networks. Instead, inter-organizational networks constitute an addition to 
structural market features at the meso level. Following the SCP-logic, market structure 
can influence inter-organizational behaviour of providers. Likewise, inter-organizational 
relations can in turn influence the structure and functioning of markets. The former has 
received little academic attention when it comes to the influence of inter-organizational 
behaviour of healthcare organizations. Studies by Mascia, Di Vincenzo (80), Lomi and Pallotti 
(79), and Mascia, Pallotti (97), all of which utilize patient transfers, form notable exceptions. 
These studies find that overlap in geographic and product markets (i.e. structural features 
of the market) influences cooperation between providers, based on which we formalize the 
following proposition:
Proposition 2a – The structure of healthcare markets affects the structure of inter-
organizational networks of healthcare providers.
The latter notion has discussed theoretically by Fottler, Schermerhorn (57) when they 
describe a process to which they refer as ‘incrementalism of inter-organizational relations’. 
The authors indicate that healthcare organizations typically commence inter-organizational 
cooperation by using cooperative ties which require less resource commitment and bear 
lower risks, explicitly mentioning patient transfers as an example. As the organizations reap 
the rewards of their cooperative inter-organizational relation, they move towards more 
committed and higher risk type of relations. Complete or joint ownership, hence integration 
which alters market structure, is the most committed type of relation described by the 
authors. Although healthcare executives have an important role when it comes to matters of 
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integration (98), this process of incrementalism has, to the best of our knowledge not been 
tested empirically, particularly based on the three types of inter-organizational relations we 
have proposed. Hence, we formalize the following proposition: 
Proposition 2b – The structure of inter-organizational networks of healthcare providers 
affects the structure of healthcare markets.
Inter-organizational relations and outcomes: meso and micro
Perhaps the most discussed and hypothesized aspect of inter-organizational relations 
in healthcare is their relation to improved patient-level outcomes such as increased 
accessibility, higher quality, and lower costs of health services. In their seminal work, Provan 
and Milward (99) show for example that networks with specific network structures are more 
effective than others. A finding reiterated by Mascia, Angeli (82) in their analysis of patient 
transfer networks in Italy. 
What constitutes an effective network structure can however vary between the different 
inter-organizational ties we have proposed. As can the underlying mechanisms of how 
these ties influence patient level outcomes. When it comes to patient transfers for example, 
researchers have suggested that referring patients to high volume hospitals has the potential 
to prevent avoidable deaths (100) by leveraging complementary resources (78). In case the 
networks facilitate the flow of patients towards providers who possess the correct resources 
and volumes to treat patients (78, 81, 82, 101) service duplication can furthermore be 
avoided (82, 100). Researchers have shown that patient transfer networks are associated 
with reduced readmission rates for patients (81) but have also found sub-optimal patient 
transfer network configurations (101, 102). 
When it comes to shared human resources the relation to patient level outcomes is slightly 
more indirect. That is, through sharing such resources, organizations create channels to 
transfer knowledge, routines, and best-practices, thus creating learning opportunities and 
harnessing the potential to increase quality of care for patients. Non-healthcare research 
has indeed found that partner organizations capable of effectively transferring knowledge 
generally outperform those who are not (52). While two Dutch studies indicate that inter-
organizational learning and improving quality of care for patients are important drivers for 
medical professionals to be shared (84, 103), other studies have indicated that medical 
specialists are unable to duplicate their performance from one organization to the next 
(104, 105). 
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Interlocking directorates can influence patient level outcomes in an even more indirect 
fashion. To the best of our knowledge, research regarding interlocking directorates has 
not been widely adopted within health care. Outside the healthcare though, researchers 
have suggested that interlocking directorates influence a firm’s strategies, profitability, and 
integration (68, 86). Board members are hence perceived as vehicles of knowledge transfer 
between organizations. Their major distinction from shared professionals however is that 
they do not necessarily possess knowledge of the primary process within a healthcare 
organization but instead harness the potential to transfer knowledge related to strategic 
and financial processes. Despite these differences in underlying mechanisms, we formulate 
the following proposition regarding the influence of inter-organizational networks at the 
meso level on outcomes at the micro level: 
Proposition 3a – The structure of inter-organizational networks of healthcare providers 
affects outcomes. 
In line with the previous interactions we argue that the interaction between inter-
organizational networks and outcomes is also bi-directional. The inverted relation is 
congruent with the formalization of the classical economic notion that providers will 
seek a competitive advantage over one another. That is, if organization A and B (at the 
meso level) observe that their outcomes are suboptimal, they will respond by structuring 
their cooperative relations in such a manner that it will improve their performance (i.e. 
outcomes). Research has for example reported that providers share medical specialists 
in order to respond to quality and volume requirements of the market (84). Hence, we 
formulate the following proposition regarding this interaction; 
Proposition 3b – Outcomes affect the structure of inter-organizational networks of healthcare 
providers.
Outcomes and policy: micro and macro
Lastly, we have argued that policy reforms at the macro level are implemented with 
the aim to improve outcomes at the micro level. They are thus fundamentally driven by 
discontent with existing micro level outcomes produced by a healthcare system. Current 
pro-competitive reforms are for example primarily aimed at slowing down increasing 
healthcare expenditures (2), one of such micro level outcomes. While we have argued in this 
chapter that the effect of macro level policy reform and micro level outcomes is mediated 
by the structure of- and inter-organizational relations within- the healthcare market, we 
formalize a more direct reverse interaction between patient-level outcomes and policy in 
our framework, which leads to the following proposition: 
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Proposition 4 – Outcomes affect policy reforms
Conclusion
Although pro-competitive reforms have been introduced in the healthcare sector of several 
Western countries, the academic literature lacks a consensus on whether such reforms reach 
their goal of maximizing patients’ value for money. We have argued that this is due to two 
main factors. First, existing research regarding competition in healthcare has not addressed 
the inherently dynamic interplay between policy at the macro level, the healthcare market 
at the meso level, and outcomes at the micro level. Second, the healthcare market, at 
the meso level, has predominantly been operationalized based on its structural features, 
neglecting cooperative inter-organizational relations which are relevant to understand any 
industry but healthcare in particular. In this chapter we hence formalized a conceptual 
framework which addresses these two shortcomings and we have identified three types 
of inter-organizational relations relevant to the healthcare sector, namely patient transfers, 
professionals’ affiliations, and interlocking directorates. 
From the framework we have furthermore derived several propositions able to guide future 
research regarding pro-competitive reforms in health care. Specifically, these propositions 
have been aimed at the interplay between macro level policy and inter-organizational 
relations at the meso level, market structure and inter-organizational relations within the 
meso level, inter-organizational relations at the meso and outcomes at the micro level 
and vice-versa, and outcomes at the micro level and policy at the macro level. Specifically, 
future empirical research could investigate the directionality of these propositions because 
by analysing networks of cooperative inter-organizational relations in healthcare markets, 
researchers and policymakers are able to better understand why certain policies do or do 
not meet their intended effects of benefits for patients. 
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PART II
Occurence of inter-organizational relations

CHAPTER 3
Exploring interlocking directorates in health care
Based on: 
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., en Ruwaard, D. Bestuurlijke dubbelrollen: natuurlijke 
bestuursstructuur of doorn in het oog van de governance code? In: H. den Uijl en T. van 
Zonneveld, Zorg voor toezicht: de maatschappelijke betekenis van governance in de zorg, 
pp. 224-232. Amsterdam: Mediawerf, 2015.
EM
BA
RG
OE
D
This chapter is embargoed at request
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 3
48
Abstract
Interlocking directorates occur when a board member of an organization also holds an 
affiliation to another organization. They were long considered the primary indication of 
cooperation between organizations and have hence been studied in a range of industries 
and through various theoretical perspectives. However, despite the strong reliance on inter-
organizational cooperation, empirical research regarding interlocking directorates is scarce 
in the healthcare industry. In this paper, we study the occurrence of direct interlocking 
directorates in health care, their geographical dispersion, their occurrence between 
organizations in the same market segment, and their changes over time. Furthermore, 
we studied the ties between market entrants and incumbent organizations. We use social 
network analysis based on publically available data extracted from the annual report of all 
Dutch healthcare organizations in 2007 and 2012. Board interlocks appear to be increasingly 
common over time, suggesting that they constitute a way to manage environmental 
uncertainty. Furthermore, they typically occur amongst geographically proximate 
organizations in similar market segments. Lastly, roughly half of all market entrants are 
tied to incumbent organizations. Traditional concerns regarding anti-competitive effects of 
board interlocks could hence resurface. More in-depth and multi-level research regarding 
interlocking directorates in health care can enhance our understanding of these forms of 
inter-organizational cooperation in the sector, as it has done in various other industries. 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Exploring interlocking directorates in health care
49
3
Introduction
During the past few decades, many countries have enacted various reforms in their healthcare 
sector (1). Healthcare organizations hence operate in turbulent times. In the Netherlands 
for example, numerous healthcare reforms were introduced in the past years (2). Examples 
include the introduction and adaptation of the health insurance act (3, 4), near-continuous 
reform of the mental healthcare sector (5), introduction of integrated financing schemes 
(6), and decentralization of the responsibility for various types of care to municipalities (7). 
As a result, the hospital sector has undergone a wave of consolidation (8, 9), municipalities 
are selectively contracting or delivering healthcare services (5), and various new models of 
(integrated) healthcare delivery have been developed (e.g. 10). Ultimately, an organization’s 
board is responsible for adequately navigating their organization through such uncertain 
surroundings (11). Boards are typically comprised of inside and outside members (12). 
The former refers to board members who are primarily affiliated to the organization, such 
as the CEO, while the latter refers to board members who are primarily affiliated to other 
organizations (12). 
Rooted in resource dependence theory, one way for organizations and their boards to cope 
with the uncertainties of the external environment is by forming board interlocks, otherwise 
known as interlocking directorates (13-17). An interlocking directorate exists when the board 
member of a particular organization is also affiliated with another organization (e.g. 12), 
forming a link between two organizations. Amongst others, such links enable organizations 
to cooperate with regulatory bodies, customers, and suppliers, as a result of which external 
constraints are reduced (e.g. 17, 18). That is, interlocking directorates constitute vehicles 
to incorporate external parties in an organization’s decision making structure in order to 
reduce external uncertainties, a phenomenon known as cooptation (17). Direct interlocks 
occur when organizations are directly linked with one another through a shared board 
member, whereas indirect interlocks imply that two organizations are both represented in 
the board of a third organization (14). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, research regarding interlocking directorates flourished in top-tier 
management journals (e.g. 18, 19, 20, 21). They were considered the main indication of 
inter-organizational relations between organizations and reliable data regarding their 
existence was generally available (12). Interlocking directorates hence constitute arguably 
the most widely studied form of inter-organizational relations and besides cooptation, 
various motives and effects of board interlocks have been proposed (22). For example, 
board interlocks were initially considered collusive strategies intended to limit the amount 
of competition between organizations and increase conformity amongst competitors (12, 
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16, 22, 23). Although the evidence regarding the anti-competitive effect of board interlocks 
is mixed (cf. 12), the formation of board interlocks between competing organizations has 
been prohibited by U.S. antitrust legislation since 1914 (23). Alternatively, interlocking 
directorates have been described as mechanisms for personal career development (e.g. 21, 
24), organizational legitimacy (e.g. 25), and social cohesion (e.g. 26). On a personal level, 
holding a great number of board positions is furthermore associated with several practical 
problems in terms of board members’ availability and flexibility (e.g. 27).
Most of the empirical work regarding board interlocks has been conducted in for-profit 
industries. Although interlocking directorates have been recognized as relevant forms 
of inter-organizational relations in the healthcare sector (e.g. 28, 29), empirical research 
regarding these ties has been limited in this industry. This omission is noteworthy for 
several reasons. Firstly, inter-organizational networks are considered widely common in 
the healthcare sector and have been the focal point of a range of studies (e.g. 30, 31-33). 
Empirically however, inter-organizational relations in health care are typically operationalized 
in ways other than interlocking directorates, for example through patient transfers 
between organizations (e.g. 34, 35, 36) rather than at the board level through interlocking 
directorates. Secondly, the occurrence of interlocking directorates seems highly plausible in 
health care given its unpredictable nature following various reforms (1) and the increased 
likelihood of interlocking directorates in unpredictable and uncertain surroundings (13-17). 
Yet, it is unclear whether this is indeed the case. Thirdly, (price-)competition has become 
a prominent mechanism in the healthcare system of several countries (37), causing the 
debate surrounding interlocks as vehicles of collusion to resurface. 
In this study, we explore direct board interlocks between healthcare organizations. More 
specifically, the aim of our paper is threefold. Firstly, we seek to unravel the occurrence 
of direct interlocking directorates in the healthcare industry. That is, we examine how 
common direct interlocking directorates are and whether they occur between geographical 
proximate organizations and organizations active in the same segment of the healthcare 
industry. To the best of our knowledge, scientific evidence regarding direct board interlocks 
between healthcare organizations is scant. Heemskerk, Hendriks (38) do analyze interlocking 
directorates in health care but their work focuses on indirect interlocks, which are formed 
when board members of two organizations both sit on the board of a third organization, 
rather than direct interlocks, which are formed by outside directors who’s primary affiliation 
is with another organization. Secondly, we aim to test whether the occurrence of direct 
board interlocks between healthcare organizations has changed over time. We do this 
in a market which, for a considerable part, has grown increasingly price-competitive (3, 
39), shedding light on how healthcare organizations react to uncertainties resulting from 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Exploring interlocking directorates in health care
51
3
increased competition. Lastly, because market entrants are commonly considered a source 
of competition to incumbent firms (40) and market entry has been described as a crucial 
aspect of effective competition in health care (41), we specifically investigate the interlocks 
between market entrants and incumbent firms. The results of our exploration will shed more 
light on the phenomenon of interlocking directorates in health care and reveal avenues for 
future empirical research regarding this matter.
Methods
Setting 
Our exploration of direct interlocking directorates in health care was conducted in the 
Netherlands and based on data from the years 2007 and 2012. The Netherlands spent 
approximately 75 and 92 billion Euro on health care in these years, amounting to 9.3 and 
10.9 percent of the country’s GDP, respectively (42, 43). These expenses were financed by 
three arrangements; the Health Insurance Act (HIA) which financed curative healthcare 
services, the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (EMEA) which funded long term healthcare 
services, and the Social Support Act (SSA) through which social support services were paid 
(44). The curative healthcare services financed by the HIA account for more than half of the 
total health and wellbeing expenditure (42) and the majority of the expenses under the 
HIA are attributable to specialized care services (45). The introduction of the HIA in 2006 
furthermore introduced (price-)competition in the curative part of the country’s healthcare 
sector (3, 4). This mechanism is largely based on traditional models of competition which 
dictate that organizations are assumed to act fully independent of one another (e.g. 40, 46). 
Whether healthcare organizations indeed operate independently largely depends on the way 
they are governed (38) and the Dutch healthcare governance code has thus prohibited the 
formation of direct board interlocks between competitors by stipulating; “Being an outside 
board member of a competitor is hereby prohibited” (47 Original in Dutch, translated by the 
authors). 
Data and sample
Our study was based on the annual reports of Dutch healthcare organizations. By June 1st of 
each year, Dutch healthcare organizations should submit their annual report, including full 
financial statements, of the preceding calendar year (48). These annual reports are made 
publically available through a dedicated website by the Dutch ministry of Health, Welfare, 
and Sport. Information reported in the annual reports of Dutch healthcare organizations 
includes general characteristics such as the type of organization, the number of employees, 
and number of locations, full financial statements, the composition of the inside and outside 
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board (respectively ‘Raad van Bestuur’ and ‘Raad van Toezicht’ in Dutch), and performance 
indicators such as the number of patients treated or the number of quality certifications 
obtained by the organization. The data contained in the annual reports of the healthcare 
organizations is furthermore compiled in a freely downloadable data file made available 
through the same website. Information is presented at the concern level (i.e. the level of 
the consolidated annual reports. The downloadable data files containing the information 
reported in the annual reports of 2007 and 2012 were used as the primary data sources in 
this study. Our analysis was based on all organizations in the dataset, which span the domains 
of specialized care, mental health care, nursing care, care for the disabled, maternity care, 
forensic care, youth care, and social care.
Analysis
Using the SAS for Microsoft Windows software package, each organization´s board 
members (i.e. the members of the inside and outside board) were extracted from the 
data file. Based on their names, each board member (i) was linked to an organization (j), 
which was identified through its chamber of commerce number. Organizations with missing 
chamber of commerce numbers were disregarded. Each organization has a certain degree 
of freedom in reporting the names of their board member. A person ‘dr. James Jones’ could 
for example be reported as such or as James Jones, J. Jones, or dr J. Jones. Therefore, all 
title prefixes (e.g. prof. or dr.) and suffixes (e.g. RA or MBA) were stripped from the names 
of the board members. Board members’ names were subsequently reformatted to contain 
a person’s first initial and family name only. Next, all punctuation marks (including spaces) 
were excluded. Lastly, based on the gender of each board member reported in the annual 
report, a gender prefix was added to each board member’s name in order to decrease the 
likelihood of unjustly considering two names as the same person. 
The complete list of board members and their affiliation to an organization’s chamber of 
commerce number formed a so-called two-mode or bipartite edgelist (49). Both of these 
bipartite edgelists (i.e. one for 2007 and one for 2012) were transformed to undirected 
unimodal matrices of interlocking directorates between healthcare organizations using 
the Statnet package in R. That is, two organizations (j1 and j2) were connected through an 
interlocking directorate when a person (i) served as a board member on both organizations. 
This could be as an outside board member in both organizations, a member of the inside 
board in both organizations, or as a member of the inside board in one and outside board in 
the other organization. Next, both unimodal matrices of interlocking directorates between 
healthcare organizations were visually represented using the Visone software package (50). 
Organizations were shaped according to their type (i.e. specialized care provider or other 
type of provider) and colored according to their geographical location in the country (i.e. 
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located in a Northern-, Southern, Eastern-, or Western- provinces). Next, we calculated the 
density (i.e. number of interlocks formed relative to all possible interlocks), average degree 
centrality (i.e. the number of ties each organization has), and transitivity (i.e. number of 
ties between organization A and C in case organization A is connected to organization B and 
organization B is connected to organization C) of each network (51). Lastly, we conducted a 
paired-samples t-test based on the interlocks of all organizations which submitted an annual 
report in 2007 as well as in 2012 to detect any changes in the occurrence of interlocking 
directorates over time. 
In order to examine the relation between market entrants and incumbent firms, we used 
two approaches, both of which were based on the boards of independent treatment centers 
which had entered the market between 2007 and 2012. Independent treatment centers 
are small organizations which offer curative healthcare services under the HIA and employ 
at least 2 medical specialists, most commonly in medical specialties such as dermatology, 
ophthalmology, or orthopedics (52). Independent treatment centers mainly offer treatments 
covered by the HIA, which distinguishes them from private clinics (52). Each independent 
treatment center which submitted an annual report in 2012 but had not done so in 2007 
was considered to have entered the market between 2007 and 2012 and was included in 
this analysis. Similar to the analysis in the entire market, the first approach consisted of 
mapping the board interlocks between market entrants and incumbent hospitals in 2012. 
Because independent treatment centers can constitute spin-offs of incumbent hospitals 
formed in conjunction with medical specialists (53, 54), we analyzed the so-called additional 
affiliations (i.e. ‘nevenfuncties’ in Dutch) of the board members of market entrants to study 
whether these board members held positions as active medical specialists in incumbent 
hospitals. Board members are obliged to report such additional affiliations in the annual 
report and they have been used to study indirect board interlocks (38).
Results
Table 3.1 presents the results of the quantitative analysis in 2007 and 2012. It displays that 
a total of 824 healthcare organizations were included in the dataset of 2007. The annual 
reports of these organizations reported 5,534 unique board members, averaging 6.72 board 
members per organization. Roughly three in every four board members was male and 
approximately 7.61% of all board members (i.e. 421 board members) held a position on 
the inside and/or outside board of multiple healthcare organizations in the 2007 dataset. 
Of these board members who held multiple affiliations, 79% was male. On average, board 
members held 1.10 board positions in 2007. However, the 421 board members who held 
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a position on the board of multiple organizations held on average 2.26 positions. The 
maximum number of positions held by a board member in 2007 was seven. Of the 824 
organizations, 410 are involved in one or more direct board interlocks (i.e. 49.75%) and 141 
are organizations which provide specialized care services (i.e. 17.11%). See Table 3.1 for an 
overview. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of board interlocks at the individual, organizational, and network level
2007 2012
Board member level
Total number of board members 5,534 7,122
% male board members 74.97% 71.32%
Total number of affiliations 6,063 7,892
Average number of affiliations per board member
Interlocking board members
1.10
421
1.11
612
% male interlocking board members 79.05% 76.14%
Number of affiliations of interlocking board members 950 1,381
Average number of affiliations per interlocking board member 2.26 2.26
Maximum number of affiliations 7 6
Organizational level
Number of organizations 824 1,276
Average board size (number of members) 6.72 5.58
Organizations with 1 or more board interlock(s) 410 595
Average interlocks of organizations present both years 0.96 1.34*
Specialized care organizations 141 299
Independent Treatment Centers (ITCs) 56 205
ITCs which have entered the market - 170
ITCs which have exited the market - 21
Average board size (# of members) of entrants - 4.53
Entrants with board interlocks to incumbent firms - 21
Entrants with alternative interlocksa to incumbent firms - 58
Network level
Network density 0.00133 0.00087
Transitivity 0.44959 0.34212
Average degree 1.09466 1.10502
a Board member is also an active medical specialist in incumbent organization
* p-value < 0.001
In 2012, our second observation year, the dataset included 1,276 healthcare organizations. 
Approximately a quarter of these organizations (i.e. 23.43% or 299 organizations) are 
specialized care organizations. The annual reports of these organizations reported 7,122 
unique board members, averaging 5.58 board members per organization. In 2012, 71.32% 
of all board members are male and 8.59% (i.e. 612 board members) held a position on 
the inside and/or outside board of more than one organization. Of these board members 
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who held multiple positions, 76.14% were male. The board members held an average of 
1.11 positions in 2012. Board members who held multiple positions held an average of 2.26 
positions and the maximum number of positions held by a board member in 2012 was 
six. Of the 1,276 organizations in the 2012 dataset, 595 organizations (i.e. 46.63%) were 
connected to at least one other healthcare organization through a board interlock. 
Figure 3.1 displays the network of board interlocks in 2007 and Figure 3.2 displays 
the network of board interlocks in 2012. In each of the networks, nodes represent an 
organization and a tie between the nodes indicates an interlocking directorate between 
the two organizations. That is, it indicates that there is at least one board member who 
sits on the inside and/or outside board of both organizations. The width of the tie between 
organizations is proportionate to the number of board members shared between the 
connected organizations. The thicker the tie, the more board members are shared between 
both organizations. Nodes are shaped according to the type of organization. Organizations 
in the specialized care sector are represented by squares, whereas organizations in 
other sectors of the healthcare industry are indicated by circles. The color of each node 
corresponds to the part of the country it is located in. Organizations located in the three 
Northern provinces of the Netherlands; Groningen, Drenthe, and Friesland are colored 
green. Organizations located in the three Western provinces of the country; Noord-Holland, 
Zuid-Holland, and Utrecht are colored grey. Organizations located in the three Eastern 
provinces of the Netherlands; Gelderland, Flevoland, and Overijssel are colored blue. Lastly, 
organizations located in the three Southern provinces of the Netherlands, Limburg, Noord-
Brabant, and Zeeland are colored red. 
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Figure 3.1: Network of interlocking directorates between Dutch healthcare organizations in 
2007.  
Figure 3.1: Network of interlocking directorates betwe n Dutch healthcare organizations in 2007.
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Exploring interlocking directorates in health care
57
3
C H A P T E R  3  
 52 
 
Figure 3.2: Network of interlocking directorates between Dutch healthcare organizations in 
2012. Visual inspection of the graphical representation of the board interlock networks in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 yields three main observations. Firstly, interlocking directorates appear most common between organizations located in similar geographical regions. This is indicated for example by the cluster of red nodes in the upper-right of both networks (i.e. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2), the many interlocks between grey nodes in the largest component of the 2007 network, and the number of same color dyads at the bottom of both networks. Secondly, organizations appear to be conneted primarily to other organizations in similar sectors (i.e. specialized or non-specialized care). The clique (i.e. fully-connected 
Figure 3.2: Network of interlocking directorates between Dutch healthcare organizations in 2012.
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Visual inspection of the graphical representation of the board interlock networks in Figure 3.1 
and Figure 3.2 yields three main observations. Firstly, interlocking directorates appear most 
common between organizations located in similar geographical regions. This is indicated 
for example by the cluster of red nodes in the upper-right of both networks (i.e. Figure 
3.1 and Figure 3.2), the many interlocks between grey nodes in the largest component of 
the 2007 network, and the number of same color dyads at the bottom of both networks. 
Secondly, organizations appear to be connected primarily to other organizations in similar 
sectors (i.e. specialized or non-specialized care). The clique (i.e. fully-connected structure) 
of non-specialized care organizations located at the bottom of both networks are examples 
of this notion. Thirdly, there appears to be a growing trend in the number of interlocking 
directorates between Dutch healthcare organizations. This is predominantly indicated by 
the increased size of the largest network component (i.e. the top-left component of both 
networks). The increased occurrence of board interlocks is furthermore supported by 
quantitative analysis. Although Table 3.1 indicates that the board interlock network of 2012 
is less dense than that of 2007, a greater percentage of board members hold multiple board 
positions in 2012 than in 2007. The results of the paired-sample t-test, presented in Table 
3.1, indicate that the 583 organizations which submitted an annual report in 2007 and 2012 
held an average of 0.96 board interlocks in 2007 versus 1.34 in 2012. The increase in the 
average number of interlocking directorates between 2007 and 2012 is significant at the 
0.001 confidence level (i.e. p-value <0.001). 
Table 3.1 indicates that market entrance by independent treatment centers largely explains 
the increase in specialized care organizations between 2007 and 2012. The analysis of the 
ties between market entrants and incumbent firms reveals that 170 independent treatment 
centers entered the market between 2007 and 2012. Additionally, 21 of the 56 independent 
treatment centers which submitted an annual report in 2007, exited the market before 2012 
(i.e. did not submit an annual report in 2012). There were 739 board members affiliated 
to the 170 market entrants through a total of 770 affiliations, indicating that an average 
market entrant had 4.53 board members. Of the 170 independent treatment centers which 
entered the market, 23 (i.e. 13.52%) had board interlocks with one or more incumbent 
hospital. Furthermore, 17 market entrants (i.e. 10%) had board interlocks with other market 
entrants but not with incumbent hospitals, as indicated by Figure 3.3 which displays the 
board interlock network between market entrants (blue nodes) and incumbent hospitals 
(red nodes) in 2012. Lastly, 86 board members, affiliated to approximately one third of all 
market entrants (i.e. 58 organizations), reported alternative affiliations as active medical 
specialists to an incumbent hospital. These alternative affiliations occurred in various 
medical specialists, listed in Table 3.2. 
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Figure 3.3: Interlocking directorates between market entrants (blue nodes) and incumbent 
hospitals (red nodes) in 2012  
Figure 3.3: Interlocking directorates between market entrants (blue nodes) and incumbent hospitals 
(red nodes) in 2012.
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 3
60
Table 3.2: Overview of market entrants’ board members’ additional affiliations to incumbent 
organizations as medical specialist 
Type of specialty Number of occurrences
Medical specialist (undefined specialty) 21
Ophthalmology 12
Dermatology 11
Cardiology 8
Surgery 5
Internal medicine 4
Plastic surgery 4
Clinical chemistry 3
Radiology 3
Ear Nose Throat medicine 2
Gynecology 2
Embryology 1
Geriatrics 1
Hematology 1
Nephrology 1
Neurology 1
Pediatrics 1
Psychiatry 1
Pulmonology 1
Radiotherapy 1
Rehabilitation medicine 1
Urology 1
Total 86
Discussion
The aim of this study was i.) to explore the occurrence of direct interlocking directorates in 
health care, including their occurrence between organizations in the same market segment 
and geographical region, ii.) to test whether the occurrence of direct board interlocks 
between healthcare organizations has changed over time, and iii.) to investigate the 
interlocks between market entrants and incumbent healthcare organizations. Our results 
shed light on the structure of governance networks in the healthcare industry as a whole and 
between incumbent and entering specialized care organizations in particular. They make the 
following contributions to the health services research literature, relevant to policymakers 
and antitrust agencies. 
Firstly, our results indicate that direct interlocking directorates are a common phenomenon 
in health care. They occur between roughly half of all the healthcare organizations in the 
Netherlands. Congruent with the evidence regarding the occurrence of indirect board 
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interlocks in other industries (e.g. 12, 23), prior research in the Dutch healthcare sector 
has indicated that 95% of the Dutch hospitals are connected through indirect interlocking 
directorates (38). Direct board interlocks are thus substantially less common than indirect 
board interlocks in health care. However, since they can be created inadvertently, indirect 
interlocks are considered less deliberate (12). Furthermore, direct interlocking directorates 
are perceived as the most influential type of board interlocks and their influence is considered 
to last several years (22, 55). Our findings hence suggest that approximately half of all health 
care organizations deliberately seek connections with other healthcare organizations. Even 
though we analyzed board interlocks based on annual reports at concern level (i.e. the 
most consolidated annual report), a portion of the direct interlocks in our dataset could 
still be formed between wholly or partially owned subsidiaries and their parent company. 
Yet, similar to forming board interlocks, forming (partial) ownership relations with other 
organizations also constitutes a form of cooptation (56). This hence supports the notion that 
healthcare organizations deliberately seek connections with other healthcare organizations. 
Secondly, our research shows that direct interlocking directorates between healthcare 
organizations have become more prevalent over time. This increase in prevalence of board 
interlocks is congruent with the introduction of several reforms in Dutch health care, for 
example increasing price-competition and altering the product structure in specialized care 
(3, 39). This finding is congruent with existing literature which poises that board interlocks 
are a mechanism to manage environmental uncertainty (13-17). However, the increase 
in board interlocks is mainly observable at the organizational level and not at the level of 
individual board members. That is, on average individual board members hold the same 
number of positions in 2007 and 2012 and the maximum number of positions held by board 
members is even lower in 2012 than in 2007. Because board interlocks erode the attention 
of board members when used in excess (57), the Dutch healthcare governance code has 
maximized the number of board positions an individual can hold at five (47). Our results thus 
support the suggestion that organizations should effectively manage their board interlocks 
at the organizational level (58). Hence, a multilevel perspective towards board interlocks 
seems necessary in order to facilitate governance structures which adequately safeguard 
the societal aspect inherent to health care. That is, policymakers and researchers should not 
only consider the maximum number of board positions of individual board members but 
should also consider the interlocks of organizations as a whole. 
Thirdly, the fact that direct interlocking directorates appear among organizations located 
in similar geographical regions as well as organizations active in similar segments of the 
healthcare industry could raise the anti-competitive concerns which have been dominant 
throughout the initial research regarding board interlocks (e.g. 12, 22, 23). This is particularly 
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true when considering that healthcare markets are highly local (59) and the fact that the 
healthcare governance code explicitly stipulates that interlocking directorates between 
competitors should be avoided (47). That is, more interlocks imply more inter-organizational 
influence and interdependency, making common and coordinated action more likely (60). 
However, while the healthcare industry requires strict anti-trust enforcement (61), the anti-
competitive effect of interlocking directorates is not irrefutably supported by empirical 
evidence (62). Future research could study this mechanism in more detail in the health care 
industry in order to safeguard effective healthcare markets. 
Fourthly, we find that several market entrants are linked to incumbent healthcare 
organizations, either in the form of ‘traditional’ direct interlocking directorates or through 
board members who are simultaneously active professionals in incumbent organizations. 
These results are in line with findings of the Dutch Health Authority regarding the relation 
between independent treatment centers and hospitals (63). They reveal that professionals 
are not merely shared between organizations in order to treat patients elsewhere, as studied 
by Westra, Angeli (54), but that they can also hold board positions in other organizations. 
While these ties do not constitute a ‘traditional’ board interlock between two boards, there 
is no reason to assume why these ties are incapable of facilitating the flow of information 
and strategic influence typically associated with board interlocks (in health care) (38, 64). 
Along this line, the Dutch healthcare governance code stipulates that: “A member of the 
inside board cannot hold a remunerated or voluntary position in another organization 
without consent of the outside board in case the combination of positions constitutes 
a more than minimal burden of work, or in any other way conflicts with the interests of 
the primary organization.” (47). Given the various ties of independent treatment centers’ 
board members, it is unclear whether they should indeed be perceived as independent 
competitors of incumbent organizations.
Limitations
The current work is not exempt from limitations. Our analysis is based on the annual reports 
submitted by healthcare organizations and the names of the board members reported 
therein. Given the freedom in reporting the board member names it is conceivable that 
some names have unjustly been considered as the same or a different person. However, 
we have prepared the data in a way which minimizes this effect. Furthermore, given the 
exploratory nature of our work, in which we were mainly interested in the occurrence and 
dispersion of interlocking directorate ties throughout the industry, any misspecifications 
should have only minor influences on our results. Lastly, our results regarding the ties 
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between market entrants and incumbent organizations are congruent with those of the 
Dutch Health Authority (63). This serves as an indication that the amount of misspecifications 
was minimal. 
Conclusion
This study has explored the phenomenon of interlocking directorates in the healthcare 
industry based on a national dataset of healthcare organizations in the Netherlands. It finds 
that direct board interlocks are common in health care and increase over time, supporting 
the notion that interlocking directorates are a vehicle to manage environmental uncertainty. 
Interlocking directorates furthermore occur between organizations in similar market 
segments and geographical regions as well as between market entrants and incumbent 
organizations, causing the traditional concerns regarding anti-competitive effects of board 
interlocks to resurface. Lastly, governance policies are predominantly geared towards 
individual board members, while a multi-level approach seems more reflective of reality. 
More in-depth research regarding interlocking directorates in health care can enhance our 
understanding of these forms of inter-organizational cooperation in the sector, as it has 
done in various other industries. 
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Abstract
Introduction: Medical specialists seem to increasingly work in- and be affiliated to- multiple 
organizations. We define this phenomenon as specialist sharing. This form of horizontal 
inter-organizational cooperation has received scant scholarly attention. We investigate the 
extent of- and motives behind- specialist sharing, in the price-competitive hospital market 
of the Netherlands. 
Methods: A mixed-method approach has been adopted. Social network analysis was used to 
quantitatively examine the extent of the phenomenon. The affiliations of more than 15,000 
medical specialists to any Dutch hospital were transformed into 27 inter-hospital networks, 
one for each medical specialty, in 2013 and in 2015. Between February 2014 and February 
2016, 24 semi-structured interviews with 20 specialists from 13 medical specialties and four 
hospital executives were conducted to provide in-depth qualitative insights regarding the 
personal and organizational motives behind the phenomenon.
Results: Roughly 20% of all medical specialists are affiliated to multiple hospitals. The 
phenomenon occurs in all medical specialties and all Dutch hospitals share medical 
specialists. Rates of specialist sharing have increased significantly between 2013 and 2015 
in 14 of the 27 specialties. Personal motives predominantly include learning, efficiency, and 
financial benefits. Increased workload and discontinuity of care are perceived as potential 
drawbacks. Hospitals possess the final authority to decide whether and which specialists 
are shared. Adhering to volume norms and strategic considerations are seen as their main 
drivers to share specialists.
Discussion: We conclude that specialist sharing should be interpreted as a form of inter-
organizational cooperation between healthcare organizations, facilitating knowledge flow 
between them. Although quality improvement is an important perceived factor underpinning 
specialist sharing, evidence of enhanced quality of care is anecdotal. Additionally, the 
widespread occurrence of the phenomenon and the underlying strategic considerations 
could pose an antitrust infringement. 
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Introduction
In an attempt to contain rising healthcare expenditures, policy reforms have altered 
health care systems in many countries. One such policy intervention is the market based- 
or competitive reform (1), of which pros and cons have been debated by scholars and 
practitioners since the introduction of the concept of ‘managed competition’ by Enthoven 
(2). Such pro-competitive reforms have led to a series of strategic reactions by healthcare 
organizations and health insurance companies (3), one of which is horizontal integration. 
Research regarding this topic primarily focuses on mergers, which have been a focal point 
of antitrust cases across the globe (4-6). Despite well-documented market imperfections in 
the healthcare sector (7), antitrust scrutiny of horizontal integration is commonly justified 
by the economic perception that competition maximizes social welfare (4). 
Looser forms of horizontal inter-organizational cooperation, in which organizations 
uphold their organizational autonomy, have received less academic attention however 
(8). Pioneering studies consider looser forms of horizontal cooperation through patient 
transfers (9-12). Mascia, Di Vincenzo (12) for example, found a positive association between 
inter-hospital (quality) competition and cooperation through patient transfers in Italy. 
Furthermore, Mascia, Angeli (11) highlight that central hospitals in well-structured patient 
referral networks display lower readmission rates, indicating an association between 
horizontal cooperation and increased quality of care, in line with previous research (13). 
In this study we focus on a previously uninvestigated form of horizontal cooperation between 
healthcare organizations, namely sharing medical specialists (i.e. human resources). 
Consistent with the terminology of nascent research regarding patient sharing, we refer 
to this phenomenon as ‘specialist sharing’. We define a specialist as shared between two 
organizations when he or she is physically present in, and uses the resources of, both 
organizations to treat patients. A specialist who, for example, works a few days per week 
in hospital A and a few days per week in hospital B is considered shared. A specialist who 
works in hospital A and occasionally (e.g. once every two weeks) works in hospital B is 
also considered shared. However, A specialist who works in hospital A and is consulted by 
colleagues of hospital B (e.g. by mail, phone, or face to face) or to whom colleagues of 
hospital B refer patients is not considered shared because the specialist in question does not 
personally treat patients in hospital A and B. 
Contrary to previous research, we investigate horizontal cooperation in an increasingly 
price competitive hospital market, namely in the Netherlands, where price-competition has 
become increasingly prevalent since its introduction in 2006 (14, 15). In the Netherlands 
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medical specialists are either tenured by a hospital or independent (i.e. self-employed 
entrepreneurs organized in per-specialty partnerships called ‘maatschappen’) and can join a 
hospital’s medical staff upon acceptance by incumbent specialists and hospital management 
(16). Sharing specialists has furthermore been identified as a form of horizontal cooperation 
which potentially undermines effective competition in this setting (17), due to the economic 
perception that the optimal form of competition occurs between independent players in a 
market (18). Subsequently, the Dutch government has explicitly discouraged these strategies 
in its most recent Coalition Agreement (19). 
Although research suggests that Dutch hospital managers are “reluctant to share talented 
employees because of the competitive pressure they experience.” (20), anecdotal 
evidence suggests that sharing medical specialists has become increasingly common in 
the Netherlands, especially in the form of merging specialty partnerships. Yet, this form 
of horizontal cooperation and its implications for competitive dynamics in healthcare 
markets have remained ill-investigated. This study intends to fill this gap using a mixed-
method approach aimed to i) explore the extent of specialist sharing in a price competitive 
healthcare sector and ii) asses the motives underpinning specialist sharing.
Methods
We used a mixed-method approach to examine the extent and interpretation of- specialist 
sharing between hospitals in the Netherlands. A quantitative exploration based on social 
network analysis (SNA) measured the extent of the phenomenon in 2013 and 2015 after 
which we analyzed whether there were significant differences in the extent at both time 
points. To ensure correct interpretation of the quantitative findings we explored the motives 
behind these inter-organizational ties through semi-structured interviews with experts (i.e. 
medical specialists and executives of several hospitals) in the country. The project within 
which this study was conducted has been approved by the Maastricht University Medical 
Center ethics committee under application number 14-5-028, based on the fact that it is not 
subject to the Dutch ‘Medical Research involving Human Subjects Act’. 
Quantitative stage
Data
Quantitative exploration of the extent of specialist sharing was conducted using health 
insurance data of Vektis, the Dutch insurance companies’ center for information and 
standardization in health care. Specifically, we used the ‘Algemeen Gegevensbeheer Code’ 
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(AGB-code) data, which is used to handle claims and analyze health consumption (21). 
Dutch health professionals and healthcare organizations are required to possess a unique 
AGB-code to bill their services. An AGB-code is granted when certain requirements are 
met. For example, specialists have to be listed in the country’s medical (BIG) registry, whilst 
hospitals need to be registered with the chamber of commerce and possess governmental 
admission to the hospital market (21). Claims submitted without a valid combination of 
a personal and an organizational AGB-code are not reimbursed by health insurers (21). 
According to the reasoning of Smeets, de Wit (22), this serves as a strong incentive for 
professionals and organizations to keep the database up to date, making it an adequate 
source to quantitatively explore the occurrence of specialist sharing.
Sample
Our sample included all independent Dutch academic and non-academic hospitals, which 
are all private, non-profit organizations. Specialized hospitals and independent treatment 
centers were excluded due to their often narrow range of services (23). In 2013, 89 hospitals 
met the inclusion criteria, 8 academic- and 81 general hospitals. Between 2013 and 2015 
several hospitals merged and altered their AGB-code. Hence, 83 hospitals were included in 
our sample in 2015. In both years we selected all medical specialists with an active affiliation 
to at least one of the included hospitals for 6 months or longer. 15,615 and 15,980 medical 
specialists were included in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The specialists were divided across 
27 medical specialties. Although the database distinguished 30 medical specialties, we 
excluded ‘nerve diseases’ because it contained no active specialists, ‘allergology’ because 
specialists could no longer register as allergologist, and ‘clinical chemistry’ because the 
specialty could include chemists as well as medical doctors. 
Data Analysis
Using social network analysis (SNA) we built 27 (i.e. one per medical specialty) networks 
of shared specialists between hospitals. In each network all hospitals to which at least one 
specialist of the respective specialty had an active affiliation were included. The affiliations 
between medical specialists and hospitals served as 2-mode edge lists (24) which were 
projected to weighted inter-hospital networks using the Statnet package (25) in R version 
3.1.0 ‘Spring Dance’. Specialists were considered shared when they had an active affiliation 
to two or more hospitals, at which point the hospitals were connected in the network. The 
weight of their connection is relative to the number of specialists shared. For each network 
we calculated the density by dividing the sum of all tie values by the number of possible 
ties in the network (26). The 27 inter-organizational networks were visualized using Visone 
version 2.15 (27). To analyze differences in the occurrence of specialist sharing we compared 
the average per specialty ratio of shared to non-shared specialist in 2013 and 2015 using 27 
t-tests (i.e. one per specialty). 
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Qualitative stage 
Sample 
In order to correctly interpret inter-organizational cooperation through specialist sharing, 
we conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with involved stakeholders between February 
2014 and February 2016. We sampled respondents from four hospitals (i.e. 3 non-academic 
and 1 academic hospital) located throughout the Netherlands, ranging from less than 200 
million Euro to more than 650 million Euro annual revenues and 1,642 FTE to over 4,500 
FTE employees. Respondents were currently or had previously been affiliated to a total of 
twelve hospitals, one of which in another country. Using a form of snowball sampling we 
asked the CEO’s of two hospitals to refer specialists within their organizations who could 
participate in the study (28). To avoid a sample based on strategic referrals by CEO’s, we 
approached specialists and CEO’s using a bottom-up strategy in the other two hospitals. Due 
to the exploratory nature of the study specialists were not required to currently be shared in 
order to be included. They were however required to have finished their residency. 
We included twenty medical specialists from thirteen different specialties. Those ranged 
from small (i.e. clinical genetics) to large (i.e. internal medicine) in terms of number of 
specialists registered in the AGB-code database and from low per-hospital sharing rates in 
2013 (i.e. clinical genetics, orthopedics, and gastroenterology) to high per-hospital rates in 
2013 (i.e. general surgery and internal medicine). Male and female specialists with various 
levels of experience and contract types (i.e. tenured or independent) were furthermore 
included (see Table 4.1 for details). To understand the implications of specialist sharing, 
we enquired specialists about their personal motives to work in or refrain from working in 
multiple organizations (i.e. be shared), as well as their perception of the hospital’s motives, 
and external drivers. Additionally, we asked four hospital executives (i.e. members of the 
executive board or senior management team) about the same topics as the medical specialists 
with the exception of their personal motives to work in multiple organizations. We did ask 
them about their perception of specialists’ motives to work for multiple organizations.
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Data Collection and Analysis
All interviews were conducted in the personal office of the respondent. They were on average 
30 minutes long (with a standard deviation of 9 minutes) and were conducted by one of two 
researchers. Both researchers used the same general questions and interviews were held in 
Dutch or in English. All interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewees, 
and transcribed verbatim. Two researchers independently analyzed the transcripts by using 
the Nvivo software package version 10 and applying an integrated approach of inductive 
and deductive coding to identify recurring themes (29). Data saturation had been reached, 
indicated by the fact that no new themes emerged from the final interviews. Differences 
were compared and discussed and findings were taken into consideration when consensus 
was reached between both researchers. Anonymity was guaranteed to all respondents 
and information traceable to a particular respondent is therefore not reported. Lastly, we 
triangulated the qualitative and quantitative data to ensure consistency between both 
sources.
Results 
Occurrence of specialist sharing
Specialist level
Table 4.2 displays the number of specialists in each medical specialty and the average number 
of hospital affiliations in 2013 and 2015. On average, specialists had 1.22 hospital affiliations 
in 2013 versus 1.27 in 2015. In total 2,261 specialists are shared between hospitals in 2013 
versus 3,138 in 2015. The greatest absolute increase in the number of shared specialists 
is in anesthesiology with an increase of 109 shared specialists. In rehabilitation medicine 
and radiotherapy the number of shared specialists decreased with 2 and 3 specialists, 
respectively. Relatively, the increase in shared specialists is greatest in geriatrics. 27 
additional specialists, which constitute 12 percent of all geriatric specialists with an active 
hospital affiliation in 2015, were shared between 2013 and 2015 in that specialty. In both 
2013 and 2015 neurosurgery displays the highest rate of specialist sharing. Respectively, 62 
and 66 percent of the specialists are shared in that specialty (see Table 4.2). 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Understanding specialist sharing
75
4
Ta
bl
e 
4.
2
 S
pe
ci
al
ty
 
Co
de
 
M
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lty
 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ts
 in
 
AG
B 
(2
01
3)
 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ts
 
af
fil
ia
te
d 
to
 
a 
ho
sp
ita
l 
(2
01
3)
 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ts
 
sh
ar
ed
 
(2
01
3)
 
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 
af
fil
ia
ti
on
s 
pe
r s
pe
ci
al
is
t 
(2
01
3)
 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ts
 
in
 A
GB
 
(2
01
5)
 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ts
 
af
fil
ia
te
d 
to
 
a 
ho
sp
ita
l 
(2
01
5)
 
Sp
ec
ia
lis
ts
 
sh
ar
ed
 
(2
01
5)
 
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 
af
fil
ia
ti
on
s 
pe
r s
pe
ci
al
is
t 
(2
01
5)
 
1 
Ophtha
lmolog
y 
721 
579 
92 
1.18 
719 
577 
123 
1.27 
2 
Ear No
se Thro
at 
527 
501 
60 
1.13 
532 
508 
101 
1.21 
3 
Genera
l Surge
ry 
1277 
1209 
261 
1.26 
1297 
1228 
296 
1.30 
4 
Plastic
 Surger
y 
309 
270 
109 
1.51 
330 
290 
137 
1.62 
5 
Orthop
aedics 
711 
634 
73 
1.12 
736 
646 
97 
1.16 
6 
Urolog
y 
443 
424 
86 
1.22 
444 
428 
116 
1.31 
7 
Obstetr
ics and
 
Gynaec
ology 
1056 
1017 
142 
1.15 
1060 
1013 
223 
1.24 
8 
Neuros
urgery
 
154 
151 
94 
1.99 
157 
153 
101 
2.06 
10 
Derma
tology 
538 
448 
70 
1.18 
563 
469 
105 
1.26 
13 
Interna
l medic
ine 
1918 
1835 
169 
1.10 
1972 
1895 
254 
1.16 
16 
Paedia
trics 
1340 
1280 
152 
1.13 
1362 
1296 
222 
1.19 
18 
Gastro
entero
logy 
423 
417 
54 
1.14 
466 
456 
96 
1.26 
20 
Cardio
logy 
963 
921 
107 
1.13 
1010 
968 
162 
1.20 
22 
Pulmon
ology 
594 
545 
73 
1.14 
602 
557 
106 
1.21 
24 
Rheum
atology
 
291 
255 
85 
1.42 
323 
285 
85 
1.36 
27 
Rehabi
litation
 medic
ine 
531 
280 
53 
1.23 
559 
294 
51 
1.23 
28 
Cardio
pulmon
ary 
surgery
 
107 
105 
11 
1.12 
114 
111 
12 
1.14 
29 
Psychia
try 
3186 
342 
31 
1.09 
3496 
359 
47 
1.14 
30 
Neurol
ogy 
889 
803 
80 
1.10 
907 
823 
116 
1.16 
35 
Geriatr
ics 
221 
199 
31 
1.19 
245 
225 
58 
1.34 
61 
Radiot
herapy
 
258 
184 
24 
1.14 
267 
179 
21 
1.12 
62 
Radiolo
gy 
1078 
1032 
87 
1.09 
1052 
1007 
165 
1.18 
63 
Nuclea
r Medic
ine 
161 
150 
39 
1.33 
165 
157 
44 
1.34 
87 
Microb
iology 
207 
179 
39 
1.27 
199 
173 
49 
1.34 
88 
Patholo
gy 
366 
325 
93 
1.38 
363 
324 
96 
1.40 
89 
Anaest
hesiolo
gy 
1509 
1445 
143 
1.10 
1533 
1466 
252 
1.20 
90 
Clinica
l genet
ics 
101 
85 
3 
1.04 
116 
93 
3 
1.03 
  
To
ta
l 
19
87
9 
15
61
5 
22
61
 
  
20
58
9 
15
98
0 
31
38
 
  
  
Av
er
ag
e 
73
6 
57
8 
84
 
1.
22
 
76
3 
59
2 
11
6 
1.
27
 
  
St
d.
 d
ev
ia
ti
on
 
66
8 
45
4 
54
 
0.
19
 
71
3 
46
0 
76
 
0.
19
 
 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 4
76
Specialty level 
Table 4.3 displays the number of hospitals that share specialists per medical specialty. 
In 2015, specialist sharing is most common in internal medicine, neurosurgery, and 
anesthesiology in relative terms. 95% or more hospitals share specialists in these specialties. 
In absolute terms the phenomenon is most common in pediatrics, anesthesiology, and 
gynecology and obstetrics. 77 or more hospitals share specialists in these specialties. The 
phenomenon is least common in clinical genetics in which 45 percent of the hospitals share 
medical specialists in 2013 and 2015. Clinical genetics, radiology, and psychiatry are the 
only specialties in which less than half of all hospitals share specialists in 2015. Clinical 
genetics and radiology are offered by only a few hospitals while psychiatry is predominantly 
offered in specialized hospitals which were excluded from the analysis. At least 69 percent 
of the hospitals share specialists in all other medical specialties. An ANOVA reveals 
significant differences in the average rate of specialist sharing in hospitals across specialties 
(p-value < 0.01). Using a Bonferroni post-hoc correction, plastic surgery, neurosurgery, and 
rheumatology for example all have significantly higher rates of specialist sharing than most 
other specialties. The absolute and relative number of specialists shared by hospitals within 
each medical specialty furthermore differs over time. In 14 of the 27 specialties the average 
absolute number of specialists shared by hospitals increases significantly between 2013 and 
2015. Increases in the percentage of specialists shared per hospital in each specialty are 
significant in a third of all medical specialties (see Table 4.3). 
The various rates of specialist sharing in each specialty result in different network structures 
which are graphically represented in Figure 4.1. Each node in these networks represents 
a hospital and the size of the node is proportionate to the number of specialists in that 
specialty affiliated to the hospital. The nodes are shaped according to their type. Triangles 
represent academic hospitals and circles represent non-academic hospitals. Hospitals that 
merged between 2013 and 2015 are displayed using a square in the 2015 network. Thickness 
of the ties between the nodes is relative to the number of specialists shared between them. 
These network structures are (partially) represented in the measure of network density 
(see Table 4.3). The average network density of all specialties does not increase significantly 
between 2013 and 2015 (p-value = 0.142).
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Figure 4.1: Inter-organizational networks of hospitals (nodes) sharing medical specialists (ties). 
Triangles represent academic hospitals, circles represent general hospitals.  
First row: Ophthalmology, Ear Nose and Throat, General surgery, Plastic surgery, Orthopedics  
Second row: Urology, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Neurosurgery, Dermatology, Internal medicine 
Third row: Pediatrics, Gastroenterology, Cardiology, Pulmonology, Rheumatology 
Fourth row: Rehabilitation medicine, Cardiopulmonary surgery, Psychiatry, Neurology, Geriatrics 
Fifth row: Radiotherapy, Radiology, Nuclear medicine, Microbiology, Pathology Sixth row: Anesthesiology, Clinical genetics.  
Figure 4.1: Inter-organizational networks of hospitals (nodes) sharing medical specialists (ties). 
Tr angles represent academic hospitals, circles represent general hospitals. 
Fi st row: Ophthalmology, Ear N e and Th oat, G neral surgery, Plastic surgery, Orthopedics 
Second row: Urology, Obstet ics and Gynecology, Neurosurgery, Dermatology, Internal medicine
Third row: Pediatrics, Gastroenterology, Cardiology, Pulmonology, Rheumatology
Fourth r : Reh bilitation medicine, Cardiopulmonary surger , Psychiatry, Neurology, Geriatrics
Fifth row: Radiotherapy, Radiology, Nuclear medicine, Microbiology, Pathology
Sixth ro : Anesthesiology, Clinical genetics.
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Hospital level 
All Dutch hospitals share specialists with another hospital. When combining all specialties 
offered by each hospital, every hospital shares at least 9 medical specialists in 2013 and at 
least 19 specialists in 2015. On average, a hospital shares 27 percent of all their specialists 
(i.e. 55 specialists) in 2013 and 35 percent (i.e. 83 specialists) in 2015. The absolute number 
and the percentage of specialists shared by Dutch hospitals both increase significantly 
between 2013 and 2015 (both p-values < 0.01 based on paired-sample t-test). The hospital 
level network is displayed in Figure 4.2. Triangles represent academic hospitals, circles 
represent non-academic hospitals, and squares represent merged hospitals between 2013 
and 2015. Hospitals are furthermore placed according to their geographical location (yet 
arranged to enhance visibility) and ties are only displayed when at least five specialists are 
shared between hospitals. 
Underlying motives of specialist sharing
All respondents in our qualitative enquiry were familiar with the concept of medical 
specialists working in multiple organizations. Although one executive said “It’s not a major 
issue” (Executive 3), twelve of the twenty medical specialists indicated that they currently 
work in more than one healthcare organization and four that they had previously worked 
for multiple organizations. Several types of specialist sharing arrangements, in terms of 
the amount and type of organizations involved, emerged from the interviews however. Of 
the respondents who currently work or had previously worked in multiple organizations, 
two specialists (had) work(ed) in three different organizations simultaneously. All others 
(had) work(ed) in two organizations. The most common form of being shared amongst our 
respondents was between two hospitals, although five respondents (had) work(ed) in a 
hospital and in another type of organization such as an independent treatment center or a 
specialized hospital. 
Financial arrangements between the organizations sharing specialists also differed. Although 
in all cases, some sort of financial or contractual arrangement regarding the shared specialist 
was present. Hospitals investing in a partially owned subsidiary, merged specialist groups 
working in several hospitals, secondment of specialists, and specialists covering weekend 
shifts on a ‘quid pro quo’ basis were, amongst others, mentioned by our respondents as 
types of financial arrangements between organizations. One respondent for example said: 
“Look, what we do in essence in case a specialist works there [in another organization] for a 
day we send a bill for a day’s work. If he does that for an entire year it’s 20% of his salary.” 
(Executive 1). In line with our quantitative exploration, our qualitative analysis considers 
arrangements involving specialists who work in two or more hospitals. 
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(Ex cutive 1). In line with our quantitative exploration, our qualitative analysis considers arrangements involving specialists who work in two or more hospitals.  
 
Figure 4.2 Specialist sharing between hospitals in 2013 (top) and 2015 (bottom). Ties are 
relative to tie weight and displayed when at least 5 specialists are shared between the hospitals. 
Triangles represent academic hospitals, circles represent general hospitals. Squares represent 
hospitals that merged between 2013 and 2015. Nodes are placed according to their geographical 
location in the Netherlands.   
Figure 4.2 Specialist sharing between hospitals in 2013 (top) and 2015 (bottom). Ties are relative 
to tie weight and displayed when at l ast 5 specia ists are shared between t e hospitals. Triangles 
represent academic hospitals, circles represent general hospitals. Squares represent hospitals that 
merged bet�een 2013 and 2015. Nodes are placed according to their geographical location in the 
Netherlands. 
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Initiators of specialist sharing
The interviews revealed that specialist sharing can be initiated by a single specialist, by 
a group of specialists (i.e. a department or a specialty partnership), or by the executive 
board of a hospital. However, all respondents indicated that there was an important role for 
individual specialist or a group of specialists. One respondent replied by saying: “I think this 
is mostly a personal choice” (Specialist 10). Another explained:
“You cannot force people to work together. If it doesn’t come from them [the specialists] 
then it will never be an ideal result. You can try to force them, you can monitor them, but it’s 
like making a child eat, it’s impossible. You can put it in his mouth but you cannot make him 
swallow.” (Specialist 3). 
However, two respondents described situations in which the initiative to share specialists 
was explicitly taken by the hospital. One of them mentioned: “We were approached by the 
board [of another hospital] at that time. Whether we would be interested to talk about 
taking over the practice there.” (Specialist 20).
The initiators of the specialist sharing indicated several factors which drive them to engage 
in this behavior. These factors are summarized in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Main drivers underpinning specialist sharing at organizational and specialist level
Organizational motives Specialists’ motives
Adhering to volume requirements Facilitating sub-specialization
Secure market share Adhering to volume requirements
Monopolize markets Improve quality of care
Raising entry barriers Working in diverse settings
Fulfilling 24/7 shift duties
Financial benefits
Specialists’ drivers to be shared
Specialists reported several personal motives and benefits of working in multiple 
organizations. The most frequently mentioned personal drivers were sub-specialization, 
efficiency, and personal financial gains. More than half of the respondents indicated that 
sub-specialization in a specific part of their medical field was one of the main drivers to 
work in multiple organizations. In order to keep up with the advancement in their respective 
fields, they felt the need to treat as many patients with a specific condition as possible. One 
specialist replied: 
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“I mean more and more what we see is staff members are going to specialize. That’s good 
on one side because you increase your level of competence and it’s bad because you tend 
to lose the overall view. But probably that’s the evolution and development we can’t stop 
because it’s also medicine itself which is getting more and more complex so nobody can see 
or do everything.” (Specialist 1). 
Specialists perceived working in multiple organizations as a practical way to facilitate such 
specialization: “In this way specialists can increase their expertise and I think that is the 
main reason why they do it. You need to see a certain volume of a certain disease and health 
care is becoming more and more specialized.” (Specialist 8). In some cases this necessity 
was explicitly present for specialists in the form of volume requirements set by a medical 
association. As one specialist put it: “As specialists, and in my specialty, surgery, it is perhaps 
most apparent, we are forced to deliver a certain level of quality 24/7. Increasingly we are 
forced to have separate degree’s or registrations for every little sub-part.” (Specialist 17). 
With the exception of one specialist who replied: “No, I like it here but I have to fill the place 
there.” (Specialist 7), specialists typically reported that they enjoyed the diversity of working 
in another hospital. They said things like: “It helps to keep an open mind if you work at 
several places” (Specialist 8), and: 
“You hear how things work over there, how people do things differently and vice-versa. You 
look in each other’s protocols and you look at each other’s practical, logistic, and medical 
problems. I find that almost more thrilling than doing the actual work on the work floor.” 
(Specialist 14). 
Experiencing these diverse environments also enabled specialists to transfer some of these 
new insights to their own organization which helped them increase efficiency in their own 
organization. One specialist said for example: “In that sense you pick up a few things. How 
to get those on point.” (Specialist 13). Independent specialists who worked in specialties 
which require 24/7 attendance of a specialist furthermore pointed out that working in shifts 
across multiple hospitals was particularly beneficial in terms of efficiency and sustainable 
employment:. “It’s the four of us and five of them. Together that makes nine so now we take 
shifts every ninth weekend and that is a real improvement.”(Specialist 20)
However, respondents also pointed out downsides of working in multiple locations. Those 
included having to manage two separate workloads: “You need to be good at both places. 
You need to be there, so that takes more than two times the effort, it’s two and a half.” 
(Specialist 2), and not being able to see the patient throughout the entire process: “You 
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have to be careful that you don’t just do the surgery and are not involved in the pre- and 
post- surgical care. That’s unpleasant. You want to keep the entire span of patient contact.” 
(Specialist 11). Despite these potential downsides, some specialists indicated that they 
perceived specialist sharing to enhance quality and convenience of care for patients, which 
served as an important driver for them to engage in such behavior: “The thing driving it is 
the wish to provide the best care for patients.” (Specialist 10) and: “It enables patients to 
receive specialized treatment close to home” (Specialist 14). Although several specialists do 
highlight that: “It depends on the specialty whether it [working in multiple organizations] 
makes sense” (Specialist 14). Other respondents indicated that the benefit for patients is not 
straightforward either: “Perhaps it’s nice for the patient if their specialist assists during the 
surgery in another hospital. But whether it’s essential? I don’t know.” (Executive 4). 
Lastly, some respondents indicate that working in multiple organizations can be driven by 
financial motives. Tenured specialists in an academic hospital predominantly mentioned 
being able to make more money outside academia: “The people I know do it for personal 
reasons, to earn more money.” (Specialist 9) whereas for independent specialists it served as 
a way to increase clientele and to protect their fiscal status of entrepreneur: “The specialists’ 
agenda to cooperate is more complex than just quality considerations. It’s also their status 
as entrepreneurs.” (Executive 4)
Organizational motives
None of the specialists perceived working for multiple organizations as a fully autonomous 
decision. One specialist replied by saying: “It is of course not a 100% autonomous decision.” 
(Specialist 16). Instead, the final decision to share a specialist lies with the hospital board, 
which is illustrated by responses such as: “I need approval to do something in another 
hospital. Formally for sure” (Specialist 11) and: “A specialist has to bring it before the 
board and the board will assess whether it is a potential problem. If it’s a problem it will 
not happen.“ (Specialist 19). One specialist recalled a situation in which the hospital board 
forbade a specialty partnership to merge with the specialty partnership of another hospital: 
“The reason it [the merge] did not happen was because of the hospital board. […] The day 
we would sign the agreement on Monday evening, the executive board sent a messenger 
to all the specialists who weren’t present because they had a compensation day for the 
weekend, on Monday morning with the decree not to sign the agreement.” (Specialist 13). 
The executives reiterated their formal position towards the specialists, mentioning: “I think 
we would forbid it if a specialist said “I am going to do that in another hospital one day 
per week”. If we didn’t want that to happen.” (Executive 2) as well as: “In fact, you actually 
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need approval to do so [work in another hospital], so that happens only occasionally. 
Except for when there is an incentive for the hospital to do so.” (Executive 3). Furthermore, 
the independent specialists and their respective executives point out that the recent 
introduction of formal ‘specialist enterprises’ within the hospital (i.e. ‘medisch specialistisch 
bedrijf’) introduced an extra decision-making layer. One specialist said for example: “The 
specialist enterprise says; “Executive board? We have to agree first.”.” (Specialist 20). 
Specialist sharing thus occurs when the interests of specialists and the executive board are 
aligned. In the words of one respondent: “I believe that at the end of the day, in a good 
hospital, the interests of the executive board and of the specialists are exactly the same; 
delivering good, efficient, effective health care.” (Specialist 17). Respondents pointed out 
several motives a hospital can have to share specialists with another hospital. These include 
external drivers as well as strategic considerations. The former mostly involves volume 
requirements which health insurers have introduced for specific treatments as a pre-
condition for hospitals to be eligible for a contract. Both specialists and executives indicate 
that these requirements are a strong driver to share medical specialists. They mention for 
example: “The health insurer once doubled the volume requirement of the professional 
medical association. They just said; “you have to do 100 procedures a year.” Nobody knows 
where the number comes from.” (Specialist 17). However, one specialist pointed out that 
specialist sharing does not necessarily facilitate meeting the volume requirements: 
“It’s about the total package, the system. […] A hospital asked THE surgeon in the country, 
who does it hundreds of times per year, to perform surgeries in their hospital. But the health 
insurer didn’t allow them to perform the procedure because they didn’t do enough. They 
said it doesn’t count, it’s the hospital that counts.” (Specialist 20)
Laslty, the respondents mentioned several strategic considerations a hospital might have 
to share medical specialists. For example, respondents indicated that specialist sharing was 
used to secure market share by ensuring the flow of specific patients towards the hospital: 
“Referring patients to this hospital is ensured by having our own specialists in the other 
hospital.” (Specialist 6). Monopolizing certain markets, diminishing competition, and raising 
entry barriers were also organizational motives pointed out by some respondents who 
said for example: “We had come to an agreement with another hospital where we give 
them procedure A and B and they send us procedure C.” (Executive 2) or: “It diminishes 
competition because if you have an agreement with someone else then you don’t compete 
anymore.” (Specialist 3) and: “If we do that we make each other stronger and it’s less likely 
that a new treatment center will open in our market. So it’s also to protect our own work.” 
(Specialist 15).
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Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of our study was to investigate the extent of- and motives behind- specialist 
sharing, in the price-competitive hospital market of the Netherlands. All Dutch hospitals 
share specialists and the phenomenon occurs in all medical specialties. In roughly half of 
all specialties it has furthermore increased significantly between 2013 and 2015. Reasons 
for specialists to work in multiple organizations include learning, efficiency, and financial 
benefits but increased workload and discontinuity of care form potential drawbacks. 
Adhering to volume norms and strategic considerations are seen as hospitals’ main drivers 
to share specialists. 
The qualitative expert opinions and quantitative evidence did not always provide a 
congruent answer regarding the differences in- and extent of- the phenomenon per 
specialty. A specialist in internal medicine mentioned for example: “My specialty does not 
lend itself for working in multiple organizations.” (Specialist 19). However, our quantitative 
results show that internal medicine is the specialty in which most hospitals share specialists. 
The discrepancy could be explained by the fact that several sub-specializations exist within 
internal medicine, but additional research is needed to disentangle these differences. We 
can nonetheless conclude that specialist sharing is a common phenomenon. Our quantitative 
evidence reveals that it occurs in every medical specialty and that every Dutch hospital 
shares multiple specialists with other hospitals. Although one respondent in our qualitative 
enquiry said: “In this specialty we don’t do that” (Specialist 5), the widespread occurrence 
of the phenomenon is generally supported by our qualitative findings. All respondents 
indicated that they were familiar with it through personal experience or through that of a 
colleague. Our qualitative evidence furthermore indicates that the phenomenon extends 
beyond sharing between hospitals which offers avenues for future research. 
Secondly, we set out to uncover the motives behind specialist sharing. Our qualitative 
findings highlight several motives at personal and organizational level along with different 
initiators and financial and practical arrangements of the phenomenon. In line with 
Scholten and Van der Grinten (30) we find that the final authority regarding decisions to 
share specialists lies with the executive board of a hospital. Such formal power suggests 
that organizational strategies drive the phenomenon but, with a few exceptions, specialists 
report having a strong involvement in the emergence of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, our 
results show that the personal motives to work for multiple employers and organizational 
motives to share specialists do not deviate to a great extent. Both groups of respondents 
furthermore identify the phenomenon as a form of cooperation through which knowledge 
flows from one organization to the next. Hence, we conclude that specialist sharing should 
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be interpreted as a form of inter-organizational cooperation which predominantly emerges 
as a bottom-up strategy requiring approval by hospital boards.
Lastly, we investigated specialist sharing within the price-competitive Dutch specialized 
care market. As Varkevisser, van der Geest (17) describe, the phenomenon leads insurance 
companies to negotiate for services which, at the back-end, are performed by the same 
specialist(s), which potentially frustrates effective competition. Enthoven (2) underlines this 
tension when he writes: “I believe the most effective competition occurs […] with each doctor 
fully committed to one organization.” (2). The fact that our quantitative results indicate a 
significant increase in the phenomenon over time, congruent with increasing competitive 
pressure in the specialized care market is therefore a notable finding. Especially since our 
qualitative results indicate that although the phenomenon is largely quality-driven, it can 
also serve anti-competitive strategies. These findings are in line with those of Gaynor and 
Haas-Wilson (31) who point out that consolidation can be an efficient response to external 
factors as well as an anti-competitive strategy. 
Although our respondents mention several points highlighted by previous research, such 
as scale economies, knowledge exchange, sub-specialization, and efficiency (32, 33), as 
drivers of specialist sharing, several respondents expressed doubts as to their achievability. 
While initial research posited that learning effects occur with increasing volumes (34), the 
association has not gone uncontested (35). Additionally, Huckman and Pisano (36) as well 
as Westert, Nieboer (37) indicate that the performance of surgeons is non-transferable 
across organizational boundaries. Regardless of the presence of anti-competitive intent, the 
establishment of specialist sharing as an emergent form of inter-organizational cooperation 
and ambiguity regarding its effect on quality beckon the question whether it bears anti-
competitive effects (38). Further research is needed to discern whether specialist sharing 
constitutes an antitrust infringement in competitive healthcare markets. 
Our work is subject to some limitations. First and foremost, possessing an AGB-code is not 
obligatory for medical specialists. Hence, the database could underestimate the actual 
number of medical specialists. However, a recent report concerning the match between 
the Dutch medical registry (i.e. BIG registry) and the AGB-database revealed that only in 
0.5% of all cases the AGB records lacked a BIG number, indicating that the overlap between 
both sources is high. From 2013 onwards, the billing procedure in the hospital sector has 
furthermore been scrutinized, increasing specialists’ necessity to possess an AGB-code. 
Additionally, triangulation of our qualitative and quantitative data revealed large overlap 
of both methodologies. We identified three discrepancies: in two cases the specialist self-
reported being shared between hospitals but the database did not support this claim and 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Understanding specialist sharing
87
4
one case vice-versa. Furthermore, specialists who reported that they were being shared 
in a manner which does not generate revenues for the receiving hospital, such as those 
covering weekend shifts, were not identified as shared in the AGB-database. Therefore, our 
quantitative analysis should be considered a conservative estimate of the phenomenon. 
Lastly, generalizability of these findings depends on rules and regulations in other countries. 
In some countries being affiliated to multiple hospitals is forbidden by law and international 
comparison is therefore a point for future research. While our database did not enable us to 
quantitatively assess the extent of cross-border specialist sharing, one of our respondents 
indicated that he was shared between a Dutch and a non-Dutch hospital highlighting that 
the phenomenon is not limited to the Netherlands.
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Abstract
Cooperative inter-organizational relations are salient to healthcare delivery. However, 
they do not match with the pro-competitive healthcare reforms implemented in several 
countries. Healthcare organizations thus need to balance competition and cooperation 
in a situation of ‘coopetition’. In this chapter we study the individual and organizational 
determinants of coopetition versus those of cooperation in the price-competitive specialized 
care sector of the Netherlands. We use shared medical specialists as a proxy of collaboration 
between healthcare organizations. Based on a sample of 15,431 medical specialists and 371 
specialized care organizations from March 2016, one logistic multi-level model is used to 
predict medical specialists’ likelihood to be shared and another to predict their likelihood 
to be shared to a competitor. We find that different organizations share different specialists 
to competitors and non-competitors. Cooperation and coopetition are hence distinct 
organizational strategies in health care. Cooperation manifests through spin-off formation. 
Coopetition occurs most among organizations in the price-competitive market segment but 
in alternative geographical markets. Hence, coopetition in health care does not appear to 
be particularly anti-competitive. However, healthcare organizations seem reluctant to share 
their most specialized human resources, limiting the knowledge-sharing effects of this type 
of relation. Therefore, it remains unclear whether coopetition in health care is beneficial to 
patients.
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Introduction
Health care is a service which is typically delivered to patients by several providers (i.e. 
organizations) cooperating in inter-organizational networks (1-3). This is the result of the 
high level of specialization of providers and the fragmented nature of the sector due to 
its funding schemes (4, 5). Inter-organizational networks can consist of various types 
of temporary or long-lasting inter-organizational relations through which resources are 
transferred between organizations, underpinned by various organizational motives (6, 
7). Examples of inter-organizational relations in health care include patient transfers, 
consortia, shared human resources, and interlocking directorates (e.g. 8, 9). Well-structured 
cooperative inter-organizational healthcare networks are considered an efficient resource 
allocation method and have proven beneficial for quality of care (e.g. 10, 11).
The absence of (price-)competition has long been considered a salient factor for inter-
organizational cooperation to flourish (12) and much of the initial research regarding inter-
organizational cooperation was consequently conducted in industries like health care (e.g. 
13). However, several Western countries have passed market-based reforms in an attempt 
to contain healthcare costs (14, 15). Such reforms, aim to stimulate competition between 
providers which should in turn optimize value in the industry (9, 16), with value being the 
best health outcomes per dollar spent (17). The introduction of competition effectively 
renders many cooperating healthcare providers in a situation where they simultaneously 
cooperate and compete, two diametrically opposed logics (18). 
During the past two decades, simultaneous cooperation and competition between organi-
zations has become an increasingly established phenomenon in strategic management 
literature known as coopetition (19). It has attracted particular attention in knowledge-
intensive industries (20, 21). While some have dubbed coopetition ‘sleeping with the 
enemy’ (22), the concept is primarily based on ‘growth commensalism’ (23). It is described 
as a phenomenon in which competitors cooperate to create or expand a market but 
compete to appropriate the largest possible share of that market in academic literature 
(e.g. 24). Along this line, knowledge sharing and inter-organizational learning are considered 
the primary motives to cooperate with competitors (e.g. 24). Improved competitiveness 
and innovativeness resulting from scale advantages are considered the main outcomes of 
this process (e.g. 25) when the tensions inherent to the opposite logics of competition and 
cooperation are well-managed at individual and organizational level (e.g. 26). Coopetition is 
primarily studied at the inter-organizational level using case studies (21) and empirical work 
has mostly failed to capture the multi-level nature of the phenomenon (20). 
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In health care, coopetition has been described as ‘the new market milieu’ (27). Yet, despite 
the implementation of competition in several healthcare systems, and the inherent 
tensions this brings cooperating competitors, coopetition has not been studied extensively 
in the sector. In their systematic review of the coopetition literature, Bouncken, Gast (21) 
identified only two studies which explicitly utilize the concept of coopetition in health care 
(i.e. 28, 29). Albeit perhaps not explicitly referencing coopetition, simultaneous competition 
and cooperation has not gone unnoticed by health services researchers. Studies by Lomi 
and Pallotti (30), Mascia, Di Vincenzo (31), and Mascia, Pallotti (32) for example show 
that competing hospitals in the Italian National Health System (NHS) are more likely to 
collaborate with one another. Mascia and Di Vincenzo (33) find that while cooperation 
benefits hospitals’ performance, competition hampers it. Conversely, Plochg, Delnoij (34) 
find that market-based reforms hamper cooperation between providers in the Netherlands. 
Most of the empirical research regarding coopetition in health care stems from the Italian 
NHS in which price-competition is absent (31) and has focused on transferring patients, 
a temporary relation between organizations (31). Empirically, long-lasting resource flows 
between organizations have only been considered to a limited extent in this stream of 
literature. Furthermore, the coopetition literature in health care has either operationalized 
competition as a relational phenomenon at the dyadic level (e.g. 35) or at the industry level 
as an industry characteristic (e.g. 34). Conceptualizations of competition at the sub-industry 
level (23), which have been applied in healthcare management research (e.g. 36), have not 
been juxtaposed with cooperation. Strategic groups are arguably the most well-known sub-
industry conceptualization of competition. Strategic groups refer to groups of organizations 
within an industry which offer similar products or services and which can thus be considered 
each other’s main competitors (e.g. 37). 
We aim to advance our understanding of coopetition in health care, and thus of competitive 
healthcare markets using the following research question; ‘What are the individual and 
organizational determinants of coopetition versus those of cooperation in health care?’. 
Consequently, we study the determinants of coopetition (i.e. simultaneous cooperation and 
competition) and contrast these with the determinants of cooperation. This enables us to 
unravel the similarities and differences between cooperation and coopetition in a price-
competitive healthcare market. Furthermore, we answer the call for a multi-level approach 
to studying coopetition by examining which resources are shared by which organizations. 
Lastly, we study a long-lasting relation specific to the healthcare sector, namely shared human 
resources (i.e. medical specialists). Medical specialists are a key resource of hospitals (38), 
yet it is common for them to be affiliated to multiple hospitals simultaneously (27, 39). This 
approach draws from the labor mobility literature in which employee inflows are perceived 
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as vehicles to attract tacit knowledge of an employee’s former employer and as conduits 
of communication between current and former employers (e.g. 40, 41). It also captures 
the tension inherent to simultaneous cooperation and competition since shared medical 
specialists between healthcare organizations has been described as anti-competitive (42).
Methods
Setting
We study coopetition in the specialized care market of the Netherlands. Price-competition 
was introduced in this sector by the Health Insurance Act (HIA) in 2006 as a consequence 
of selective contracting of providers by third-party purchasers (i.e. insurers) (43). Upon 
introduction of the HIA in 2006, it was limited to approximately 7% of the specialized care 
services but since 2012, price-competition pertains to roughly 70% of the specialized care 
services (44). In 2013, more than half of the curative healthcare expenditure under the HIA 
was spent on specialized care services which are delivered by academic hospitals, teaching 
hospitals, general hospitals, specialized hospitals, and independent treatment centers (45, 
46). 
Data
Our study, which was not subjected to the Dutch ‘Research involving Human Subjects 
act’ following the decision of the Maastricht University Medical Center ethics committee 
(number 14-5-028), was based on data owned by Vektis, the Dutch center for information 
and standardization in health care. Specifically, we used the publically available ‘Algemeen 
Gegevensbeheer Code’ (AGB-code) data (version U145, released in the second half of March 
2016) which is designed to handle claims and to analyze healthcare consumption (47). An 
AGB-code is a unique identifier for healthcare professionals and healthcare organizations in 
the Netherlands. Insurers only reimburse claims with a valid combination of a professional’s 
and organization’s AGB-code (47). In order to receive an AGB-code, medical specialists need 
to be listed in the country’s medical (BIG) registry and specialized care organizations need to 
possess a unique chamber of commerce number and governmental admission to the market 
(47). The AGB-code database contains the active affiliations of professionals to healthcare 
organizations as well as a professional’s and an organization’s basic characteristics (e.g. age, 
gender, experience, type of organization, and location). AGB-code data has previously been 
used to explore the occurrence of shared specialists in the Netherlands (48). 
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Sample 
From the database we selected all medical specialists (n=19,852), all specialized care 
organizations (n=969), and all active affiliations of the specialists to the organizations 
(n=26,614). Because the financial incentive for specialists to keep the database up to date 
(49) becomes obsolete upon their retirement, all specialists who had reached the Dutch 
retirement age on April 1st 2016 were excluded. Five specialist who were below the age of 
30 on April 1st 2016 were also excluded, since only professionals who have completed their 
residencies are eligible for an AGB code, which is practically impossible before the age of 30 
in the Netherlands (50). Specialists without an active affiliation to any of the organizations 
in our sample were disregarded.
Specialized hospitals, including psychiatric hospitals, were excluded because they can also 
be categorized as long-term care organizations in the AGB-code data and different entry 
barriers can apply (47). Our sample hence included independent treatment centers (ITCs), 
general hospitals, teaching hospitals, and academic hospitals. Similar to what Gaynor 
and Town (51) describe as ambulatory surgical centers, ITCs are ambulatory clinics that 
typically offer low-complex outpatient care in a few specialties. Furthermore, the distinction 
between general, teaching, and academic hospitals is similar to what Zwanziger, Melnick 
(52) describe as primary, secondary, and tertiary hospital services. General hospitals offer 
basic (i.e. ‘primary’) hospital services in several specialties. Teaching hospitals offer services 
which require more specialized resources (i.e. ‘secondary services’) and are hospitals where 
medical students and residents can be placed. Academic hospitals offer highly specialized 
(i.e. ‘tertiary’) services on a regional basis and are responsible for the training of medical 
students and residents in close collaboration with a university (52, 53). Because the services 
offered by organizations within each of these categories are distinct and most closely 
resemble the services offered by organizations in the same category, each organizational 
type was considered a separate strategic group. 
All specialists were assigned an organization to which they were primarily affiliated and, if 
applicable, an organization to which they were shared. We calculated the duration of each 
active affiliation a specialist had using the starting date of the affiliation. The organization to 
which a specialist had the longest active affiliation was considered the specialist’s primary 
organization. The second organization to which a specialist was affiliated was considered the 
organization to which a specialist was shared. Specialists with more than two affiliations were 
considered shared to the strongest competitor. That is, the most geographically proximate 
organization in the same strategic group. In cases none of the additional affiliations were to 
an organization in the same strategic group we considered them shared to the organization 
to which they had the second-longest affiliation. Specialists with equal affiliation durations 
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for their first two affiliations were disregarded because we were unable to determine the 
primary organization which decided to share the specialist in these cases. Ultimately, we 
retained a sample of 15,431 medical specialists in 29 medical specialties (see Appendix 1), 
primarily affiliated to 371 specialized care organizations. 
Measures and model specification
Dependent variables 
In the Netherlands, medical specialists are either employed by a hospital or independent, 
self-employed, entrepreneurs organized in per-specialty partnerships called ‘maatschap’ 
(54). Sharing a medical specialist thus either implies that an organization shares a tenured 
employee or that a ‘maatschap’ is affiliated to multiple organizations. In both cases the 
hospital board is responsible for its specialists (55) and decides whether or not to share 
a specialist (48). Previous research has identified sharing specialists as an emergent, yet 
deliberate, strategy of healthcare organizations given the formal decision-making authority 
and the strategic considerations underpinning the decision (48). 
We used two dependent variables, both of which indicated whether a specialist was shared 
between two organizations in our sample. Our first was a binary indicator coded 1 when 
a specialist was shared to another organization in our sample and 0 otherwise. Based on 
this first dependent variable, we modeled the individual and organizational determinants of 
cooperation. That is, a specialist’s general likelihood to be shared. Our second dependent 
variable was a binary indicator coded 1 when specialists who were shared, as identified by 
our first independent variable, were shared to an organization in the same strategic group 
as their primary organization and 0 otherwise. Based on this second dependent variable we 
modeled the individual and organizational determinants of coopetition. That is, a specialist’s 
likelihood to be shared to a competitor (i.e. an organization in the same strategic group). 
Model specification
We constructed a multilevel logistic regression model with maximum likelihood estimation, 
Laplace likelihood approximation, and logit link function for both dependent variables 
using the ‘glimmix’ procedure in the SAS software for Microsoft Windows version 9.3. 
The multilevel structure was used in order to account for the separation of effects at the 
individual and organizational level (56). Formally we specified the following model: 
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Where:
 
Level-1 independent variables
β0
ij 
through β37
ij
 represent personal characteristics of medical specialists and serve as first-
level predictors of the likelihood that a specialist is shared. β0
ij
 represents the first-level 
intercept. Gender, experience, and the specialty of a specialist are all common personal-
level variables in research regarding collaboration in health care (e.g. 57). Gender
i
 was 
coded 1 for male and 0 for female. Experience
i
 was operationalized as the number of years 
between April 1st 2016 and the date on which a specialist finished his or her residency. 
 represents 29 mutually exclusive dummies indicating a specialist’s 
medical specialty coded 1 for yes and 0 for no. Internal medicine, the largest specialty in our 
sample, serves as the reference category. PhD
i
 indicates whether the specialist holds a PhD 
(i.e. 1 for yes and 0 for no) and is used as an indication of seniority (58) in medical terms. 
Affiliation Duration
ij 
represents how long a specialist has been affiliated to their primary 
organization measured in years per April 1st 2016 and is a predictor of employee turnover in 
labor economics (e.g. 59). Independent
ij
 is a dummy variable coded 1 for specialists who work 
in a ‘maatschap’ and 0 for employed specialists. Traveltime
ij
 and Traveltime
ij
2, are only used 
in model 2 and
 
indicate the (curvilinear) effect of geographical proximity, operationalized as 
travel time in hours, between a specialist’s primary and secondary organization. The travel 
time between each dyad of organizations was retrieved from the Google Maps API through 
inputting both organizations’ visiting address using the SAS software for Microsoft Windows 
version 9.3. Our findings proved robust against operationalizing proximity as geographical 
distance like in previous research (57, 58).
Level-2 independent variables
α
j
 denotes the second level random intercept specified as the grand mean α and hospital 
specific deviation from that mean µ
j
.  through  represent organizational characteristics 
of a specialist’s primary organization and serve as second-level predictors of the likelihood 
to be shared. Size
j
 constitutes a common variable in studies regarding hospital strategies 
and was operationalized as the total number of specialists affiliated to the organization 
expressed in hundreds. Competition
j
 represents a measure of the degree of competition to 
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which an organization is exposed. It is operationalized as the cumulative degree of service-
overlap of organization j with all other organizations k in a 10 kilometer radius. The degree 
of service overlap between organization j and another organization k was defined as the 
percentage of specialties offered by organization j which organization k also offers. We 
considered an organization to offer a specialty when at least one specialist of a specialty was 
primarily affiliated to the organization. The 10 kilometer radius represents the local nature 
of specialized care markets (60) but findings proved robust against higher radiuses. MHS 
membership is a dummy variable coded 1 when an organization is part of a multihospital 
system (MHS) (61) in which at least one other organizations from our sample is also a 
member and 0 otherwise. The variable was constructed based on the group ID associated 
with each AGB-code in the Dutch national company registry of Statistics Netherlands. 
ITC
j
, General Hospital
j
, Teaching Hospital
j
, and Academic Hospital
j
 are mutually exclusive 
dummies indicating the type (i.e. strategic group) of each organization. General hospitals 
serve as the reference category. Lastly,  indicates the error term. 
Results
Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the first-level variables. It reveals that roughly 
28% of all medical specialists in our sample (n=15,431) are shared and that 31% of those 
shared specialists (n=4,277) are shared to an organization in the same strategic group. Of 
the 15,431 specialists, 61% are male, 52% are employed by their primary organization, and 
22% have obtained a PhD. Of the 4,277 shared specialists 66% is male, 45% is employed 
by their primary organization and 20% has a PhD. On average, specialists have almost 12 
years of experience and have been affiliated to their primary organization for roughly 9.5 
years. Shared specialists are, on average, more experienced (i.e. 13 years) and have longer 
affiliations to their primary organization (i.e. 10.5 years). Most of the specialists, as well as 
the shared specialists, are primarily affiliated to a general or a teaching hospital. Lastly, on 
average, shared specialists are shared to organizations located almost an hour away from 
their primary organization.
Table 6.2 displays the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of healthcare organizations. 
It indicates that 371 organizations served as the primary organization of one or more 
specialists in our sample. On average, 56 specialists were affiliated to an organization and 
organizations were exposed to 5.74 organizations in a 10 kilometer radius with which they 
had full service overlap. Most organizations in our sample are ITCs (78%), followed by 
general hospitals (13%), teaching hospitals (8%), and academic hospitals (2%). Of those 371 
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organizations, 226 organizations cooperate. That is, they served as the primary organization 
of at least one shared specialist. On average, 90 specialists are affiliated to these organizations 
and they have 5.15 organizations in a 10 kilometer radius with which they have complete 
service overlap. Most of the organizations to which shared specialists are primarily affiliated 
are ITCs (63%), followed by general hospitals (21%), teaching hospitals (13%), and academic 
hospitals (4%). Of these 226 organizations, 176 engage in coopetition. That is, they share at 
least one specialist to an organization in the same strategic group. 
Table 6.3 indicates the number of specialists shared between each type of organization at 
organizational level. The rows represent the type of organization to which specialists are 
primarily affiliated and the columns represent the type of organization to which specialists 
are shared. The diagonal represents the number of specialists shared to organizations in 
the same strategic group (i.e. 31%, or 1,325 of the 4,277). Almost half of the specialists 
shared by an ITC are shared to another ITC (i.e.158 of the 359). Approximately a third of the 
specialists who are shared by a general hospital or a teaching hospital are shared to another 
general hospital or teaching hospital (574 out of 1,761 and 500 out of 1,614 respectively), 
while roughly a fifth of the specialists shared by an academic hospital are shared to another 
academic hospital (i.e. 93 out of 543). Table 6.3 furthermore highlights that 45% of the 
specialists who are primarily affiliated to an ITC, 33% of all specialists primarily affiliated to a 
general hospital, 28% of all specialists primarily affiliated to a teaching hospital, and 15% of 
all specialists primarily affiliated to an academic hospital are shared.
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Table 6.3   Shared to     
  ITC Genera
l hospi
tal 
Teachi
ng hosp
ital 
Academ
ic hosp
ital  
Numbe
r of spe
cialists
 shared
 
Numbe
r o
f s
pecialis
ts 
primar
ily 
affiliate
d t
o 
organiz
ational
 type* 
% of 
special
ist  sh
ared p
er 
organiz
ational
 type  
Shared
 by ITC 158 75 120 6 359 798 44.99% General hospital 661 574 423 103 1,761 5,373 32.77% Teaching hospital 451 579 500 84 1,614 5,687 28.38% Academic hospital 81 191 178 93 543 3,573 15.20%  Total 1,351 1,419 1,221 286 4,277 15,431  * The total number of affiliated specialists to each type of organization was calculated based on the percentage of specialists affiliated to each type reported in Table 6.1.    Table 6.4 presents the results of our logistic multilevel regression models predicting the 
likelihood a specialist is shared and the likelihood a specialist is shared within a strategic 
group. Only the results of the full model are presented. In both cases the full model, including 
all individual and organizational level predictors, displayed the best model fit, indicated by 
the Akaike Information Criterion. The intraclass correlation (ICC), calculated following the 
method described by Snijders and Bosker (56), reveals that a specialist’s primary organization 
explains roughly a quarter of the variance in the likelihood to be shared (i.e. model 1) and 
more than a third of the variance in the likelihood to be shared to a competitor.
Likelihood of cooperation 
Model 1 in Table 6.4 reveals the results of the regression model predicting the likelihood 
that a specialist is shared (i.e. the likelihood of cooperation). The results indicate that 
male specialists are 25% more likely to be shared than female specialists. Furthermore, a 
specialist is 3% more likely to be shared for each year he or she has been affiliated to their 
primary organization. Additionally, independent specialists are 10% less likely to be shared 
than specialists who are employed by their primary organization. Lastly, the likelihood of 
a specialist to be shared differs across medical specialties. In 21 of the 28 specialties the 
likelihood to be shared differs significantly from the reference category (see Appendix 2). 
At the organizational level, neither the size of a specialist’s primary organization nor the 
degree of competition to which it exposed significantly influence the likelihood of specialists 
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to be shared. The type of organization to which a specialist is primarily affiliated and 
whether that organization is part of a MHS do significantly influence a specialist’s likelihood 
to be shared. Specialists who are primarily affiliated to an academic hospital are 76% 
less likely to be shared than specialists affiliated to a general hospital (i.e. the reference 
category). Specialists affiliated to organizations which are part of a larger system of multiple 
organizations are 84% more likely to be shared. 
Likelihood of coopetition 
Model 2 in Table 6.4 presents the results of the regression model predicting the likelihood 
that a shared specialist is shared within a same strategic group (i.e. the likelihood of 
coopetition). At the individual level, the contract type, specialty of a medical specialist, and 
the traveling time between the primary and secondary organization all significantly influence 
a specialist’s likelihood to be shared within a strategic group. Independent specialists are 
31% less likely to be shared within a strategic group. A specialist is furthermore more likely 
to be shared within a strategic group if the organization to which he or she is shared is 
located further away, as indicated by the positive and significant effect of traveling time. 
However, the negative and significant effect of the squared travel time indicates that this 
likelihood decreases when the travel time between both organizations exceeds 96 minutes. 
The likelihood of a specialist to be shared within a strategic group differs significantly from 
the reference category in 8 of the 28 medical specialties (see Appendix 2). 
At the organizational level, neither the size, the degree of competition to which an 
organization is exposed, nor MHS membership influence the likelihood that a specialist is 
shared within a strategic group. The type of organization to which a specialist is primarily 
affiliated does have a significant influence on the likelihood of a specialist to be shared in a 
strategic group. Specialists who are primarily affiliated to an ITC are 2.44 times as likely to 
be shared to an organization in the same strategic group (i.e. another ITC) than specialists 
affiliated to a general hospital (i.e. the reference category). 
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Discussion
The aim of the study was to identify the individual and organizational determinants of 
cooperation and coopetition in health care. We based our analysis on shared human resources 
between healthcare organizations and used a multilevel approach to study which healthcare 
organizations share which human resources in general and to competitors. We find that 
more than a quarter of all specialists are shared. This contradicts the notion that specialists 
have a lifetime affiliation with one single hospital (54). In line with previous research (27, 48, 
62) it instead indicates that sharing specialists is a common inter-organizational relation in 
health care. This is particularly true for male specialists which can be explained by the fact 
that females are three times more likely to work part-time than males in the Netherlands 
(63) and sharing part-time employees could erode the already limited availability of these 
employees to an organization. 
Our results indicate that cooperation and coopetition entail different strategies. This becomes 
apparent in several ways. Firstly, the organizational level explains a considerable amount of 
the variance in a specialist’s likelihood to be shared (to a competitor), underlining the notion 
that sharing medical specialists is a deliberate organizational strategy. Secondly, not all 
organizations which cooperate engage in coopetition. Sixty-one percent of the organizations 
in our study cooperate. Of those, 78% engage in coopetition. Thirdly, the type of specialists 
shared in general and shared to competitors differs. While male specialists and specialists 
with longer affiliations, and consequently higher degrees of firm-specific knowledge, are 
more likely to be shared in general, they are not more likely to be shared to competitors. 
There are furthermore significant differences between the likelihood to be shared versus 
the likelihood to be shared to competitors in several medical specialties. Lastly, coopetition 
is more common for ITCs while cooperation is more common for organizations which belong 
to a multi-hospital system but less common for academic hospitals. Coopetition ultimately 
entices decisions ‘what to share, with whom, when, and under which conditions’ (64) and 
our results show that different organizations share different resources (i.e. specialists) in 
situations of cooperation versus coopetition.
Cooperation predominantly manifests itself through spin-off formation by general and 
teaching hospitals. Model 2 indicates that specialists shared to organizations in the same 
geographical market are likely to be shared to non-competitors. Subsequently, inspection 
of Table 6.3 reveals that 40% (i.e. 1193 of 2952) of the specialists who are shared to non-
competitors are shared to an ITC. Although such ambulatory clinics compete with hospitals 
for patients (65), hospital boards do share specialists to ITCs which constitute (potential) 
competitors (48) and these ITCS are thus likely to constitute spin-offs. Creating a spin-off 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Coopetition in health care specialist sharing
127
6
in the same geographical market furthermore minimizes the travel-time for specialists 
and allows hospitals to outsource certain activities while ensuring incoming referrals of 
patients (48). The finding that specialists with high degrees of firm-specific knowledge (i.e. 
longer affiliations to their primary organization) are more likely to be shared underlines the 
notion of spin-off formation as these specialists can maximize the alignment between both 
organizations. 
Coopetition manifests itself most clearly in organizations which are active in the price 
competitive segment of the market. That is, ITCs typically perform services in the price 
competitive market segment (66) and specialists primarily affiliated to an ITC are 2.5 times 
more likely to be shared to a competitor. Furthermore, 45% of all specialists primarily 
affiliated to an ITC are shared. However, Model 2 also indicates that cooperation with 
competitors predominantly occurs with competitors located further (i.e. one hour on 
average) away. Given the local nature of specialized care markets (60) these competitors 
thus reside in different geographical markets. The risk of anti-competitive effects resulting 
from sharing medical specialists, which has been suggested by previous research (42, 48, 
67) thus seem limited. The fact that coopetition seems most common in organizations 
which operate in the price-competitive market segment does raise the question on which 
criteria these organizations select appropriate partners to share their resources to. Future 
research should attempt to unravel these mechanisms at a dyadic level, preferably through 
longitudinal approaches. 
Lastly, our results suggest that both cooperation and coopetition based on shared medical 
specialists fails to fulfill its full knowledge-sharing potential. Inter-organizational learning 
and knowledge exchange are considered important drivers of coopetition in general and 
sharing specialists in particular (20, 48, 62) However, neither more experienced specialists 
nor specialists with medical seniority (i.e. those who have obtained a PhD) are more likely 
to be shared. Healthcare providers thus seem reluctant to share their most experienced, 
specialized, and arguably most knowledgeable human resources. Furthermore, specialists 
who are primarily affiliated to an academic hospital and who typically have experience with 
treating the most complex patients are significantly less likely to be shared. Considered in 
conjunction with the finding that specialists with higher degrees of firm-specific knowledge 
are less likely to be shared, this result suggests that healthcare organizations seek to protect 
their competitive advantage (i.e. their most specialized resources). 
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Limitations
Our work is subject to a few caveats. Firstly, medical specialists and healthcare organizations 
are not obliged to possess an AGB-code. However, it is a requirement for reimbursement by 
health insurers. This constitutes a strong financial incentive to keep the database up to date, 
making it a reliable source for research purposes (49). Additionally, the AGB-code database 
has recently undergone a quality review in which all specialists were requested to update 
their records (68). Secondly, we have operationalized competitors through mutual strategic 
group membership. However, competition is not exclusive to organizations within a strategic 
group. Hospitals can cross-subsidize unprofitable services with the revenues of simpler 
services for which they compete with ITCs for example (51). Nonetheless, organizations 
offer services which most closely resemble those offered by organizations from the same 
strategic group and the sub-industry categorization on which we based our strategic groups 
is generally accepted in multiple healthcare settings (52). 
Conclusion
The presence of price-competition in several healthcare markets makes it compelling to 
understand the mechanisms of cooperation and coopetition in the sector. In this chapter 
we studied cooperation and coopetition between healthcare organizations based on shared 
human resources. We show that coopetition and cooperation entail different strategies in 
health care. That is, different organizations share different resources under circumstances 
of cooperation and competition. Cooperation predominantly manifests through spin-off 
formation. Coopetition occurs most in the price-competitive segment of the market but does 
not seem to be anti-competitive. However, healthcare organizations are reluctant to share 
their most specialized human resources, seemingly protecting their competitive advantage 
which limits the full knowledge-sharing potential of this type of inter-organizational 
relationship. Whether coopetition in healthcare benefits patients hence remains a point for 
future research. 
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Appendix A
Appendix A Descriptive statistics of medical specialty dummies
Model 1
(n=15,431)
Model 2 
(n=4,277)
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Ophthalmology 3.81% 0 1 6.08% 0 1
Ear nose throat 3.05% 0 1 2.81% 0 1
Surgery 7.42% 0 1 8.44% 0 1
Plastic surgery 1.66% 0 1 3.39% 0 1
Orthopedics 4.21% 0 1 3.41% 0 1
Urology 2.43% 0 1 3.06% 0 1
Gynecology 6.17% 0 1 6.13% 0 1
Neurosurgery 0.86% 0 1 2.10% 0 1
Dermatology 3.15% 0 1 8.42% 0 1
Pediatrics 8.09% 0 1 5.78% 0 1
Gastroenterology 2.82% 0 1 2.57% 0 1
Cardiology 6.07% 0 1 10.12% 0 1
Pulmonology 3.43% 0 1 3.37% 0 1
Rheumatology 1.61% 0 1 1.61% 0 1
Allergology 0.12% 0 1 0.12% 0 1
Rehabilitation 1.72% 0 1 1.31% 0 1
Cardio thorax surgery 0.73% 0 1 0.33% 0 1
Psychiatry 3.27% 0 1 1.75% 0 1
Neurology 5.02% 0 1 3.02% 0 1
Geriatrics 1.50% 0 1 1.26% 0 1
Radiology 5.97% 0 1 5.59% 0 1
Radiotherapy 1.13% 0 1 0.37% 0 1
Nuclear medicine 0.87% 0 1 0.87% 0 1
Clinical chemistry 0.99% 0 1 0.58% 0 1
Microbiology 0.97% 0 1 1.08% 0 1
Pathology 1.76% 0 1 1.64% 0 1
Anesthesiology 9.16% 0 1 6.83% 0 1
Clinical genetics 0.63% 0 1 0.12% 0 1
Internal medicine 11.38% 0 1 7.86% 0 1
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Appendix B
Appendix B Odds ratios of medical specialty dummies omitted from Table 6.4 
 OR (95% CI) Model 1 OR (95% CI) Model 2
Ophthalmology 3.852 (3.058 - 4.852) 0.811 (0.521 - 1.262)
Ear nose throat 1.440 (1.104 - 1.880) 1.118 (0.643 - 1.943)
Surgery 1.954 (1.613 - 2.369) 0.896 (0.603 - 1.332)
Plastic surgery 6.074 (4.469 - 8.257) 0.641 (0.366 - 1.121)
Orthopedics 1.106 (0.864 - 1.415) 1.551 (0.941 - 2.559)
Urology 2.448 (1.869 - 3.205) 1.014 (0.601 - 1.711)
Gynecology 1.659 (1.350 - 2.039) 0.829 (0.535 - 1.284)
Neurosurgery 11.813 (7.787 - 17.92) 0.844 (0.438 - 1.625)
Dermatology 15.813 (12.152 - 20.577) 0.372 (0.242 - 0.572)
Pediatrics 1.147 (0.933 - 1.409) 1.199 (0.773 - 1.858)
Gastroenterology 1.472 (1.120 - 1.936) 1.298 (0.734 - 2.295)
Cardiology 3.756 (3.086 - 4.571) 0.318 (0.210 - 0.482)
Pulmonology 1.524 (1.186 - 1.960) 0.537 (0.310 - 0.931)
Rheumatology 1.874 (1.347 - 2.606) 1.454 (0.750 - 2.820)
Allergology 1.100 (0.343 - 3.533) 1.122 (0.064 - 19.702)
Rehabilitation 1.213 (0.851 - 1.730) 0.581 (0.270 - 1.251)
Cardio thorax surgery 0.800 (0.442 - 1.449) 4.832 (1.399 - 16.695)
Psychiatry 0.532 (0.381 - 0.743) 0.803 (0.397 - 1.622)
Neurology 0.754 (0.587 - 0.969) 1.169 (0.688 - 1.988)
Geriatrics 1.489 (1.034 - 2.145) 2.142 (1.061 - 4.324)
Radiology 1.279 (1.032 - 1.585) 0.901 (0.57 - 1.423)
Radiotherapy 0.540 (0.308 - 0.947) 0.006 (<0.001 - >999.999)
Nuclear medicine 1.925 (1.249 - 2.964) 1.087 (0.463 - 2.549)
Clinical chemistry 0.633 (0.385 - 1.040) 0.908 (0.318 - 2.592)
Microbiology 1.923 (1.271 - 2.909) 1.389 (0.629 - 3.066)
Pathology 1.563 (1.121 - 2.179) 2.069 (1.101 - 3.885)
Anesthesiology 1.026 (0.843 - 1.249) 1.745 (1.171 - 2.601)
Clinical genetics 0.542 (0.216 - 1.360) 1.426 (0.146 - 13.901)
Internal medicine - -

CHAPTER 7
The evolution of cooperative inter-organizational healthcare 
networks: The role of price-competition
Under review
A preliminary version of this study has been awarded the ‘Best International Paper award’ at 
the 2016 Academy of Management Annual Meeting in Annaheim, CA, USA
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Abstract
Objective: To study the evolution of inter-organizational networks in health care and the 
role of price-competition therein. 
Data sources: Secondary data from the national information center on health care, Ministry 
of Health, Antitrust Authority, Healthcare Inspectorate and National Health Institute, and 
the Health Authority in the Netherlands between 2010 through 2015. 
Study design Longitudinal social network analysis (i.e. stochastic actor-based model) 
analyzing the influence of organizational characteristics and network characteristics on 
forming or severing inter-organizational relations. 
Data collection Data in the study is routinely collected for the billing process of health care 
services, annual reporting, quality assurance, and antitrust purposes. 
Principal findings Although hospitals form a limited amount of cooperative relations, 
inter-organizational networks become increasingly dense. Hospitals in close geographical 
proximity and with a license to merge are particularly prone to form inter-organizational 
relations, as are large and high-quality hospitals. Hospitals exposed to greater degrees of 
price-competition are significantly more likely to form cooperative relations. 
Conclusions Cooperative inter-organizational networks in health care evolve as a result 
of social-, quality-, and competition-related factors. These contradict the neoclassical 
perception of competition, rendering effects on consumer welfare unclear.
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Introduction
Since the formalization and introduction of managed competition in the healthcare sector 
(1, 2), a wide and rich scholarly debate concerning its effects has emerged. It mainly revolves 
around the question whether the theoretical merits of (price-)competition as a resource 
allocation method hold in the healthcare industry, given that its characteristics deviate from 
traditional industries (3). In their extensive review of the scientific literature, Gaynor, Ho (4) 
found mixed evidence of the effect of price- and non-price- competition on outcomes such 
as price and quality. Nonetheless, pro-competitive healthcare reforms have been introduced 
in several Western countries as an instrument to contain the rapidly rising expenditures and 
optimize value within health care (e.g. 4, 5, 6-9). 
The introduction of competition alters existing rules and regulations (i.e. institutional 
context) of the healthcare industry (2, 10, 11). Such alteration aims to stimulate competitive 
behavior and strategies of healthcare organizations, which in turn should improve health 
outcomes (12). However, mergers, which constitute a cooperative response, have arguable 
been the most prominent example of strategic responses to competitive pressures in 
healthcare markets (e.g. 13, 14-18). Scholars have suggested several motives for hospitals in 
competitive markets to merge (i.e. horizontally integrate), ranging from explanations rooted 
in resource dependency theory to matters of bargaining power explained by industrial 
organization paradigms (19-22).
Mergers constitute the tightest or most formal type of cooperative inter-organizational 
strategies between organizations (23, 24). Due to its highly specialized and fragmented 
nature however, healthcare is a service which is typically delivered by networks of 
providers linked by loose(r) forms of inter-organizational relations (e.g. 11, 25, 26). In fact, 
management scholars’ interest in phenomena like strategic networks stems from research 
in non-profit industries such as healthcare (27). Most of the research regarding networks 
of cooperative inter-organizational relations in the healthcare industry has mainly studied 
the network directly, identifying several types of inter-organizational relations between 
healthcare organizations and various network typologies (e.g. 11, 23, 25, 28), or has studied 
the effect networks have on outcomes like quality and safety (e.g. 29, 30-33). The precursors 
of forming or severing inter-organizational relations and the evolution of inter-organizational 
networks in health care, and particularly the role of (price-)competition in this regard, have 
not gained equal academic attention however. 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 7
138
Several factors can influence the formation of different types of cooperative inter-
organizational relations (34). However, the influence of competition on forming such 
relations has recently attracted increasing scholarly through concepts such as coopetition 
(e.g. 35, 36). Outside the healthcare industry, researcher has shown that competition can 
make cooperation between organizations more likely (e.g. 37, 38) as well as less likely (e.g. 
39). The effect is contingent on the degree to which organizations have and emphasize 
similarity goals (40, 41). In health care, Lomi and Pallotti (42), Mascia, Di Vincenzo (43), and 
Mascia, Pallotti (44) all find that that competing hospitals are more likely to cooperate with 
each other. However, these studies have mostly adopted cross-sectional designs and were 
conducted in the Italian National Health System (NHS) which revolves around non-price-
competition (i.e. quality competition) rather than price -competition (43, 45). 
Well-structured inter-organizational networks result in higher quality of care (33, 46) and 
cooperation benefits hospitals’ performance (47). Understanding the determinants of inter-
organizational relations in health care and the evolution of inter-organizational networks 
can thus help researchers, policymakers, and practitioners to structure such networks in 
ways that optimize value for patients. Understanding the role of price-competition in the 
evolution of these networks will furthermore shed light on the effect that introducing 
competition in health care has on the formation of inter-organizational relations, which 
indicates the desirability of competition as a resource allocation method in health care. 
Given the benefits and widespread occurrence of cooperative inter-organizational networks 
in health care and the presence of price-competition in several healthcare sectors, in this 
chapter we study how cooperative inter-organizational networks in health care evolve and 
what the role of price-competition is in the evolution of such networks. 
Methods
Empirical setting
We model the evolution of cooperative inter-organizational network between hospitals in 
the Netherlands. The Health Insurance Act (HIA) introduced various competitive elements in 
the Dutch healthcare sector in 2006. The most notable of which is arguably the introduction 
of price competition between specialized care organizations (i.e. hospitals) (48, 49). Initially 
price-competition was limited to 10% of all hospital services but it has been gradually 
increased between 2006 and 2012 and applies to 70% of all hospital services as of 2012 (49). 
Similar to the US model, price competition between Dutch hospitals is the result of selective 
contracting of providers by third party purchasers (i.e. insurance companies) (50-53). Like 
in most Western countries, the hospital sector constitutes the largest part of healthcare 
expenditure in the Netherlands (4, 54-56). 
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Data
Our study was based on five longitudinal data sources between 2010 through 2015. Firstly, we 
used data supplied by Vektis, the Dutch center of information on health care which handles 
the claims of all services under the HIA, to identify inter-organizational relations between 
hospitals. Specifically, we used the so-called AGB-code (‘Algemeen Gegevensbeheer Code’) 
database which contains unique identifiers of all medical professionals and healthcare 
organizations and the affiliations between them. It forms the foundation of the billing process 
for healthcare in the Netherlands (57) and has been used in prior studies regarding shared 
specialists (58). Hospitals’ annual reports, the content of which is made publically available 
in a dataset by the ministry of Health, form our second data source. The dataset includes 
general indicators of each hospital such as size, production output, and productivity as well 
as detailed financial information (59). Our third data source is Elsevier’s annual ranking of 
hospital quality in the Netherlands. It contains a rating on a 4-star scale for each hospital on 
overall quality and 6 sub-dimensions of quality based on 799 quality indicators collected by 
the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate and the National Healthcare Institute (60). Hospitals with 
below average quality receive 1 or 2 stars while 3 or 4 stars are reserved for hospitals with 
above average quality scores. Fourthly, the Dutch Antitrust Authority, to which all hospitals 
need to submit their intent to merge (49), supplied an overview of their final decision to 
(dis)allow each hospital merger since 2006. Lastly, these data sources were coupled using a 
coupling table supplied by the Dutch Healthcare Authority, based on the general corporate 
registry of Statistics Netherlands, including the unique identifier in the insurance data (i.e. 
AGB-code), annual reports (i.e. chamber of commerce number), Elsevier ranking (i.e. name 
of the hospital), and Antitrust Authority (i.e. name of the hospital). 
Sample
Our sample consists of all general hospitals in the Netherlands which possess a unique 
identifier (i.e. AGB-code) and which, according to the records of the Antitrust Authority, 
had not merged at the start of our observation period (i.e. 2010). Academic hospitals were 
excluded due to the fact that they typically offer more complex services than their non-
academic counterparts (51). Independent treatment centers and specialized hospitals, 
such as psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals, were excluded due to their narrow scope of 
services (51, 53, 61). The Dutch Health Authority identified 84 general hospitals in 2010 (62). 
However, we considered hospitals which had obtained a license to merge prior to 2010 as 
one organization. Therefore, our sample instead contains 80 hospitals.
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Variables
Dependent variables
Networks of cooperative inter-hospital relations constituted the dependent variable 
in this study. These were operationalized through shared medical specialists between 
hospitals. Medical specialists constitute one of the main resources of hospitals (63) and 
sharing specialists between hospitals is a highly common phenomenon (58, 64, 65). In the 
Netherlands, medical specialists typically have a life-time affiliation to just one hospital (66) 
and sharing medical specialists is considered an emergent hospital strategy and an adequate 
indicator of inter-hospital cooperation (58). In the original conceptualization of managed 
competition, specialists with multiple affiliations have been described as a hindrance to 
effective competition (1). 
The network of shared specialists between each dyad of hospitals was represented by a 
non-symmetrical n x n adjacency matrix in which each cell indicated how many specialists 
were shared between hospital i in the row and hospital j in the column. One such matrix 
was constructed for each of the six years of our study period. The non-symmetrical nature of 
the matrices indicates that hospital i can share specialists to hospital j but hospital j can opt 
not to share specialists to hospital i. The matrices were constructed based on the affiliation 
records of medical specialists in the AGB-code database. The hospital to which a specialist 
had the longest affiliation was regarded as the sending organization. All other organizations 
to which a specialist had an active affiliation were considered receiving organizations. 
Specialists with missing starting dates for any of their affiliations or multiple organizations 
to which they were affiliated longest were disregarded. 
To accommodate our analysis, the six matrices were dichotomized to indicate the absence or 
presence of a relation between two hospitals. Although specialists have a financial incentive 
to add new affiliations to their record (i.e. it enables them to bill for their services), no such 
incentive exists for removing former affiliations. To reduce the likelihood that hospitals were 
unjustly deemed to have a cooperative relation, we hence only considered hospitals to have 
a relation when more than one specialist was shared between them. Two dichotomization 
scenarios were used. In the first, all hospitals which shared two or more specialists were 
considered to have a relation. In the second, hospitals were considered to have a relation 
when they shared specialists from at least two different medical specialties. In line with the 
work of Büchner, Hinz (47) the two dichotomization scenarios indicate depth and breadth 
of cooperation respectively. Scenarios with higher dichotomization values resulted in an 
average degree below 2 rendering the network to sparse for our analyses (67), We present 
the results from the analyses based on the two dichotomization scenarios. 
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Independent variables
Our analysis technique allowed for the incorporation of two types of independent variables; 
actor-based (exogenous) effects and network-based (endogenous) effects. Actor-based 
effects account for the evolution of the network as a result of (dyadic) characteristics of 
actors (i.e. hospitals) within the network. The network-based effects account for the 
evolution of the network as a result of the structure of the network itself (68). 
The actor-based variables used in our model were characteristics of individual hospitals and 
characteristics of a relation between a dyad of hospitals. All hospital and dyadic attributes in 
our model varied across observation years with the exception of the distance between two 
hospitals. Because we sought to study the role of price-competition in the evolution of inter-
organizational networks in healthcare, our main variable of interest was the percentage of 
services each hospital offered in the price-competitive segment of the market. It serves as an 
indication of a hospital’s exposure to price-competition. The variable was constructed based 
on hospitals´ annual reports, in which they are obliged to report the number of services 
provided in the price-competitive and non-price-competitive market segment. Hospital size, 
financial performance, efficiency, and quality, all of which constitute common variables in 
the hospital performance literature (e.g. 33, 47, 69), were also included in our model as 
hospital attributes. The latter was based on the Elsevier quality ranking and the three former 
variables were based on hospitals’ annual reports. Size was operationalized as the number 
of available beds. Financial performance was operationalized as net profit divided by total 
sales. Efficiency was defined as the amount of days patients were unnecessarily admitted to 
the hospital as a fraction of the total number of admission days (i.e. percentage of delayed 
discharges). Quality was represented by a dummy variable indicating whether a hospital 
offered above (coded 1) or below (coded 0) average quality.
Three dyadic attributes were used to model the evolution of cooperative inter-organizational 
hospital networks. The first was a binary variable indicating whether a dyad of hospitals was 
granted a license to merge by the antitrust authority to account for the consolidation wave 
in the Dutch hospital market (4, 70). It was represented by a symmetrical n x n matrix which 
included a 1 for the first observation year in which the approval had been granted (provided 
that it was granted in the first half of the year) and every subsequent observation year. 
Geographical distance and service overlap constituted the remaining dyadic attributes in 
our model and represent the two main dimensions of Sohn’s (71) measure of inter-hospital 
competition; geographical- and service-market overlap. The geographical distance between 
each dyad of hospitals was calculated using the geocode procedure in SAS for Microsoft 
Windows based on the zip-code of each hospital reported in the AGB-code database and 
represented by a symmetrical n x n matrix which was constant over time. Service overlap 
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indicated the extent to which hospitals offer similar services. Because the Dutch DRG-like 
system deviates from that used in the US (72), we recreated the service categories used 
by (71) based on the Dutch DRG-like system following the argumentation by Zwanziger, 
Melnick (51). This resulted in the identification of 29 service domains based on the medical 
specialties recognized in the AGB-code database. Consequently, the service overlap between 
two hospitals was represented by a non-symmetrical n x n matrix indicating the percentage 
of hospital i’s services (i.e. specialties) offered by hospital j. A hospital was considered to 
offer a specialty when at least one specialist in a specialty was primarily affiliated to the 
hospital. One service-overlap matrix was constructed for each observation year to account 
for possible changes in hospitals’ service mix. 
Several basic network-based effects were included as independent variables in our model; the 
outdegree-, reciprocity-, transitivity-, and three-cycle effects. The outdegree and reciprocity 
effects are such basic network-based effects that they cannot be omitted (67). The outdegree 
effect represents the tendency for hospital i to form relations with other hospitals j at time 
t
+1
 based on the number of outgoing relations at time t. A negative outdegree value is 
common due to the social costs involved with maintaining relations. A hospital is thus likely 
to only form a few of the 79 (i.e. n-1) relations it can possibly form. Reciprocity indicates the 
likelihood of relations to be reciprocated. In this case it represents the tendency of hospital 
j to share specialists to hospital i at time t
+1
 if hospital i shares specialists to hospital j at 
time t. The transitivity and three-cycle effects both represent the tendency towards triadic 
structures. The transitivity effect indicates the tendency for hospital i to share medical 
specialists with hospital h at time t
+1
 if hospital i shares specialists with hospital j and hospital 
j shares specialists with h at time t. It is often described using the saying ‘a friend of a friend 
is a friend’. The three-cycle effect indicates whether, under the same conditions, hospital h 
is instead likely to share specialists with hospital i. Three additional network-based effects 
were added to ensure adequate representation of the number of incoming and outgoing 
ties per hospital. These were the squared in- and outdegree popularity effect and the out-
out assortativity effect. The two former effects represent the tendency for hospitals with 
many incoming or outgoing relations to attract or send additional relations respectively. The 
latter effect represents the tendency for hospitals with many outgoing ties to form relations 
with hospitals who also have many outgoing ties. All network-based effects are graphically 
represented in Figure 7.1. Solid lines in this figure represent ties present at time t. Dotted 
lines represent ties created at time t
+1
 for each effect. 
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Figure 7.1: Visual representation of network effects.  
Tie created at time t+1 
Tie present at time t 
Hospital 
i j 
i j 
i 
j 
k 
i 
j 
k 
Outdegree 
Reciprocity 
Transitivity 
Three-cycles 
i 
j 
k 
l 
m 
i 
 j 
j 
k 
l 
m 
i 
 j 
j 
 j 
k 
 j 
l 
 j 
m 
Outdegree popu-larity 
Indegree popula-rity 
Out-out assortati-vity 
Figure 7.1: Visual representation of network effects. 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 7
144
Results
Table 7.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the independent variables in each year. 
The RSiena package automatically imputes missing data using the last-observation-carry-
forward method. The descriptive statistics in Table 7.1 are therefore based on the imputed 
data. However, missing data did not exceed the maximum of 10% of the observations, as 
suggested by Ripley, Snijders (67). Table 7.1 indicates that in all years, on average, hospitals 
in the Netherlands had approximately 450 beds, between 0.7 and 2.2 percent delayed 
discharges, and a net profit margin between 3.4 and 4.6 percent. More than half (i.e. 
between 58 and 73 percent) of the hospitals offered above average quality. Congruent with 
the increase of services subject to price-competition in 2012, the average percentage of 
services offered in the price-competitive market segment by hospitals increased from 25.4 
percent in 2011 to 72.9 percent in 2012. Furthermore, hospitals are, on average, located 
roughly 100 kilometers from each other and their services overlap for more than 80%. 
Lastly, 16 hospital mergers were approved during our study period. 
Table 7.2 displays the descriptive statistics of both dependent inter-hospital networks for 
each observation year. It indicates that, under both dichotomization scenarios and across 
all indicators, inter-hospital relations have become increasingly common over time. That 
is, the absolute number of ties, the network density (i.e. the percentage of possible ties 
formed in the network), the average degree (i.e. the average number of connections a 
hospital has), and the maximum number of outgoing ties in the network (i.e. maximum 
outdegree) increase over the years. The absolute values of each indicator do vary between 
the alternative dichotomization scenarios however. 
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The increase in inter-organizational relations is furthermore supported by Table 7.3, which 
displays the tie changes between each year and the accompanying Jaccard-index. The latter 
is well above the 0.3 threshold described in Ripley, Snijders (67). The 0 à 0 column contains 
the number of hospital dyads which remain unconnected between waves, which applies to 
the majority of dyads in the network. The 1 à 1 column includes the number of relations 
sustained between observation waves. The 0 à 1 and 1 à 0 column indicate the number 
of relations formed and dissolved between observation waves. More ties are created than 
dissolved between all observation waves under both dichotomization scenarios. 
Table 7.4 shows the results of the final model under both dichotomization scenarios. The 
constants of the rate function indicate the rate by which each actor in the network has 
the opportunity to change ties (67, 68). The other parameters represent the so-called 
evaluation effects and can be split up in the network-based and hospital-based effects. The 
interpretation of the network-based effects is similar across all models, with the exception 
of the indegree popularity effect. The outdegree, three-cycle, and outdegree popularity 
effects are negative and significant. Hospitals thus send outgoing relations to a select 
number of hospitals and are less likely to receive relations from ‘friends-of-friends’. The 
reciprocity, transitivity, and out-out assortativity effects are positive and significant in all 
models. Hospitals are thus more likely to form relations with hospitals that already have 
a relation with them, with ‘friends-of-friends’, and with hospitals which also have many 
outgoing relations. The indegree popularity effect is positive and significant in one of the 
models and indicates that hospitals with many incoming relations are likely to receive even 
more incoming relations. 
Table 7.4 furthermore indicates that size, quality, mergers, levels of competition, and 
distance all significantly influence the evolution of inter-hospital networks, albeit in different 
ways in both models. Large and high quality hospitals are significantly more likely to share 
specialists. Likewise, hospitals in close geographic proximity and which have obtained a 
license to merge are more likely to have relations amongst them. However, the influence 
of mergers and size is only significant at the 10% confidence level. The influence of size and 
quality is furthermore not consistent across both models. Lastly, the results of model 1 show 
a positive and significant effect of the percentage of services a hospital offers in the price-
competitive market segment. Hospitals which offer many services in the price-competitive 
market segment are more likely to form cooperative inter-organizational relations. However, 
the effect is only significant in model 1. 
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Discussion
In this chapter we investigated the evolution of cooperative inter-organizational networks 
in the healthcare industry and the role of price-competition therein. We have done so in 
the Netherlands based on a common inter-organizational relation between hospitals, 
namely sharing medical specialists. This study is among the first to investigate which factors 
influence the formation and evolution of inter-organizational networks in the healthcare 
industry and contributes to existing literature on inter-organizational (healthcare) networks 
in three ways.
Firstly, we find that inter-organizational relations are formed (and inter-organizational 
networks hence evolve) as a result of social processes. Three such processes become 
apparent in our results. The first, indicated by the outdegree and the outdegree popularity 
effects, reveals that healthcare organizations are selective in their partners. That is, they 
form only a few of the n-1 possible ties and organizations with many outgoing ties are less 
likely to add outgoing ties. Hospitals thus seem to deliberately choose hospitals to share 
their resources with, supporting the notion that sharing specialists is best perceived as an 
organizational strategy, at least in the current empirical setting (58). The second, indicated by 
the transitivity, three-cycle, and assortativity effects, is that inter-organizational healthcare 
networks follow hierarchical structures. Hospitals tend to send out relations to other well-
connected hospitals and are less likely to receive relations from hospitals which are ‘lower’ 
in hierarchy (i.e. friend-of-friend) (76). The third is that inter-organizational relations are 
likely to be reciprocated. Following the reasoning of Oliver (34), this suggests that relations 
are formed based on notions of collaboration and coordination among organizations. 
Secondly, we find that inter-organizational networks serve as a potential vehicle to improve 
quality of care in the healthcare sector. Our results indicate that hospitals with above 
average quality ratings and larger hospitals are more likely to send out relations (i.e. share 
their specialists) to other hospitals. The former is true in the dichotomization scenario 
representing depth of collaboration while the latter is true for the scenario representing 
breadth of collaboration. These findings follow existing literature which suggests that 
combining complementary resources and learning from other organizations drive the 
formation of cooperative inter-organizational relations, both within and outside the 
healthcare context (e.g. 77, 78, 79). Although our findings support research which finds that 
well-structured networks facilitate high quality care (33, 46), they contradict the neoclassical 
perception of competition in health care. That is, in a (price-)competitive market, sharing 
key resources to competing organizations potentially erodes an organization’s competitive 
advantage. 
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Thirdly, we find that competition stimulates the formation of inter-organizational relations. 
Research in non-healthcare industries has generated mixed conclusions regarding the 
influence of competition on the formation of cooperative inter-organizational relations (e.g. 
37, 38, 39), while several studies in non-price-competitive healthcare markets found that 
competition increases the likelihood of cooperation (42, 44, 80). Our results indicate that in 
price-competitive healthcare markets, competition stimulates cooperation. This is indicated 
by the fact that inter-organizational relations between hospitals have become increasingly 
common congruent with the increase in price-competition and that hospitals which 
are exposed to higher degrees of price-competition are more likely to form cooperative 
relations. Furthermore, hospitals in similar geographical markets (i.e. geographical 
proximate hospitals) are more likely to form inter-organizational relations with each other. 
These findings also contradict the traditional neoclassical perception of competition which 
forms one of the main arguments of pro-competitive healthcare reforms (e.g. 2). 
Because healthcare is predominantly a local (71, 80, 81) and highly concentrated market (4) 
our findings could indicate deliberate anti-competitive intents of healthcare organizations. 
This is particularly relevant to the type of inter-organizational relation used in our work as 
it potentially hinders effective managed competition (1, 82). Whether such behavior have 
anti-competitive effects depends on the degree to which quality can be improved through 
these relations, to what extent they result in abnormal prices, and if they do, how these are 
translated to insurance premiums of consumers (53). Future research should study these 
effects. 
Limitations
This study has a few limitations. Firstly, medical specialists are not obliged to register their 
affiliations in the AGB-code database. However, Dutch health insurers data is reliable (83) 
and has previously been used to study the phenomenon (58). Secondly, inter-organizational 
relations were operationalized through shared medical specialists. Although this constitutes 
an emergent cooperative inter-organizational relation in the Netherlands (58), it potentially 
carries alternative meaning in other contexts. Regardless of the context however, sharing 
specialists constitutes an enduring flow of resources and knowledge between hospitals, a 
core characteristic of inter-organizational relations (34).
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Conclusion
Cooperative inter-organizational networks in health care evolve as a result of social, quality-, 
and competition-related factors. High quality and greater exposure to price-competition 
both significantly enhance the likelihood of forming cooperative inter-organizational 
relations between healthcare organizations. These mechanisms are not in line with the 
traditional neoclassical view of competition which forms the backbone of many healthcare 
reform policies. The effects on consumer welfare, and hence the desirability of competition 
in healthcare markets, remain unclear. 
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PART IV
Discussion, Summary, and Addenda

CHAPTER 8
General discussion
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8
General discussion
In 2006, the Netherlands introduced competition in its healthcare system in an attempt 
to improve efficiency, stimulate patient-choice, and enhance solidarity (1-3). Considerable 
public and political debate regarding the desirability of competition in the health care sector 
has ensued ever since (4). The scientific evidence regarding the effect of competition in 
health care on outcomes such as price and quality of care is ambiguous (5). However, the 
majority of this evidence is based on empirical studies which disregard the cooperative 
inter-organizational strategies and relations of healthcare providers (i.e. organizations). 
Yet, it is common for healthcare providers to deliver their services in various cooperative 
inter-organizational networks (6-9). Therefore, the main aim of this dissertation was to 
study cooperative inter-organizational relations between healthcare providers in a price-
competitive market. More specifically, this dissertation aimed to a.) study the interaction 
between pro-competitive reforms, inter-organizational relations, and health outcomes, b.) 
investigate the structure of inter-organizational networks between healthcare providers 
based on shared board members, shared professionals, and shared patients, including the 
evolution of these structures over time, and c.) examine the influence of (price-)competition 
on the formation of cooperative inter-organizational relations. These aims were met by one 
theoretical and five empirical studies, which have been presented in this dissertation. The 
remainder of this chapter will commence by summarizing the main findings of the studies 
presented in this dissertation. It will subsequently describe several theoretical as well as 
methodological reflections. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of this 
work for policymakers and practitioners and by offering various suggestions for future 
research. 
Main findings
The central argument of this dissertation, introduced in Chapter 2, is that the effect of 
competition in health care cannot be fully understood without considering the (networks 
of) cooperative inter-organizational relations of healthcare providers. Instead, they have 
an intermediary role between pro-competitive policy reforms, which are likely to influence 
the formation of inter-organizational relations, and health outcomes, which are likely to 
be influenced by the structure of inter-organizational networks. The empirical studies 
described in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 assess the structure of inter-organizational 
networks based on shared board members, shared medical professionals, and shared 
patients. The results of these chapters reveal that all these types of inter-organizational 
relations are common between healthcare providers in a price-competitive market. They 
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furthermore occur between organizations in similar geographical regions and have become 
increasingly common in line with the increase of price-competition. This could foster 
concerns regarding potential anti-competitive effects, especially in the case of shared board 
members, studied in chapter 3, and shared professionals, studied in chapter 4. Additionally, 
chapter 4 shows that inter-organizational relations are formed according to various strategic 
motives of healthcare providers including quality-related as well as competitive motives. 
However, chapter 5 indicates that the structure of inter-organizational networks, of referred 
(i.e. shared) patients, does not always resemble optimal network structures. The results of 
the studies in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 indicate that the formation of inter-organizational 
relations is indeed influenced by competition. Contrary to the traditional view of competition 
markets however, chapter 7 indicates that price-competition stimulates cooperation 
between hospitals. Yet, chapter 6 reveals that organizations share different specialists to 
their direct competitors than to non-competitors, indicating that cooperation between 
direct competitors, a phenomenon known as coopetition, entails a different strategy than 
cooperation in general. Overall, inter-organizational relations between healthcare providers 
have the potential to increase consumer welfare, by increasing quality of healthcare services 
through inter-organizational knowledge sharing, as well as decrease consumer welfare 
through anti-competitive behavior. 
Theoretical reflection
Occurrence of inter-organizational relations
The results of the studies described in this dissertation are unanimous in their finding 
that various types of cooperative inter-organizational relations are highly common in the 
healthcare industry. These findings underline the existing notion in health services research 
literature that healthcare is a service which is typically delivered by networks of cooperating 
providers (8-10). Existing research has furthermore shown that well-structured inter-
organizational networks of healthcare providers can enhance the quality of the delivered 
services (e.g. 11, 12). Additionally, the studies described in this dissertation indicate that inter-
organizational networks between healthcare providers have become increasingly common 
with the increase in price-competition over time (13). These findings thus substantiate the 
central argument of the dissertation that, solely studying market structure as much of the 
existing empirical literature has done (5) is inadequate when attempting to understand 
the effect of competition in health care. Instead, networks of inter-organizational relations 
constitute an intermediary between policy at the macro level and outcomes at the micro 
level.
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Competition and cooperation: two peas in a pod
Considering that cooperative inter-organizational networks hold a mediating role between 
pro-competitive policy reforms and health outcomes, the pertinent question to understand 
the effect of pro-competitive healthcare reforms is whether and how competition 
influences the formation of inter-organizational relations between healthcare organizations. 
Competition and cooperation have traditionally been perceived as two non-reconcilable 
concepts. According to neoclassical theory, the ideal market consists of many buyers and 
sellers seeking to maximize their self-interest and interacting in arms-length transactions 
(14, 15). However, during the past two decades researchers have increasingly noted that 
a firm’s performance cannot be understood without considering its inter-organizational 
relations, which can form a source of unique resources for organizations (e.g. 16, 17, 18). 
Consequently, cooperation and competition have increasingly been viewed as concepts 
which coexist and in which organizations engage simultaneously, rather than being 
considered two opposing ends of the same spectrum (18-21). In fact, more recent research 
has posited that competition leads to mutual awareness, repeated interaction, and personal 
knowledge and trust, which increases the likelihood that competing organizations cooperate 
(22). However, in for-profit industries, the empirical evidence that competitors indeed 
increasingly cooperate is mixed (22-25). 
In line with research conducted in non-healthcare settings, the findings regarding the effect 
of competition on inter-organizational cooperation, presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of 
this dissertation, are somewhat mixed. That is, the results of the study described in Chapter 
6 indicate that the level of competition to which an organization is exposed, defined as the 
cumulative degree of service overlap an organization has with organizations in a pre-defined 
geographical radius, does not influence the likelihood that an organization cooperates 
(with competitors). Conversely, the study described in Chapter 7 finds that organizations 
engaged in higher levels of price-competition are in fact more likely to cooperate and that 
cooperation is furthermore more likely between organizations located in close geographical 
proximity to one another (i.e. active in similar geographical markets). However, Chapter 7 
also indicates that the degree of service overlap between organizations does not influence 
organizations’ likelihood to cooperate. 
Competition between healthcare providers is considered a function of the overlap of the 
services organizations provide and geographical market from which they draw patients (26). 
However, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 both indicate that increased service overlap between 
organizations does not influence the likelihood that organizations cooperate. The results 
thus suggest that competing geographically (i.e. being active in the same geographical 
market) more strongly influences the cooperative behavior of healthcare providers than 
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being engaged in fierce service competition (i.e. offering many similar services than other 
organizations). This suggests that mutual awareness (22) predominantly stems from 
geographical proximity rather than service overlap. It is plausible that organizations pay 
more attention to organizations located in similar geographical markets and increasingly 
interact with these organizations. Following the mutual awareness argument of Trapido 
(22), repeated interaction builds trust between organizations, making cooperation with 
organizations in similar geographical markets more likely. The findings could also be 
partially driven by specific empirical decisions. For example, the cooperation has been 
operationalization as shared medical specialists in both chapters. Given the impracticalities 
for specialists to travel between distant organizations, this form of cooperation is likely 
to occur between geographical proximate organizations. Furthermore, in line with the 
approach of Sohn (26), service overlap was operationalized as the number of specialties 
which both organizations offer. However, most Dutch hospitals offer a relatively broad range 
of specialties (27). Service overlap between most hospitals is thus high and the degree of 
service overlap does not vary much between dyads of organizations. Additionally, a medical 
specialty is a relatively broad characterization of service offering. Specialists can offer a 
range of treatments within one specialty, which are not necessarily substitute services. 
Two organizations could hence both offer specialty X but offer distinct services within that 
specialty, effectively rendering service overlap between the organizations non-existent 
even though a high degree of service overlap is detected at specialty level. Future research 
should investigate this matter further and attempt to create more sophisticated measures 
of service overlap between healthcare organizations. 
Despite their discrepancies, the empirical findings presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 do 
indicate that competition does not make healthcare providers averse towards cooperation. 
This confirms that, at least in the healthcare industry, the traditional view of competing 
organizations as atomistic actors is inadequate (14, 16). The findings also explain the 
increased occurrence of various types of inter-organizational relations in an increasingly 
price-competitive healthcare market (13). They are furthermore in line with the outcomes 
of studies conducted in healthcare industries which are not based on price-competition 
(28-30). Overall, the existing empirical evidence thus suggests that competition increases 
the likelihood of inter-organizational cooperation in the healthcare industry. However, 
organizations can engage in competition and cooperation simultaneously (20, 21). 
Therefore, the fact that competition fosters collaboration between healthcare providers 
does not automatically imply that the level of competition has reduced. The co-existence 
of competition and cooperation between healthcare providers thus generates ample 
opportunities for future research. 
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Methodological reflection
Macro – Meso and Meso – Micro 
Several lessons can be drawn from the methodologies employed by the work in this 
dissertation. While the central argument of the dissertation is that inter-organizational 
relations mediate the effect of pro-competitive healthcare reforms at the macro level 
and outcomes at the micro level, the empirical focus of the dissertation has been on the 
interaction between macro level policy and inter-organizational relations at the meso level. 
Although the effect of (networks of) inter-organizational relations at the meso level on 
outcomes such as costs and quality of care at the micro level has been the subject of existing 
research (11, 12, 31), it has not taken a central position in the empirical components of 
this dissertation. Analogous to the interaction between the macro, meso, and micro levels 
however, the effect of inter-organizational relations on micro level outcomes should not be 
overlooked. This is especially true for the implications of relatively understudied forms of 
inter-organizational collaboration in healthcare such as interlocking directorates and shared 
medical professionals on micro level outcomes. Future research should hence focus on the 
effect of such inter-organizational relations on outcomes such as costs and quality of care. 
Insurance data: the good, the bad, and the ugly 
The majority of the empirical studies presented in this dissertation are based on insurance 
data. One of the empirical studies was based on claims data and three empirical studies were 
based on the affiliation data of medical specialists to healthcare organizations. Using claims 
data is quite common in US-based research regarding matters of competition in health care 
(e.g. 32, 33). In the Netherlands however, claims data have primarily been used to study the 
effect of payment reforms such as bundled payments (e.g. 34). The use of insurance data 
other than claims data has not had similar applications in previous research. The work in 
this dissertation hence constitutes a first step towards utilizing insurance data (i.e. claims 
and non-claims data) for research purposes in the field of industrial organization of (Dutch) 
healthcare markets. All Dutch inhabitants are obliged to take out at least a basic insurance 
package for which health insurers cannot refuse applicants (35, 36). All health insurers in 
the country are furthermore obliged to submit their data to the national information center 
of health care (Vektis) on a quarterly basis. One of the main strengths of Dutch insurance 
data is therefore that it offers a comprehensive picture of the healthcare market. Similar 
to US-based claims data, Dutch claims data furthermore includes the actual price paid for 
specific services. The question whether this data should therefore be publically available 
to consumer has caused considerable public debate recently. Nonetheless, the availability 
of detailed price information adds to the usability of Dutch insurance data for research 
purposes, especially within the health services research realm and matters regarding the 
industrial organization of healthcare markets. 
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Like most secondary data sources, insurance data also has some inherent drawbacks. Most 
of these drawbacks are a consequence of the data’s stand-alone nature. That is, insurance 
data result from the process of handling claims by healthcare providers to insurers. One 
of the most well-recognized drawbacks of Dutch insurance data is the lack of detailed 
clinical information (37). In specialized care for example, Dutch hospitals are reimbursed 
based on a home-grown DRG-like product structure called DBCs which is based on the 
resource utilization of the ‘average patient’ (38). Dutch claims data hence does not include 
information such which activities were performed how many times during the course 
of a patient’s treatment. Similarly, the data is not linked with patients’ medical records, 
rendering specific clinical details unobservable. Secondly, given the specificities of the claims 
procedure in Dutch healthcare and the quarterly cycle of submitting data to the national 
information center for health (Vektis), there is typically a time-lag in the availability of Dutch 
insurance data. Therefore, its application is predominantly in post hoc analysis. Another 
practical drawback is that coupling insurance data to other (secondary) data sources can be 
an arduous task. This became most apparent when accounting for mergers in some of the 
empirical studies. Healthcare providers with an intention to merge are obliged to indicate 
their intentions to the Dutch antitrust authority for approval. The antitrust authority keeps 
a record of when each merger is approved or forbidden, which in some cases requires an 
in-depth review of the case. Organizations which have obtained a license to merge but have 
not yet merged into one organizational entity continue to submit separate annual reports 
to the chamber of commerce. Once both organizations become one organizational entity, 
which can be at any point in time after having obtained the license to merge and which is 
occasionally preceded by a merger of the boards of both organizations (i.e. ‘bestuurlijke 
fusie’), a joint annual report will be submitted to the chamber of commerce. The records 
of the chamber of commerce will indicate that a merger has occurred once organizations 
submit one annual report. Lastly, Vektis registers a merger when the organizations actively 
request a new organizational ID for billing purposes (i.e. AGB code) or request that an 
existing code be discontinued. Organizations are not obliged to do so however. Lastly, the 
widespread use of lump-sum contracting of healthcare providers (13) can render the price 
of specific DBCs uninformative. Furthermore, hospital-to-insurance prices are intermediary 
prices. That is, following the structure of competitive healthcare markets, patients select the 
health plan to which they enroll based on monthly premiums and coverage of these plans 
(5), rather than hospital-to-insurers prices. 
The network level of analysis
The empirical studies in this dissertation have been conducted at various levels of analysis. 
These include analyses at the level of individuals (i.e. board members of healthcare 
organizations, medical specialists, and patients), analyses at the level of healthcare 
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organizations, and analyses at the network level (i.e. a collection of multiple healthcare 
organizations and their cooperative ties). Although delivering healthcare to patients requires 
the cooperation of several organizations in various networks (9, 39, 40) and scholars argue 
that competition should occur between integrated networks of providers (41, 42), analyses 
at the network level have long been neglected in the healthcare industry (43). More 
recently however, network analysis has been described as an adequate way to analyze how 
health services are organized at the network level (44, 45). The application of longitudinal 
social network analysis, such as applied in Chapter 7 of this dissertation, is furthermore 
unprecedented in the health services research field. Although the empirical work in this 
dissertation thus offers a methodological advancement to existing literature, it has mainly 
studied horizontal networks, namely networks between organizations which offer similar 
services (46). Yet, vertical networks, namely between organizations active at different stages 
of the healthcare delivery process such as primary and secondary care providers are equally, 
if not more, common in the healthcare sector (47). These should hence be studied in future 
research regarding the organization of health care using social network analysis techniques. 
Implications for policy and practice
Besides constituting a large part of the economy in most Western countries (5, 48), the 
healthcare industry, above all, concerns itself with peoples’ health and well-being. In his 
seminal paper published approximately half a century ago, Arrow (49) noted that risk and 
uncertainty associated with health distinguishes the healthcare market from commodity 
markets. Yet, rising healthcare costs have rendered efficient healthcare delivery essential 
(50). Consequently, various countries have structured and reformed their healthcare 
sector based on the ‘traditional’, micro-economic, rules of competition (50, 51). Overall, 
the work in this dissertation has clearly demonstrated that inter-organizational relations in 
the form of shared board members, shared professionals, and shared patients are common 
in price-competitive healthcare markets and that they have become increasingly common 
in increasingly (price-)competitive healthcare markets. The degree of price-competition 
has furthermore been shown to significantly predict tie formation between healthcare 
organizations. The studies in this dissertation thus indicate that introducing pro-competitive 
reforms in the Dutch healthcare sector (i.e. at the macro level) has triggered increased inter-
organizational cooperation by Dutch healthcare providers (i.e. at the meso level). 
The findings of the studies in this dissertation can lead to two similar but distinct 
interpretations and subsequent courses of action by policymakers. To supporters of 
applying competition in the healthcare industry, they could be considered an indication of 
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anti-competitive behavior by healthcare organizations and be interpreted as evidence of 
collusion. In fact, interlocking directorates (i.e. shared board members) and shared medical 
professionals have both previously been described as potentially collusive by scholars (52, 
53). Similarly, the Dutch healthcare authority recently indicated that concentrating specific 
service in a few selected organizations, which can occur by referring patients to these 
organizations, could also harness anti-competitive effects (54). In line with this interpretation, 
protagonists of competition in the healthcare could call for stringent anti-trust enforcement 
regarding horizontal inter-organizational cooperation between healthcare organizations. 
Scholars have in fact already suggested that besides mergers, anti-trust agencies should 
consider novel inter-organizational arrangements in the healthcare industry (55). Anti-trust 
regulations should furthermore be applied equally stringent in health care as in other markets 
(56). More stringent scrutiny of cooperation inter-organizational relations by the anti-trust 
authority will directly affect board members, professionals, and patients however. The study 
described in Chapter 4 of this dissertation revealed that specialists and board members are 
currently already weary of anti-trust punishment. Increased scrutiny of inter-organizational 
relations will likely only increase this notion. Therefore, more stringently applying anti-
trust measures is only desirable in case inter-organizational relations clearly impede micro 
level outcomes such as costs, quality, and accessibility of care. To opponents of applying 
the competitive model in the healthcare industry, the findings of this dissertation could 
be perceived as an additional indication that healthcare markets deviate from commodity 
markets. This could lead to the conclusion that competition is ineffective and therefore 
undesirable in the healthcare industry. Consequently, antagonists of the competitive 
approach to healthcare could propose a shift away from the competitive model. It is unclear 
whether such an alternative healthcare system would also produce outcomes which place 
the Dutch healthcare sector among the best in the world (57, 58) however. 
Directions for future research
The studies presented in this dissertation clearly show that inter-organizational networks 
should not be overlooked when studying healthcare markets. That is, researchers, 
policymakers, anti-trust agencies, and healthcare organizations should not solely focus on 
structural characteristics of healthcare markets. Instead, networks of various cooperative 
inter-organizational relations are common in health care, serve strategic purposes, and are 
influenced by competitive policies at the national (i.e. macro) level. At the same time however, 
inter-organizational networks merely constitute an intermediary outcome between macro 
level policies and micro level outcomes. While pro-competitive policy reforms are enacted 
with the intent to stimulate healthcare providers to compete more fiercely, this ultimately 
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serves as a means to improving micro level outcomes such as costs, quality, and accessibility 
of healthcare services. Therefore, several avenues for future research emerge from this 
dissertation. First and foremost, research should be concerned with the interplay between 
inter-organizational networks at the meso level and health outcomes at the micro level. 
That is, in order to contribute to efficient healthcare delivery, it should seek to reveal which 
network structures produce favorable health outcomes. Secondly, a wide range of inter-
organizational relations have been identified in the healthcare industry, yet only some have 
been thoroughly studied empirically. Future research should thus not only focus on various 
forms of cooperative inter-organizational networks, it should predominantly seek to tests 
the antecedents and effects of various types of relations empirically. Thirdly, research should 
focus on understanding the interrelation and interdependence between various networks. 
For example, it is unclear whether organizations which share board members are also more 
likely to share professionals or patients, and vice-versa. Understanding these interactions 
facilitates a deeper understanding of how healthcare markets function in practice. Some 
types of inter-organizational relations could furthermore be preludes of or substitutes for 
mergers between healthcare organizations, which are typically considered the extreme end 
of the spectrum of inter-organizational relations (59, 60) and directly influence the structural 
characteristics of healthcare markets. Fourthly, the studies presented in this dissertation 
have predominantly been conducted in the specialized care (i.e. hospital care) sector. 
Although in monetary terms this is typically the largest part of the healthcare industry (5), 
studying inter-organizational cooperation is equally relevant in other healthcare domains 
and is arguably most relevant when studied across various domains of the healthcare 
industry. Future research should hence attempt to do both of these. 
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S
Summary
Although the Netherlands has introduced (price-)competition in its healthcare industry in 
an attempt to curb the trend of increasing health expenditure and optimize the quality of 
healthcare services, scientific evidence regarding the effect of competition in health care is 
mixed. This is, at least in part, due to the fact that empirical studies overlook cooperation 
between competing healthcare providers, while inter-organizational cooperation is a 
widespread phenomenon in the healthcare sector. Therefore, this dissertation aimed to 
study cooperative inter-organizational relations between healthcare organizations in a 
price-competitive healthcare market. Specifically it assessed the conceptualization of inter-
organizational relations, studied the structure, evolution, and formalization of various 
network ties, and investigated the influence of competition on the formation of such 
relations. The dissertation is split up into four parts. 
Chapter 2 constitutes Part I of the dissertation and describes the central notion and 
theoretical foundation of the dissertation. It establishes the role and relevance of cooperative 
inter-organizational relations in pro-competitive healthcare reforms. Based on a narrative 
literature review, Chapter 2 introduces a conceptual framework to guide the empirical 
investigation of competition in healthcare markets. In this framework, cooperative inter-
organizational relations are positioned alongside structural market characteristics at the 
meso level, which forms the intermediary between pro-competitive reforms at the macro 
level and outcomes at the micro level. Several testable propositions are derived from the 
framework. These pertain to i.) the relation between macro level policy reforms and meso 
level inter-organizational relations, ii.) the relation between market structure and inter-
organizational relations at the meso level, iii.) inter-organizational relations at the meso 
level and micro level outcomes, and iv.) the influence of micro level outcomes on macro 
level policy reforms. 
Part II of the dissertation is comprised of Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5. The focus of 
Chapter 3 is on networks of interlocking directorates (i.e. shared board members) between 
Dutch healthcare organizations. While they have been widely studied in various industries, 
interlocking directorates have attracted only limited academic attention in the healthcare 
industry. The quantitative study described in chapter is based on the annual reports of 
Dutch healthcare organizations in 2007 and 2012. The results indicate that approximately 
half of the healthcare organizations in the Netherlands are connected through direct 
interlocking directorates. These ties furthermore exist between organizations located 
in similar geographical regions and which provide similar types of services. Interlocking 
directorates have also become increasingly common over time, congruent with the increase 
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of price-competition. Additionally, half of all market entrants in the specialized care market 
are connected to incumbent hospitals through interlocking directorates or alternative 
affiliations of their board members. In line with existing research, the evidence presented 
in Chapter 3 indicates that interlocking directorates constitute a mechanism to reduce 
environmental uncertainty in the Dutch healthcare sector. However, the findings also raise 
traditional antitrust concerns of interlocking directorates. 
In Chapter 4, the phenomenon of shared professionals (i.e. medical specialists) is explored 
using a mixed-methods approach. Although sharing medical specialists is considered widely 
common in the healthcare industry and it has been explicitly mentioned as a potential anti-
competitive force, it has remained a relatively understudied form of inter-organizational 
cooperation in the healthcare industry. The quantitative findings of Chapter 4 indicate 
that all hospitals share medical specialists, that sharing medical specialists occurs in every 
medical specialty, and that sharing specialists has become increasingly common over time in 
approximately half of all specialties. The qualitative findings of Chapter 4 furthermore indicate 
that medical specialists can have various motives to be affiliated to multiple organizations. 
These include improving quality of care, facilitating sub-specialization, adhering to volume 
requirements, lowering the amount of night and weekend shifts, working with diverse 
teams, and financial benefits. Along similar lines, healthcare organizations will share medical 
specialists if it serves strategic purposes such as adhering to volume requirements, securing 
market share, monopolize markets, or deterring market entry. Given the formal decision-
making authority of hospital boards to share their specialists, sharing medical specialists is 
best considered a deliberate but emergent cooperative strategy of healthcare organizations.
Chapter 5 examines the structure of patient referral networks (i.e. shared patients) in Dutch 
oncological care, one of the most deadly and costly conditions in many countries. Using 
claims data of all Dutch health insurers, Chapter 5 tests how existing referral networks 
resemble structures which are considered favorable by several prominent stakeholders in 
Dutch oncology. It does this for three high-volume and three low-volume cancer types. The 
results indicate that although the referral networks are structured differently across tumor 
types, up to 42% of all cancer patients are referred to different organizations at least once 
during the course of their treatment. Up to 53% of the patients are furthermore referred back 
to their original organization at some point during their treatment. Organizations typically 
refer patients with common forms of cancer to various other organizations, while referring 
patients with less prevalent types of cancer to fewer organizations. Referral networks of 
prevalent cancer types are denser and more centralized than those of rare cancer types. 
Furthermore, the structure of observed referral networks varies considerably from their 
planned counterpart. As a result, organizations need to adapt their often routinized patient 
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referral patterns and integrated financing mechanisms could be a way to incentivize 
organizations to do so. 
Part III of the dissertation is formed by Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Chapter 6 studied cooperation 
and coopetition (i.e. simultaneous cooperation and competition) in the healthcare sector, 
using shared medical specialists as a proxy of inter-organizational cooperation. It aimed to 
understand the differences between these two inter-organizational strategies. The study 
shows that organizations share different medical specialists to their competitors than to 
their non-competitors. This indicates that cooperation and coopetition are two distinct 
strategies of healthcare providers. Cooperation mainly seems to manifest itself through 
spin-off formation, indicated by the fact that male specialists who have been affiliated to the 
organization for a longer period of time are typically shared by organizations which belong 
to a group of co-owned organizations. Conversely, coopetition is predominantly used by 
independent treatment centers, which are typically active in the price-competitive market 
segment. In coopetition, tenured specialists are mainly shared to organizations located in 
separate geographical markets. Specialists of academic hospitals are less likely to be shared 
and specialists with higher degrees of specialization and with more experience are neither 
more nor less likely to be shared. Consequently, the learning-effect, which is commonly 
perceived as one of the most important aims of cooperation and coopetition, might not 
be maximized leaving the benefits of these two strategies for patients unclear. However, 
coopetition does not seem to be an anti-competitive strategy.
Similar to Chapter 6, Chapter 7 also uses shared medical specialists as a proxy of collaboration 
between hospitals. While various motives to form cooperative inter-organizational relations 
have previously been studied, this chapter investigates the influence of price-competition 
on the formation of cooperative inter-organizational relations between hospitals over time. 
In line with the preceding chapters, the study described in Chapter 7 reveals that inter-
organizational cooperation between hospitals has become increasingly common over time. 
Large hospitals, hospitals with above average quality ratings, hospitals with a license to 
merge, and hospitals in close geographical proximity are particularly prone to cooperate. 
Furthermore, the greater the degree of price-competition in which a hospital is engaged, 
the more likely the hospital is to share its specialists to other hospitals. This indicates that 
price-competition in the healthcare industry fosters collaboration between healthcare 
providers. The effect of this behavior on consumer welfare is unclear. On the one hand, 
the fact that competing hospitals tend to cooperate more often and do so with hospitals in 
close geographical proximity could indicate anti-competitive behavior which could lead to 
reduced consumer welfare. Contrastingly however, the fact that high-quality hospitals are 
particularly prone to cooperate could increase consumer welfare by raising the quality of all 
providers in the market through inter-organizational knowledge transfer.
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Chapter 8 constitutes Part IV of the dissertation. It presents the main findings of the studies 
included in this dissertation. It furthermore discusses the theoretical contributions of the 
work, the methodological strengths and weaknesses, the implications for policymakers 
and practitioners, and several avenues for future research. Overall, the studies presented 
in the dissertation indicate that various forms of cooperative inter-organizational relations 
are common in the healthcare industry, have become increasingly common over time, and 
are formed according to various strategic motives. The dissertation thus demonstrates 
that analyzing (the evolution of) healthcare systems at the network level can generate 
useful insights. These can furthermore be generated with routinely collected insurance 
data. Lastly, although price-competition coexists with and can even stimulate cooperation 
between healthcare providers, cooperation and coopetition do entail two distinct strategies. 
Policymakers can hence interpret the findings of the dissertation as evidence that antitrust 
regimes should be more stringent or that the traditional competitive model does not apply 
to health care. 
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Samenvatting
In 2006 werd er, middels de introductie van de Zorgverzekeringswet (Zvw), prijsconcurrentie 
ingevoerd in het Nederlandse zorgstelsel. De voornaamste redenen hiertoe waren het 
afremmen van de toenemende zorgkosten en het verhogen van de kwaliteit van zorg. Het 
wetenschappelijk bewijs omtrent het effect van concurrentie in de gezondheidszorg is 
echter wisselend. Dit is deels te verklaren doordat empirisch onderzoek veelal methoden 
hanteert die geen rekening houden met samenwerkingsrelaties tussen verschillende 
zorgaanbieders, terwijl dergelijke relaties wijdverspreid zijn in het zorglandschap. Het 
doel van dit proefschrift was daarom om samenwerkingsrelaties tussen zorginstellingen te 
onderzoeken in een zorgmarkt waarin prijscompetitie van kracht is. Binnen het onderzoek 
dat in dit proefschrift beschreven is, werd eerst bepaald welke rol samenwerkingsrelaties 
vervullen in het zorgstelsel. Vervolgens werd de structuur, de evolutie en de formalisering 
van verschillende samenwerkingsrelaties tussen zorginstellingen onderzocht. Tot slot 
werd de invloed van concurrentie op het ontstaan van samenwerkingsrelaties tussen 
zorginstellingen getoetst. Het proefschrift bestaat in totaal uit vier delen. 
Hoofdstuk 2 beslaat het eerste deel van het proefschrift. Hierin is het theoretisch 
fundament van het proefschrift beschreven. Op basis van een narratieve literatuurstudie 
wordt in hoofdstuk 2 een conceptueel model geïntroduceerd. Dit model vormt een leidraad 
voor verder empirisch onderzoek naar het effect van (de introductie van) concurrentie in 
de zorgsector. Samenwerkingsrelaties tussen zorginstellingen worden in dit model, samen 
met marktstructuur, gezien als het mesoniveau. Samenwerkingsrelaties en marktstructuur 
vervullen een intermediërende rol tussen de invoering van concurrentie op beleidsniveau 
(i.e. macroniveau) en patiëntuitkomsten op microniveau. Het model is tevens voorzien van 
een aantal empirisch te testen proposities. Deze proposities beschrijven I.) de samenhang 
tussen beleidsveranderingen op macroniveau en samenwerkingsrelaties op het mesoniveau, 
II.) de samenhang tussen marktstructuur en samenwerkingsrelaties binnen het mesoniveau, 
III.) de samenhang tussen samenwerkingsrelaties op het mesoniveau en patiëntuitkomsten 
op het microniveau en IV.) de samenhang tussen patiëntuitkomsten op het microniveau en 
beleidsveranderingen op het macroniveau. 
Deel 2 van het proefschrift bestaat uit hoofdstuk 3, hoofdstuk 4 en hoofdstuk 5 waarin 
verschillende samenwerkingsrelaties tussen zorginstellingen zijn bestudeerd. In hoofdstuk 3 
ligt de focus op netwerken van zogenoemde ‘interlocking directorates’, oftewel bestuurlijke 
dubbelrollen in de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg. Dergelijke dubbelrollen ontstaan 
wanneer bestuurders of toezichthouders van zorginstellingen actief zijn als bestuurder en/
of toezichthouder in meerdere zorginstellingen tegelijk. Hoewel bestuurlijke dubbelrollen 
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in verschillende bedrijfstakken veelvuldig onderwerp van wetenschappelijk onderzoek zijn 
geweest, is dat in de zorg slechts in beperkte mate het geval. Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een 
kwantitatieve studie die gebaseerd is op de jaarverslagen die Nederlandse zorginstellingen 
in 2007 en 2012 hebben gedeponeerd. De uitkomsten van deze studie tonen aan dat 
ongeveer de helft van alle zorginstellingen in Nederland aan een of meerdere andere 
zorginstellingen gelinkt zijn middels bestuurders in dubbelrollen. Bovendien komt het voor 
dat bestuurders dubbelrollen hebben bij organisaties die in een vergelijkbare geografische 
markt actief zijn en die vergelijkbare diensten aanbieden. Parralel aan de toenemende mate 
van prijsconcurrentie kwamen bestuurlijke dubbelrollen in 2012 significant meer voor dan 
in 2007. Verder heeft de helft van alle toetreders tot de markt van medisch specialistische 
zorg een relatie met een bestaande instelling in diezelfde markt. Hetzij via bestuurders of 
toezichthouders die eenzelfde rol vervullen in een bestaande organisatie in de markt, hetzij 
door middel van bestuurders of toezichthouders die actief zijn als medisch specialist in een 
bestaande organisatie in de markt. Deze resultaten suggereren dat bestuurlijke dubbelrollen 
voor zorgorganisaties een manier kunnen zijn om grip te houden op de externe omgeving. 
Daarmee worden de bevindingen uit andere bedrijfstakken bevestigd. Net als in andere 
bedrijfstakken roepen ze echter ook mededingingsrechtelijke vragen op. 
In hoofdstuk 4 is door middel van een combinatie van kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve 
onderzoeksmethoden het fenomeen van zorgprofessionals (i.e. medisch specialisten) met 
een aanstelling in meerdere zorginstellingen geëxploreerd. Tentatief bewijs suggereert 
dat het delen van medisch specialisten tussen zorginstellingen veelvuldig voorkomt 
en het fenomeen wordt door sommigen auteurs in de literatuur gezien als mogelijk 
concurrentiebeperkend. Er bestaat echter nog geen wetenschappelijk bewijs waaruit blijkt 
hoe wijdverspreid het delen van medisch specialisten daadwerkelijk is, noch waaruit blijkt 
wat de motieven van specialisten zijn om in meerdere instellingen te werken of wat de 
motieven zijn van zorginstellingen om specialisten te delen. Het kwantitatieve deel van 
het onderzoek bewijst dat alle ziekenhuizen in Nederland medisch specialisten delen met 
één of meer andere ziekenhuizen, dat het fenomeen niet is voorbehouden aan specifieke 
specialismen en dat in ongeveer de helft van alle specialismen het delen van specialisten 
significant is toegenomen in de loop der jaren. Het kwalitatieve deel van het onderzoek wijst 
uit dat specialisten voornamelijk in meerdere instellingen willen werken om de kwaliteit van 
zorg te verbeteren, subspecialisatie mogelijk te maken, aan volumenormen te voldoen, het 
aantal nacht- en weekenddiensten te kunnen verdelen over meer collega’s, in verschillende 
teams te werken en om er financieel op vooruit te gaan. Vergelijkbaar met deze motieven 
is het voor zorginstellingen aantrekkelijk om specialisten te delen vanwege strategische 
overwegingen zoals het voldoen aan volumenormen, het veiligstellen van marktaandeel, 
het monopoliseren van markten, of het weren van toetreders tot de markt. Gezien de 
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formele beslissingsbevoegdheid van het ziekenhuisbestuur om specialisten wel of niet te 
delen met andere organisaties kan het delen van specialisten getypeerd worden als een 
spontane samenwerkingsstrategie (i.e. emergent strategy) van ziekenhuizen. 
Hoofdstuk 5 focust zich op patiëntenstromen tussen verschillende zorginstellingen. In de 
studie zijn patiëntenstromen van oncologische patiënten bestudeerd. In veel Westerse 
landen is kanker niet alleen een van de meest dodelijke- maar tevens een van de duurste 
aandoeningen. Op basis van declaratiegegevens van alle Nederlandse verzekeraars wordt 
in hoofdstuk 5 getoetst in welke mate verwijsnetwerken van oncologische patiënten in 3 
hoog-volume en 3 laag-volume tumorsoorten overeenkomen met het verwijsnetwerk dat 
verschillende stakeholders in de Nederlandse oncologiezorg als optimaal beschouwen. De 
resultaten van de studie wijzen uit dat patiëntverwijzingen in alle tumorsoorten voorkomen. 
In de tumorsoort waar patiëntverwijzingen het meest voorkomen, wordt 42% van de 
patiënten minimaal 1 keer verwezen naar een andere instelling. Ten hoogste 53% van deze 
patiënten wordt uiteindelijk terugverwezen naar de instelling die hen in eerste instantie 
verwees. Ziekenhuizen gebruiken meerdere verwijspartners (i.e. andere ziekenhuizen) voor 
patiënten met hoog-volume tumoren, terwijl zij voor patiënten met laag-volume tumoren 
over het algemeen slechts één verwijspartner hanteren. Verwijsnetwerken van hoog-
volume tumoren hebben een hogere dichtheid en zijn meer gecentraliseerd dan die van 
laag-volume tumoren. De structuren van de verwijsnetwerken van hoog- en laag-volume 
tumoren wijken af van de optimale structuur. Ziekenhuizen zullen hun verwijsroutines dus 
actief moeten aanpassen om aan de optimale structuur te voldoen. Integrale bekostiging 
zou hiertoe een incentive kunnen vormen. 
Deel 3 van dit proefschrift bestaat uit hoofdstuk 6 en hoofdstuk 7 en analyseert de 
invloed van concurrentie op samenwerkingsrelaties tussen zorginstellingen. In hoofdstuk 
6 is het verschil tussen samenwerking en coöpetitie (i.e. het gelijktijdig plaatsvinden van 
concurrentie en samenwerking) tussen organisaties onderzocht. In de studie is onderzocht 
of er verschillen bestaan tussen deze twee strategieën. Het delen van medisch specialisten, 
het fenomeen dat in hoofdstuk 4 werd geëxploreerd, dient in deze studie als indicatie van 
samenwerking tussen zorgorganisaties. De resultaten van deze kwantitatieve studie laten 
zien dat zorgorganisaties andere specialisten delen met directe concurrenten dan met 
organisaties die geen directe concurrent zijn. Coöpetitie en samenwerking vormen dus twee 
verschillende strategieën. Coöpetitie is een strategie die voornamelijk wordt toegepast 
door zelfstandige behandelcentra, organisaties die veelal zorg uit het prijs-competitieve 
B-segment aanbieden. In situaties van coöpetitie worden over het algemeen specialisten 
die in loondienst zijn gedeeld met organisaties die in een andere geografische markt 
actief zijn. Samenwerking komt voornamelijk tot uiting in de vorm van spin-offs. Dit blijkt 
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uit het feit dat specialisten die al lang aan een organisatie verbonden zijn vaker worden 
gedeeld en dat dit in het bijzonder wordt gedaan door organisaties die deel uitmaken van 
een groep waaronder meerdere zorgorganisaties vallen. De studie laat tevens zien dat 
mannelijke specialisten vaker gedeeld worden dan vrouwelijke en levert geen bewijs voor 
het leereffect. Specialisten met meer ervaring of met een doctoraat worden namelijk niet 
meer of minder gedeeld dan anderen en specialisten van universitaire centra worden zelfs 
minder vaak gedeeld dan specialisten van andere ziekenhuizen. Hoewel coöpetitie geen 
anti-competitieve strategie lijkt te zijn, blijven de effecten van deze strategie voor patiënten 
onduidelijk. 
Net als hoofdstuk 6 gebruikt ook hoofdstuk 7 gedeelde specialisten als een proxy voor 
samenwerking tussen ziekenhuizen. Hoewel de wetenschappelijke literatuur verschillende 
motieven van organisaties beschrijft om samenwerkingsrelaties aan te gaan, focust 
de studie die in hoofdstuk 7 beschreven staat zich op de invloed van prijsconcurrentie 
op het aangaan van dergelijke relaties. Evenals uit voorgaande hoofdstukken blijkt uit 
hoofdstuk 7 dat samenwerkingsrelaties tussen Nederlandse ziekenhuizen in toenemende 
mate voorkomen. Daarnaast blijkt uit de studie dat grote ziekenhuizen, ziekenhuizen 
die bovengemiddelde kwaliteitsscores hebben, ziekenhuizen met een goedgekeurd 
fusieverzoek, en ziekenhuizen die dicht bij elkaar liggen meer samenwerkingsrelaties 
hebben. De hoeveelheid prijsconcurrentie waarin een ziekenhuis verwikkeld is, beïnvloedt 
bovendien het aantal samenwerkingsrelaties dat het ziekenhuis heeft. Hoe hoger de mate 
van prijsconcurrentie, hoe meer samenwerkingsrelaties een ziekenhuis heeft. Concurrentie 
tussen ziekenhuizen lijkt daarmee vooral een stimulans voor ziekenhuizen om samen te 
werken. Het effect hiervan op de consumentenwelvaart (i.e. patiënten) is onduidelijk. 
Enerzijds kan het feit dat samenwerkingsrelaties zich vooral manifesteren bij ziekenhuizen 
die aan veel prijsconcurrentie onderhevig zijn en tussen ziekenhuizen die dicht bij elkaar 
liggen duiden op anti-competitief gedrag, wat een negatieve invloed zou kunnen hebben op 
de consumentenwelvaart. Anderzijds kan het feit dat samenwerkingsrelaties vooral worden 
aangegaan door ziekenhuizen die bovengemiddelde kwaliteitsbeoordelingen hebben een 
indicatie zijn van kennisdeling waardoor de kwaliteit van zorg gestimuleerd wordt, wat een 
positief effect kan hebben op de consumentenwelvaart. 
Hoofdstuk 8 beslaat het vierde en laatste deel van dit proefschrift. Hierin zijn de belangrijkste 
bevindingen van het proefschrift beschreven. Verder zijn de theoretische contributies van 
de studies, de methodologische sterktes en zwaktes en de implicaties voor de praktijk 
en beleid uitgelicht. De studies die in dit proefschrift beschreven staan, wijzen uit dat 
samenwerkingsrelaties tussen zorginstellingen verschillende verschijningsvormen kennen, 
wijdverspreid zijn, in toenemende mate toegepast worden en op basis van verschillende 
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strategische motieven worden aangegaan. Hiermee demonstreert dit proefschrift dat 
het bestuderen van netwerken tussen zorginstellingen een waardevolle manier is om (de 
evolutie binnen) de zorgsector te bestuderen. Verzekeraarsdata, die structureel verzameld 
worden door zorgverzekeraars, vormen in dit opzicht een belangrijke bron van data en 
informatie. Hoewel (prijs)concurrentie en samenwerking gelijktijdig kunnen bestaan tussen 
zorgorganisaties, vormen samenwerking en coöpetitie twee verschillende strategische 
keuzes. Beleidsmakers kunnen de bevindingen van dit proefschrift interpreteren als bewijs 
dat er in de zorgsector behoefte is aan strikter toezicht op mededingingsvraagstukken of als 
bewijs dat het competitieve model niet werkt in de zorg. 
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Valorization
‘Think before you act’ is a principle which is instilled within most individuals at an early 
age. It is typically reiterated shortly after an undertaking which lacked sufficient (or any) 
anticipatory thinking and serves as a warning for future endeavors. In essence, it endorses 
one to contemplate whether or not to act at all. As one advances through the various layers 
of the educational system, thinking becomes increasingly emphasized in spite of acting. 
Doctoral education, arguably the pinnacle of that educational system, consequently brings 
forth thinkers (intellectuals). Obliging these very thinkers to act after they have thought is 
quite the reverse of what has been instilled within them for many years and can thus be a 
daunting task. Nevertheless, it makes things come full circle. Hence, this chapter describes 
the practical relevance and implications of the research which has been presented in this 
dissertation. 
General relevance
In most developed countries, the healthcare sector constitutes the largest sector of the 
economy, outdoing commonly known sectors such as construction, broadcasting and 
telecommunication, or computer and electronic products (1). In 2015, the average OECD 
country spent 9% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health care for example, an 
increase of almost 2% compared to the average expenditure on health in OECD countries 
in 2000 (2). In other words, health expenditure is high and on the rise. Many countries 
feel the need to break the upward trend of health expenditure in order to keep healthcare 
accessible to future generations and have passed various reforms towards this aim (3). Not 
surprisingly, the field of health services research (or health systems research), which studies 
how health services are delivered and organized, has become increasingly well-established 
during the past two decades (4). In fact, given the sheer (economic) size of the healthcare 
industry and its relevance to people’s overall health and wellbeing, one could argue that 
health services research is one of the most vital areas of scientific research today. It is 
within that very context and with the aim to contribute to creating an efficient and well-
functioning healthcare system which will guarantee the access to health care services for 
future generations that this research has been undertaken. 
One of the crucial distinctions between health services research and biomedical or clinical 
research is the context-specific nature of health services research work (5). The Netherlands 
is no exception to the trend of high and increasing health expenditure. In 2015, the country 
spent almost 11% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on health care (roughly 72 billion 
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Euros), making it the largest spender on health with the exception of the United States (2, 
6). In the same year, the combined expenses on health and social care even approximated 
94 billion Euros, roughly 14% of the country’s GDP (6). However, the Dutch healthcare 
system is, as are the healthcare systems of nearly all countries, one of a kind. Like in many 
countries, healthcare and the healthcare system have furthermore been a matter of fierce 
public debate in the Netherlands. While the discussants typically agree that providing high 
quality and affordable healthcare to the entire population is an important goal, opinions 
about how to reach that goal at a macro level (i.e. how to organize the healthcare sector) 
can deviate substantially. The current way of organizing the healthcare sector in the 
Netherlands (i.e. through mechanisms of managed competition between providers and 
third-party payers) has been the focus of the studies presented in this dissertation. Through 
studying the way the healthcare system functions, this research seeks to contribute to a 
sustainable healthcare system. Its findings are hence relevant to all who concern themselves 
with healthcare in the Netherlands. 
Relevance for researchers
This research has three main points of relevance for scholars in the health services research 
and healthcare management field. First and foremost, the research presented in this 
dissertation advances the study (and understanding) of various types of inter-organizational 
relations which are present in the healthcare industry. They challenge healthcare 
management and health services research scholars to go beyond studying well-known and 
commonly studied types of inter-organizational relations like patient transfers or contractual 
alliances. This dissertation includes several papers which study forms of inter-organizational 
relations which had previously remained under-researched in the healthcare industry (e.g. 
shared medical specialists). These papers have been well-received in respectable outlets 
such as the Academy of Management conference, EGOS colloquium, and Social Science and 
Medicine journal. This serves as a testament to the notion that inter-organizational relations 
occupy a relevant space within the health services research and healthcare management 
fields. The studies in this dissertation advance scholars’ understanding of the healthcare 
sector and encourage them to investigate novel types of inter-organizational relations 
within the industry (i.e. at the meso-level). 
Secondly, four of the five empirical studies described in this dissertation utilize a network 
perspective. That is, they utilize an analysis of inter-organizational relations which transcend 
the traditional dyadic (i.e. between two organizations) approach. The fragmented nature 
of the healthcare industry is well recognized throughout the health services research and 
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healthcare management fields. As a result of this fragmentation, scholars agree that various 
organizations or organizational units typically collaborate with one another in order to 
deliver healthcare services to patients. Nevertheless, a large share of the scientific research 
still uses single organizations or dyads of two organizations as the unit of analysis. The 
studies in this dissertation have shown, albeit in some cases in a mere descriptive sense, 
that the whole network can be a useful level of analysis to understand certain phenomenon 
on an industry-wide scale. Researchers are thus stimulated to utilize networks as level of 
analysis in future studies within the industry. 
Thirdly, this dissertation contributes to the rich field of science concerned with studying 
the effects of (price-)competition in health care. Most importantly, it makes a case for 
incorporating various types of inter-organizational arrangements in these studies, rather 
than merely focusing on market structure as predictors of organizational performance. In 
essence, the argument is made that the combination of industrial organization paradigms and 
healthcare management principles can together foster a deeper and clearer understanding 
of the effects of competition in the healthcare industry. Combining these research fields 
in future studies should hence bring forth new insights within the sector and open several 
relevant avenues for scientific discovery. 
Relevance for policymakers
The past decade has seen an increasing emphasis on the use of scientific evidence in health 
policy (5). Ultimately, the managed competition is one of many different ways to organize 
a country’s healthcare system at the macro level. In practice, the choice to (continue to) 
let the healthcare system revolve around the principles of managed competition is hence 
one of policymakers. The studies presented in this dissertation reveal to policymakers one 
of the effects of their choice to utilize price-competition in the Dutch healthcare sector. 
At the very least, it demonstrates that even within a price-competitive regime, healthcare 
providers increasingly cooperate with one another in various ways. This could in fact 
challenge the assumptions underpinning the principle of managed competition. During 
the course of this dissertation trajectory, (preliminary versions of) these results have hence 
been disseminated to the Dutch Healthcare Authority and the Dutch Antitrust Authority, 
which concern themselves with adequate functioning of healthcare markets and antitrust 
issues in the healthcare market. On the other hand, the exploratory study of shared medical 
specialists reveals that competition is not the only factor driving cooperation between 
healthcare providers. Increasing medical specialization, minimal volume requirements and 
other purchasing strategies of health insurers, and increasing prevalence of comorbidities 
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are a few examples of factors which increase providers’ need to cooperate in order to be 
able to deliver (high quality) health care services. The research presented in this dissertation 
thus indicates to policymakers that various processes reinforce or counteract one another 
when it comes to the strategies employed by healthcare organizations. Such processes not 
only constitute top-down policy reforms but also include bottom-up phenomena stemming 
from professionals, healthcare organizations, third-party payers (such as insurers), and 
other stakeholders. 
Relevance for practitioners 
From a practical perspective, some of the empirical research presented in this dissertation 
perhaps constitutes a mere formalization of ongoing processes. That is, part of the 
empirical work regarding cooperation through shared board members or shared medical 
professionals is descriptive in nature and thus illustrates the occurrence of and changes 
in specific cooperative strategies. However, these studies all reveal the widespread nature 
of such cooperative strategies, indicating to managers of healthcare organizations that 
organizational boundaries are becoming increasingly blurred in the current healthcare 
landscape and that traditional, mono-organizational views to managing healthcare 
organizations likely seem outdated. Research nascent to the PhD trajectory has furthermore 
indicated that crossing organizational boundaries can have various effects on the 
employability of health professionals. Healthcare managers and health professionals alike 
can translate these insights into direct policy by closely considering how well professionals 
fit in other environments in order to maximize the benefit boundary spanning behavior by 
professionals. Particularly because previous research has indicated that physicians do not 
necessarily perform equal in different organizations (7) 
Building on findings which showed that hospitals can utilize vertical inter-organizational 
relations to serve strategic purposes (8), our research suggest that horizontal inter-
organizational relations could have similar effects. In order to fully comprehend the relation 
between horizontal inter-organizational relations and the performance of healthcare 
organizations however, further empirical research is warranted. A novel research project 
is therefore being initiated within the current Health Services Research department to 
investigate which types of inter-organizational relations contribute to positive patient (i.e. 
micro level) outcomes in which way. 
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V
Knowledge dissemination
The knowledge produced by the studies presented in this dissertation has been 
disseminated through various channels during the past several years. These include the 
common methods of scientific knowledge dissemination by way of numerous presentations 
during international scientific conferences and various publications in international peer-
reviewed scientific journals. However, there has been a strong emphasis on disseminating 
the knowledge generated by the work presented in this thesis in a more direct way to 
policymakers and practitioners rather than to just fellow academics. Such dissemination has 
been strongly encouraged through the Academic Collaborative Center for Sustainable Care, 
a joint initiative of Maastricht UMC+ and Maastricht University. The Academic Collaborative 
Center for Sustainable Care has funded this research and the practical impact of scientific 
research is one of its core driving philosophies. Examples of such direct knowledge 
dissemination include sharing published work through online communication channels, 
the creation of audiovisual material to support the research and distributing it through 
online outlets, publications in open source national and international journals about 
nascent fields and topics (e.g. competition in mental health care and vertical integration), 
presenting (preliminary) results to independent regulatory agencies in the Netherland 
such as the Dutch Healthcare Authority and the Dutch Antitrust Authority, incorporation 
of the research findings in teaching material for students in the master program Health 
Policy, Innovation and Management, and conducting consultation work for local healthcare 
providers and policymakers regarding the management and organization of health care. 
All of these activities have contributed to directly translating the insights gained from the 
research work conducted during the past years to practical knowledge relevant to a wide 
range of stakeholder. In future work, knowledge dissemination furthermore continues to 
be an important pillar. In fact, several new research projects have already been initiated 
in collaboration with independent regulatory agencies, local policy makers, and healthcare 
managers. These co-created projects not only ensure that the most practically relevant 
research questions are being addressed but also that the results of these studies are 
translated into direct actionable insights. 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 8
196
References
1. Gaynor M, Ho K, Town RJ. The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets. Journal of Economic 
Literature. 2015;53(2):235-84.
2. OECD. OECD Health Statistics 2016. 2016.
3. Cutler DM. Equality, efficiency, and market fundamentals: the dynamics of international medical-care 
reform. Journal of Economic Literature. 2002;40(3):881-906.
4. Fulop N. Studying the organisation and delivery of health services: research methods: Psychology 
Press; 2001.
5. WHO. Word Report on Health Policy and Systems Research Switzerland: World Health Organization, 
2017.
6. CBS. Zorguitgaven; aanbieders van zorg en financieringsbron. Den Haag / Heerlen, the Netherlands: 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; 2016.
7. Huckman RS, Pisano GP. The Firm Specificity of Individual Performance: Evidence from Cardiac 
Surgery. Management Science. 2006;52(4):473-88.
8. Douglas TJ, Ryman JA. Understanding competitive advantage in the general hospital industry: 
Evaluating strategic competencies. Strategic Management Journal. 2003;24(4):333-47.
List of publications 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 8
198
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
List of publications
199
P
List of publications
Scientific articles in international journals
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Jatautaité, E., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. (2016). Understanding 
Specialist Sharing: A mixed-method exploration in an increasingly price-competitive 
hospital market. Social Science & Medicine, 162, 133-142.
Westra, D., Wilbers, G., & Angeli, F. (2016). Stuck in the middle? A perspective on ongoing 
pro-competitive reforms in Dutch mental health care. Health Policy, 120 (4), 345-
349.
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. (2017). Understanding competition between 
healthcare providers. Introducing an intermediary inter-organizational perspective. 
Health Policy, 121 (1), 149-157.
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. (2017). Coopetition in health care: A multi-
level analysis of its individual and organizational determinants. Social Science & 
Medicine, 186, 43-51 
Westra, D., Wilbers, G., & Angeli, F. (2017). Response to the letter to the editor regarding: 
Stuck in the middle? A perspective on ongoing pro-competitive reforms in Dutch 
mental health care. Health Policy, 121 (1), 96-97.
Scientific articles in national journals
Westra, D., Kroese, M., Ruwaard, D. (2017). Substitutie van zorg: Wat weten we, wat moeten 
we weten en wat moeten we doen? Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde, 
2017: 161(9): 43-45.
Book chapters 
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. (2016). Bestuurlijke dubbelrollen: natuurlijke 
bestuursstructuur of doorn in het oog van de governance code? In: H. den Uijl en T. 
van Zonneveld, Zorg voor toezicht: de maatschappelijke betekenis van governance 
in de zorg, pp. 224-32. Amsterdam: Mediawerf, 2016.
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 8
200
Submitted articles
Latten, T., Westra, D., Angeli, F., Paulus, A., Struss, M., & Ruwaard, D. Healthcare Providers 
and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Going beyond the Gift - A Systematic Literature 
Review. Under review
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Kemp, R., Batterink, M., & Reitsma, J. The bigger the better? A mixed-
methods study of the effects of hospital mergers on quality of care. Submitted 
Westra, D., Tjan-Heijnen, V., Angeli, F., ten Hove, M., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. Studying 
patient referral networks in oncological care: A next step in centralization. Submitted
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. Exploring interlocking directorates in health 
care. Submitted
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. The evolution of cooperative inter-
organizational networks: The role of price-competition. Submitted
Full conference papers
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. (2015). Understanding specialist sharing: 
a mixed method exploration in a price competitive healthcare market. European 
Group for Organizational Studies, 31st colloquium 2015, Athens, Greece. 
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. (2016). Does Price Competition Drive 
Cooperation in Health Care? A Stochastic Actor Oriented Model Analysis. Academy 
of Management Annual Meeting 2016, Anaheim, USA.
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., & Ruwaard, D. (2016). Individual and Organizational 
Characteristics of Inter-Organizational Cooperation in Health Care. Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting 2016, Anaheim, USA.
Fleuren, B., Willems, W., van Hoof, S., Quanjel, T., Westra, D. (2017). Working at an inter-
organizational interface and sustainable employability: A qualitative study. 
Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2017, Atlanta, USA.
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
List of publications
201
P
Conference abstracts
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., Ruwaard, D. (2014). Price competitive policy reform 
and the influence on cooperative specialist networks. International Journal of 
Integrated Care 2014; Annual Conference Supplement
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., Ruwaard, D. (2014). The evolution of cooperative leadership 
networks in competitive healthcare markets. European Health Management 
Association annual conference 2014
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., Ruwaard, D. (2015). Understanding specialist sharing: a 
form of horizontal cooperation stimulating integrated care or an antitrust risk for 
competitive healthcare markets?. International Journal of Integrated Care 2015; 
Annual Conference Supplement
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Carree, M., Ruwaard, D. (2015). Evidence of specialist sharing: 
Implications for managing hospitals in a competitive market. European Health 
Management Association annual conference 2015
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Tjan-Heijnen, V., Carree, M., Ruwaard, D. (2015). Integrated health 
care delivery in Oncology using ‘Comprehensive Cancer Networks’. International 
Journal of Integrated Care 2015; Annual Conference Supplement
Westra, D., Angeli, F., Tjan-Heijnen, V., Carree, M., Ruwaard, D. (2015). Integrated health 
care delivery in Oncology using ‘Comprehensive Cancer Networks’. European 
Health Management Association annual conference 
Westra, D., Clemens, T., Brand, H., & Ruwaard, D. (2016). Quantifying cross-border care in 
the EU: an analysis of care utilization data in the Netherlands. European Health 
Management Association annual conference 2016
Westra, D., van Hoof, S., Willems, W., Quanjel, T., Fleuren, B., & Ruwaard, D. (2016). 
Perspectives on enabling integration of Primary and Secondary care. International 
Journal of Integrated Care 2016; Annual Conference Supplement
Latten, T., Westra, D., Angeli, F., Paulus, A., Struss, M., Ruwaard, D. (2017). Healthcare 
providers and the pharmaceutical industry: going beyond the gift. European Health 
Management Association annual conference 2017
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 8
202
Westra, D., Ranjbar, V., Oldenhof, L. (2017). Early Career Development Forum: A workshop. 
European Health Management Association annual conference 2017
Dankwoord 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Chapter 8
204
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Dankwoord
205
D
Dankwoord
Een wijs man begon zijn dankwoord ooit met ‘welkom beste lezer’. Hoewel er een soort 
geruststellende ontnuchtering van die opening uit gaat, koester ik ergens de stiekeme 
hoop dat dit dankwoord niet het eerste, noch het enige, hoofdstuk is dat mensen van 
dit proefschrift zullen lezen. De basis van die wens zit hem in het feit dat dit proefschrift 
het product is van een proces dat 4,5 jaar heeft geduurd. Die 4,5 jaar aan tijd en energie 
komen echter voornamelijk tot uiting in alle hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift behalve het 
dankwoord. Het proces, de groei en de ontwikkeling die ik tijdens de afgelopen 4,5 jaar heb 
doorgemaakt zijn meer dan de moeite waard geweest en dit dankwoord illustreert vooral 
dat ik dit proefschrift in geen enkel opzicht in mijn eentje heb geproduceerd. Hoewel het 
een bijna onmogelijke opgave is, probeer ik in dit dankwoord iedereen die op zijn of haar 
manier heeft bijgedragen aan de totstandkoming van het proefschrift de revue te laten 
passeren. De meeste van jullie weten echter wel hoe belangrijk jullie zijn geweest, dus lees 
vooral ook een ander deel van ‘ons’ werk. 
Laat ik beginnen bij het begin. Hoe toepasselijk, bij mijn eigen netwerk. Zonder jouw moeite 
en inzet Eric had ik dit traject namelijk wellicht nooit kunnen starten. Hoe groot of klein de 
moeite voor jou ook was, het heeft me op het spoor gezet van een baan (wellicht wel een 
hele carrière) waar ik iedere dag gigantisch veel voldoening uit haal en plezier aan beleef. 
Daarmee is het effect voor mij hoe dan ook groots. 
Dirk, Martin en Federica, jullie hebben de afgelopen jaren verreweg het meest bijgedragen 
aan de ontwikkeling die bij promoveren hoort. Mijn ontwikkeling. Het was een voorrecht 
om van jullie begeleiding gebruik te mogen maken en van jullie te kunnen leren. Ieder met 
eigen input, ieder met eigen expertise, ieder met een eigen kijk op dingen, maar bovenal 
ieder met een eigen stijl. Zonder jullie steun was het eindresultaat bij lange na niet geweest 
wat het nu is, dat is een ding wat zeker is. 
Dirk, terugkijkend op de afgelopen 4,5 jaar besef ik me eens te meer hoe cruciaal jouw rol 
is geweest tijdens dit traject. Dat geldt uiteraard voor je inhoudelijke kennis; je zat bovenop 
de details om te zorgen dat de kwaliteit van het werk hoog genoeg was, maar dat geldt nog 
veel meer voor je betrokkenheid en coachende rol. Wat een gok moet het bijvoorbeeld 
voor je zijn geweest om me überhaupt aan te nemen. Die beslissing is echter tekenend voor 
het vertrouwen dat je sinds die dag in me stelt. Je hebt me alle ruimte gegeven om mezelf 
te ontwikkelen en hebt me altijd gesteund wanneer het nodig was. Je stond meer dan 
open voor nieuwe ideeën, nieuwe richtingen en input van buitenaf. Je hebt mijn ambities 
daarnaast in alle opzichten gestimuleerd. Jouw vermogen om zowel interne als externe 
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mensen, projecten en ideeën met elkaar te verbinden is bewonderenswaardig en is van 
onschatbare waarde geweest voor mijn project. Niet in de laatste plaats omdat zonder die 
eigenschap de academische werkplaats, en daarmee ook mijn project, waarschijnlijk nooit 
het levenslicht zou hebben gezien. Ik ben trots dat ik de kans krijg om dat werk te blijven 
voortzetten en hoop daarbij nog lang van je te mogen blijven leren. 
Martin, een van de eerste dingen die je Sjors en mij duidelijk maakte toen we in 2010 voor 
het eerst in je kantoor zaten voor het schrijven van onze masterscriptie was dat de zorg een 
onbekende sector voor je was. Desondanks was je gedurende dit traject in staat om met 
slechts een aantal vragen de vinger direct op de zere plek te leggen. Na een overleg met 
jou vroegen mijn kamergenootjes steevast ‘En, moet het weer anders?’. ‘Anders, maar dat 
maakt het wel veel beter’, was dan altijd mijn antwoord. Je kritische blik is de afgelopen jaren 
van onschatbare waarde geweest. Je hebt het vermogen om een analyse of een compleet 
artikel rigoureus om te gooien terwijl het eigenlijk al zo goed als klaar was om in te dienen. 
‘Gewoon’ omdat er anders toch nog een paar vraagtekens blijven bestaan en dat moeten we 
niet hebben. Hoewel het op de momenten zelf misschien niet altijd even prettig was, heb ik 
veel van je geleerd tijdens dit traject. Die kritische houding staat voor mij symbool voor het 
zijn van wetenschapper. Ik hoop daarom dat ik die enigszins van je heb kunnen overnemen 
en dat die houding me nog vaak van dienst gaat zijn in de toekomst. 
Federica, I am not sure whether to write this in Dutch or in English. Luckily, neither French 
nor Italian are an option for me. You have been my go-to source of support during these 
past years, in whichever language. You would typically be the first person I’d talk to when 
I was stuck on something. I don’t recall ever ending such a conversation without having 
an adequate approach, a solution, or a completely new idea. In fact, it was your initial 
suggestions to ‘do something with networks’ which ultimately led to this dissertation. 
You have always encouraged me to pursue new ideas and new projects, and you were not 
afraid to try something new, both in teaching and in research. I hope that this curiosity is 
something I will continue to uphold for a long time to come. Your future (PhD) students in 
Tilburg can consider themselves lucky to have you. I won’t be able to conveniently drop 
into your office any longer but I am extremely happy for you in making a big step up in your 
career, you deserve it! I am looking forward to the ongoing collaboration and the many new 
ideas and joint projects which will undoubtedly follow. Uit het oog is niet per se uit het hart. 
Zonder de medewerking van iedereen binnen Vektis, in het bijzonder Niels, Michiel en het 
hele MSZ-team, was dit project gedoemd om te mislukken. Niet alleen omdat dit proefschrift 
grotendeels op jullie data is gebaseerd, maar vooral vanwege de input die jullie op het 
gebied van het gebruik van data, uitvoeren van analyses en interpretatie van de resultaten 
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hebben geleverd. Het is een stukje sturen van Maastricht naar Zeist en weer terug maar het 
was het dubbel en dwars waard en ik zou de keuze om met jullie te werken zonder enige 
vorm van twijfel weer maken. Sterker nog, ik hoop dat er nog vele gezamenlijke projecten 
volgen in de toekomst, in Zeist, Maastricht of ergens daar tussenin. 
Leuke, slimme, lieve, gezellige HSR collega’s en collega’s van de onderzoekslijnen RHC en 
VBHC; bedankt voor 4,5 super jaren! Ik heb een geweldige tijd gehad (en heb die nog steeds) 
op DUB 30. Of het nou in het juniorenoverleg, tijdens de lunch(walks), het dagje uit, of 
‘gewoon’ tijdens het werk was, ik heb me iedere dag enorm welkom en gewaardeerd gevoeld 
door jullie allemaal en het enorm naar mijn zin gehad. In het bijzonder dank aan iedereen 
van het secretariaat, met name Brigitte. Jullie vormen met recht het kloppend hart van onze 
afdeling! Dank ook aan alle collega’s binnen de Academische Werkplaats Duurzame Zorg, 
een onderzoeksprogramma waar we hopelijk nog lang van mogen genieten. De ‘Original Six 
Promovendi’: Sofie, Willemine, Bram, Eveline, en Maartje, maar ook alle later toegevoegde 
promovendi: Tessa, Esther en Gijs, ik kijk er nu al naar uit om lekker achterover te kunnen 
zitten bij de verdediging van jullie ongetwijfeld prachtige proefschriften. 
Geweldige kamergenootjes van 0.015, wat had ik zonder jullie moeten doen? Met 6 kids 
en een zevende onderweg was het in ieder geval een hele vruchtbare kamer (no pressure 
Mitchel en Ingrid). Maar veel belangrijker nog, het was met afstand de leukste kamer op 
DUB 30! Diepgaande discussies over willekeurige maar altijd heel belangrijke en meestal 
lichtelijk feministisch getinte onderwerpen met Willemine. Talloze tips en tricks over wat 
wel en niet te doen met pasgeboren en aanstaande kinderen van Linda. Samen met Sofie 
de leuke maar vooral ook de minder leuke kanten van promoveren meemaken. Ingrid als 
benjamin van het stel iets wijs proberen te maken (niet dat het ooit echt lukte). Als mannen 
onder elkaar lullen over Ajax (ik hoop overigens dat het me met de nieuwe FIFA beter zal 
vergaan dan de vorige) of over een van de vele series waarvan Mitchel volledige op de 
hoogte was (met wie moest ik nu het nieuwe seizoen Game of Thrones doornemen?). Met 
z’n alle room-escapen en gezellig een hapje eten. Nieuwe huizen zoeken, kopen, bekijken en 
bespreken. Wat het ook was het was super! Hoewel onze paden inmiddels wat uit elkaar zijn 
gelopen, kijk ik met heel veel plezier en lichte weemoed terug op de tijd in kamer 0.015. Ik 
had me geen betere kamergenootjes dan jullie kunnen wensen, punt.
Next door in 0.019 is het er echter zeker niet slechter op geworden. AOM buddy Maike, 
het voelt niet alsof we ‘maar’ 8 maanden een kantoor hebben gedeeld. We zaten min of 
meer in hetzelfde schuitje waardoor we over allerlei dingen konden sparren. We hebben 
in 0.019 niet alleen oneindig veel ideeën voor nieuwe projecten bedacht maar we hebben 
ook samen gereisd, veel aan elkaar gehad en enorm gelachen. Een mooie balans! Mijn 
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toekomstige kamergenootje krijgt er een hele kluif aan om je te vervangen. Geniet van je tijd 
in de VS, het is een geweldige kans en het gaat ongetwijfeld een prachtig avontuur worden. 
Het is je gigantisch gegund! 
Mannen! Ik heb niet de illusie dat ik in de speech-schrijf-capaciteiten van Jasper kan 
overtreffen of ook maar enigszins evenaren. Als ik ooit nog eens promoveer (ja je kunt echt 
meer dan 1 keer promoveren) dan zal ik Jasper als ghostwriter inschakelen. Deze keer waag 
ik toch echt zelf een poging. Giel, Lex, Rick, Jasper, Mischa, Timo, Dennis, Boy, we kennen 
elkaar al jaren en met jullie allemaal heb ik verschillende life-events, te gekke feestjes, 
legendarische weekendjes in Frankrijk (of Duitsland), geniale carnavalsedities, ontelbaar 
veel gezellige avonden, en nog veel meer memorabele dingen meegemaakt. We zijn samen 
opgegroeid, hebben samengewoond en zaten op dezelfde opleiding. Vriendinnen kwamen 
en gingen (bij sommige wat vaker dan bij andere), sommigen hebben zich gesetteld en 
anderen nog niet, maar aan de vriendschap die we hebben veranderde door de loop van 
tijd bijzonder weinig. Of jullie nu in Maastricht wonen, ergens boven de rivieren of aan de 
andere kant van de wereld, of jullie voor langere tijd op reis zijn of om de hoek wonen, 
wanneer we samen zijn of elkaar op een andere manier spreken is het binnen no-time weer 
zoals vroeger. Ik hoop van harte dat we nog oneindig veel gave dingen samen mee mogen 
maken, zoals vanouds. Jullie zijn geweldig!
Het is eigenlijk onmogelijk om aan een leek uit te leggen waarom de uitspraak ‘Brazialian Jiu 
Jitsu changes lives’ zo goed samenvat wat Brazialiaans Jiu Jitsu zo bijzonder maakt. Volgens 
mij heeft het te maken met de honderd procent focus op het hier en nu die de sport vereist 
en de onvoorstelbare ‘aliveness’ die dat met zich meebrengt. De sport vormt al bijna 10 jaar 
een centrale rol in mijn leven en heeft bijzondere vriendschappen voortgebracht. 4,5 jaar 
geleden was BJJ een van de belangrijkste redenen om te willen promoveren. De flexibiliteit 
die inherent is aan de baan als promovendus leek me de ideale mogelijkheid om naast (of 
tijdens) mijn werk zo veel mogelijk met de sport bezig te blijven. Naarmate het PhD traject 
echter intensiever werd vormde de sport steeds meer een rustpunt en een manier om alles 
los te laten. Even weg uit de hectiek en focussen op het hier en nu. Jordy, je hebt niet alleen 
een van de beste teams van het land gecreëerd maar je hebt ook een club opgebouwd 
waarin verschillende mensen op hun eigen manier van deze prachtige sport genieten. 
Chapeau! Ik ben blij dat ik daar samen met de mensen van het eerste uur zoals Wout, Stijn, 
Laura, Geert, Etienne en de mensen van de iets latere uurtjes zoals Stefan, Noël, Roel, 
Florent en nog vele andere een onderdeel van kan zijn. We hebben de halve wereld over 
gereisd, geweldige avonturen meegemaakt en vele successen gevierd. Maar na de ‘slap en 
bump’ doet iedereen op de mat nog steeds (of misschien juist nu) maximaal zijn best om me 
te laten kloppen. Vaak met succes. Er bestaan maar weinig dingen die mooier zijn dan dat. 
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
R8
R9
R10
R11
R12
R13
R14
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24
R25
R26
R27
R28
R29
R30
R31
R32
R33
R34
R35
R36
R37
R38
R39
Dankwoord
209
D
Lieve Giel, Mirte, Lex en Anne. Mijn dankwoord is niet compleet als er geen apart stukje 
over jullie, de Tripledate, in staat (hoewel Joëll en Sheila inmiddels toch hard bezig zijn om 
er een vaste Quardrupledate van te maken). Giel en Lex, we kennen elkaar al jaren. Jullie 
zijn de peetooms van mijn (aanstaande) kinderen. Wat ik hier ook aan mooie herinneringen 
zou opschrijven, het zou nooit 100% de lading dekken dus dat zal ik ook niet doen. Ik kan 
jullie met recht mijn beste vrienden noemen. Bedankt voor alles. Ik hou van jullie. Mirte en 
Anne, stiekem kennen wij elkaar ook al heel lang. Behalve een hele goede band met Romy 
en mij maken jullie die twee heren gelukkig. Dat is al een hele prestatie. Jullie zijn schatten 
en hopelijk hebben we nog heel veel mooie dingen in het verschiet samen. 
Ruud, Steef, Berdy en Joost, het is toch een beetje spannend als je vriendin je voor de eerste 
keer meeneemt naar ‘vrienden’ of ‘familie’. Vanaf het eerste moment dat ik bij jullie binnen 
kwam bleek die spanning echter nergens voor nodig. Jullie zijn in de afgelopen 5 jaar stuk 
voor stuk uitgegroeid tot goede vrienden en belangrijke personen in mijn leven en ik ben 
enorm trots dat jullie (Steef en Berdy) peettantes van onze kinderen zijn. Wat het ook is, van 
gezellige middagjes en avonden tot de geboorte van prachtige kinderen, de momenten met 
jullie zijn altijd bijzonder en bijzonder gezellig. 
Jean en Anita, jullie zijn de beste schoonouders die ik me kan wensen. Niet alleen omdat 
jullie Romy’s ouders zijn maar vooral omdat jullie me met open armen hebben ontvangen. 
Bij jullie voel ik me welkom, voel ik me thuis en voel ik me op mijn plek. Jullie staan altijd 
klaar om te helpen, met Lisa of op welke andere manier dan ook. Bij jullie kan ik altijd 
terecht om iets te bespreken of voor raad. Jullie zijn geweldige grootouders en net zo’n 
geweldige schoonouders. Jullie vervullen een belangrijke rol in mijn leven en ik hoop dat dat 
nog heel lang zo mag blijven. 
Familie Westra, Oma, Manon, Kri en Mick, of het nu een etentje, een feestje of iets anders 
is, er is altijd wel wat te doen in de familie. Zodra het nodig is zijn we bij elkaar en staan we 
voor elkaar klaar. Het is super om te weten dat jullie er zijn als het nodig is en me op wat 
voor manier dan ook steunen. Els, dankzij jou kwam ik ooit in de zorgsector terecht en je 
hebt vanaf toen nog ontelbaar veel geweldige dingen gedaan. Je bent eigenlijk net familie. 
Wout, broer(tje), trainingsmaatje en nu ook een van de paranimfen. Qua leeftijd ben je 
misschien het kleine broertje maar op veel gebieden ook niet, en dan bedoel ik niet alleen 
fysiek. In veel gevallen ben je juist ook een voorbeeld. Door jou kwam ik in aanraking 
met vechtsport en met het Braziliaans Jiu Jitsu, jij hebt een ongekende rust en kalmte, 
je hebt gigantische discipline en jouw toewijding aan de dingen waar je voor gaat is 
bewonderenswaardig. Dat zijn stuk voor stuk dingen die ik van je probeer te leren. Sinds een 
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aantal jaren is Nicole een van die belangrijke dingen in je leven en hebben jullie een eigen 
plekje gecreëerd. Ik weet zeker dat er in de toekomst nog vele dingen zullen zijn waarin jij, 
of jullie, een voorbeeld bent, of zijn! 
Pap, men zegt weleens dat ik sprekend op je lijk. Ik weet niet of dat altijd als een compliment 
bedoeld was, maar zo heb ik het wel opgevat. Zonder me te pushen of druk op me te leggen 
stimuleerde jij me toch om het beste uit mezelf te halen. Iets dat je heel knap hebt weten 
te balanceren. Je leerde me verantwoordelijk te zijn voor mijn eigen daden en dat vormt 
uiteindelijk de basis voor dit proefschrift. Bovenal ben je een voorbeeld dat ik ook graag 
voor mijn eigen kinderen zou zijn. Bedankt daarvoor, bedankt voor alles!
Mam, je had iets met boeken. Je las graag boeken. Je stimuleerde anderen om boeken 
te lezen. Boeken waren je werk. Boeken waren zelfs een tijdje ons werk. En je had zelf 
gewoonweg een hoop boeken. Misschien heb je wel onbewust het zaadje bij me geplant 
om een boek, dit boek, te schrijven. Misschien was je wel de enige die het van kaft tot kaft 
zou lezen. Hoe dan ook, je had het zeker aan je collectie toegevoegd. Ik wou dat dat kon. Ik 
wou dat je het eindresultaat kon zien. Zoals er wel meer dingen zijn waarvan ik wou dat je 
ze nog kon meemaken. Ik herinner me nog een moment vlak nadat ik aan dit traject begon. 
Je zei simpelweg; ‘ik ben trots op je’ en dat is uiteindelijk het enige dat telt. Mam, ik mis je!
Lieve Romy, lieve schat, om te zeggen dat de beste voor het laatst is bewaard is misschien 
een groot cliché maar het is o zo waar. Het promoveren zit erop en jij bent tijdens dit hele 
traject op alle gebieden mijn steun en toeverlaat geweest. Jij leerde me de afgelopen jaren 
op zaken (en vooral mezelf) reflecteren. Jij was mijn rots in de branding in zware tijden. 
Jij vierde de mooie momenten met me. Jij bood altijd en voor alles een luisterend oor. Jij 
was altijd in voor een goed gesprek. Ook voor jou moeten de afgelopen jaren soms zwaar 
zijn geweest maar ik had dit traject absoluut niet willen doorlopen zonder jou. Vele malen 
belangrijker dan de tijd die achter ons ligt vind ik echter de tijd die in de toekomst ligt. We 
hebben een geweldige dochter en krijgen er binnenkort een zoon bij. We zijn een gezin! 
Wie had dat gedacht toen we elkaar 16 jaar geleden voor het eerst leerden kennen? Ik kan 
onmogelijk omschrijven hoe erg ik me verheug op de tijd die nog komen gaat als gezin. Op 
samen onze kinderen zien opgroeien, op de ups en de downs, op de prachtige herinneringen, 
op de nieuwe uitdagingen en avonturen, op de mooie plekken en leuke mensen op ons pad, 
op alles zolang het maar samen is met jou. Met jou wil ik nog zo veel meemaken. Jij maakt 
me gelukkig. Ik hou ongelofelijk veel van je!
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Lisa en onze aanstaande zoon (je naam moest nog even geheim blijven van mama), jullie 
maken papa’s leven compleet. Het gevoel van papa zijn is het mooiste dat er is. Uiteindelijk 
zijn jullie waar het allemaal om draait. Ik zou voor geen goud ook maar iets van jullie willen 
missen. Alles wat ik doe staat in het teken van jullie. Ik hou van jullie, onvoorwaardelijk en 
voor altijd. 
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